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INTRODUCTION
In November^ 19^2, Henry Louis BeUmon, Noble county wheat farmer 
and former state chairman of the Republican party, became the first elected 
Republican governor in Oklahoma's history, and the primary focus of this 
work is to try to explain how Governor Bellmon came to occupy that office. 
But it was felt that a full understanding of this event required a 
rather detailed explanation of the Oklahoma political system within which 
it occurred and a recounting of numerous antecedent political, events that 
reach well back into Oklahoma history. For example, in predominantly 
Democratic Oklahoma a large number of switch votes by Democrats are re­
quired to bring about a Republican victory; it therefore seemed pertinent 
to inquire whether the extensive switch voting in I962 was a relatively 
new phenomenon in the state or whether certain factors present in I962 
operated to heighten an already existing predisposition to scratch the 
ballot. Hence this has become a study of Oklelioma politics to a large 
extent, rather than a study of a single election.
The approach to this study has been influenced strongly by the 
findings of the Survey Research Center of the Uhiversity of Michigan in 
its studies of presidential elections since 19^. These findings are 
set forth in two books. The Voter Decides emd The American Voter, and in 
an article in the June, I96]., issue of the American Political Science 
Review entitled "Stability emd Change in 196O: A Reinstating Election."
2The Research Center's approach to the study of elections has 
been to concentrate upon three variables: (l) the long-range factor
of political party allegiance, as reflected in the state as a whole in 
the partisan division of the vote over a relatively lengthy period, 
and the short-run factors of (2) campaign issues and (3) candidate 
personalities in a given election.^ When the long-term and short-term 
influences impel the individual voter toward the same political party, 
he makes his choice of candidate earlier, is more firm in his decision, 
eind is more likely to vote the straight ticket. When there is conflict 
between party preference and one or more of the short-term factors, this
leads to a more equivocal decision and to split-ticket voting or to
2
staying at home on election day.
Of the three variables, party allegiance was found to be the 
most important— so important that it was adjudged "the single most potent 
force in shaping voter attitudes toward political events and candidates. 
Party affiliation was found to be far more importauit them economic status, 
social milieu, or deep-seated temperament in determining voter attitudes. 
It is especisklly important because it is an antecedent factor that 
colors the formation of attitudes toward issues emd candidates.^ Most
^Angus Campbell emd Others, The Voter Decides (Evanston, 111.;
Row, Peterson, and Company, 195 )^, pp. 65-Ô7.
^Ibid.. pp. 161-162, 182-183.
^Angus Campbell and Others, The American Voter (Hew York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., I96O), p. 292.
^Ibid.. pp. 136-137.
3persons appear to evaluate political events In the light of their party 
allegiances: they tend to minimize the mistakes of their own party,
where these are not too serious or too close to home, and to magnify the 
mistakes of the opposing party. Party allegiance is important also be­
cause it is a highly durable factor that is not easily chimged; of the 
national sa^le of persons interviewed by Research Center workers, $6 
per cent were found never to have crossed party lines in their voting.^ 
Belonging to a political party is comparable to belonging to any social 
group, it was found; the ties are psychological, not legal, and the 
longer one belongs the greater his attachment becomes, generally
speaking.^ Only an event of "extraordinary intensity" can shake the
7
political loyalties of any significant number of the electorate, and
only two such events have occurred since the Reconstruction era: the
Panic of I893, the iiq>act of which was evidenced in the I896 election,
0
and the Great Depression, felt in the election of 1932. The Research 
Center found, in short: "The partisan division of the vote over any
period, as it may favor one party or the other, provides the point at 
which one must start to understand any specific election.
Knowledge of the total number of Democratic and Republican 
partisans in the electorate, adjusted for the usual rate of voter turn­
out for the two groups, produces the normally expected vote for a coming
^Ibid.. p. 1U8. ^Ibid.. pp. 88, 295-296, U97.
"^Ibid.. p. 151. ^Ibid.. p. 555.
^Phillip £. Converse and Others, "Stability and Change in 196O:
A Reinstating Election," The American Political Science Review, LT (June,
1961), 273-274.
4election. For example, the Research Center found that approximately 
60 per cent of the national electorate has expressed a preference for 
the Democratic party since 1952. But the realistic voting strength of 
that party was placed at 53 to 54 per cent in advance of the 1960 
election because voter turnout is low in the strongly Democratic South 
and because Democrats are somewhat less likely to vote than Republicans 
outside the S o u t h . S i n c e  voters do not always vote in accordance 
with their party preferences, the voting may be deflected from normal 
expectations in such a way as to give the majority party an even greater 
majority or to give victory to the minority party, depending upon the 
strength and direction of the short-term influences.
Even large-scale switch voting may not be indicative of v^ole- 
sale party realignments. For exanq>le, the Redearch Center found that 
General Eisenhower attracted several million votes from the Democratic 
party and from previously inactive voters "without effecting any sub­
stantial reorientation in their attitudes regarding the parties.
Neither does extensive switch voting necessarily indicate a wholesale 
rise in political neutrality; only 3 per cent of those who called
chemselves Independents in 1956 said they did not feel closer to one of
12the parties than the other.
Among the departures made by the Research Center from previous 
election studies is a de-emphasis upon the effort to predict political 
behavior from a classification of voters into sociological categories,
lOlbid., p. 274. ^^Campbell, The Voter Decides, p. 174.
19Campbell, The American Voter, p. 124.
5such as socio-economic level, religion, or place of residence.Such 
factors are regarded as important, but more as reinforcing rather than 
controlling influences in many elections. Social class vas not an 
important determinant of voter attitudes in 19^6, the Research Center 
found, as the Eisenhower appeal cut across all social classes; however, 
social c3æs3 does affect the degree of involvement in politics and say 
thus affect such factors as voter turnout in s(Mae elections
The influence of the Research Center's approach to the study of 
elections will be noted in the manner in which the material in this study 
is presented.
Part I will set forth general background information; a brief 
review of Oklahoma political history in Chapter I and an examination 
of Œclahana social and economic characteristics in Chapter II. Part II 
will deal with the more long-range influences upon the I962 election; 
the geographical bases of Democratic and Republican strength in (Rclahoma, 
the relative strength of the parties, the extent of switch voting, the 
record of voter turnout in the various sections of the state, and the 
dynamics of the Oklahoma political system. Part III will take up the 
short-term influences that had a bearing upon the I962 election as well 
as the election itself.
^3ibid., pp. 84-85, 292.
^^Ibid.. p. 304.
PART I
THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
OKIAEOMA POLITICS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
TEE ELECTION OF OKLAHOMA'S FIRST 
REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR
CHAPTER I 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF OKLAHOIA POLITICS
Oklahoma has been a predominantly one-party, Democratic state 
since statehood vas achieved in 1907» But Republican candidates have 
registered a series of impressive victories since 1952, vinning one 
gubernatorial and three presidential contests, and these raise 
important questions about the present and future status of Oklahoma 
politics. Slightly more than five hundred statewide officials were 
elected in Oklahoma from I90T through I960, excluding presidential 
electors and the few officials elected in special elections but in­
cluding occasional elections to fill unexpired terms. Republicans 
therefore have von approximately four per cent of the statewide elections. 
A listing of eill Republican victories in statewide contests from 1907 
throu^ i960 will give sane indication of that party's strength in Okla­
homa prior to the Bellmon election in I962.
Three-fourths of the Republican statewide victories came in the 
Republican landslide years of 1920 and 1928, when state candidates were 
carried into office on the coattails of Presidents Harding and Hoover.
8table 1.— The nimber of Republican statewide victories, 1907-I960
Year Offices Humber
1920 Presidential victory for Warren G. Barding 
Ihiited States senator— J.V. Harreld 
Corporation commissioner
Fbur Justices of the state supreme court 
Judge of the criminal court of appeals 8
1924 United States senator— W.B. Pine 1
1928 Presidential victory for Herbert Hoover 
Corporation commissioner 
Three Justices of the state supreme court 
Judge of the criminal court of appeals 6
1942 United States senator— E.H. Moore 1
1948 Justice of the state supreme court 
(unopposed) 1
1952 Presidential victory for Eisenhower 1
1956 Presidential victory for Eisenhower 1
i960 Presidential victory for Richard Nixon 1
20
The fact that Governor Bellmon was elected in I962 without benefit of 
presidential coattails increases the interest in his victory, for the 
only previous such successes occurred in the 1924 and 1942 senatorial 
races. And the fact that Bellmon*s victory followed a Democratic land­
slide victory in the gubernatorial contest in I958, when the Democratic 
candidate received 74.1 per cent of the total vote, adds additional 
interest.
It is believed that a relatively brief review of Oklahoma 
political history, with special ei^ phasis upon past Republican victories
9and the settings in which they occurred, can throw much light upon the 
recent series of Republican successes. To facilitate such a discussion, 
it has seemed convenient to divide the state's political history into 
five periods In which distinctive trends or common political factors ap­
pear to have been operative.
1. The period before statehood, 1889-1907- Nearly all the 
territory that is now Oklahoma was reserved primarily for the Indians 
of the Five Civilized Tribes and later the Plains Indians during nearly 
all the nineteenth century period of westward migration. Hence Qklahcsna 
had few white settlers and little political history prior to I889, the 
year in which six million acres of central Oklahoma land was opened to 
settlement by whites, or until I89O, the year in which Oklahoma Terri­
tory was organized under terms of the Organic Act signed by President 
Benjamin Harrison on May 2, I89O. Until achievement of statehood in 
1907f sK)st of what is now Oklahcma comprised two federal territories: 
Indisin Territory, which occupied much of what is now northeastern, east 
central, southeastern, and south central Oklahoma, aund Oklahoma Terri­
tory, which occupied most of the remainder of the present state. In 
1890 the two territories had a combined population of only 270,000. 
Indian Territory population totalled 197,000, or more than three-fifths 
of the total;^ the white population of Indian Territory was roughly 
equal to the Indian population in the mid-l880's but soon f&r out­
distanced it. 2 Oklahoma Territory's population in I89O was 7^,167,
^ïdwin C. IfcReynolds, Oklahos»: A History of the Sooner State
(Borman, Okla.; Uhiversity of Oklahoma Press, 195 )^, p. 414.
^James Ralph Scales, "Political History of Oklahoma, 1907-19*^9" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Department of History, Uhiversity of 
Oklahoma, 19*^9), p. 10.
10
which included 6l,000 new settlers and 13,167 "lalns Indians. By I9OC 
the combined population of the two territories was 790,000, and by I9IO 
the new state's population had risen to 1,657,155.
Because Oklahoma's voters cast rather heavy votes for Populist 
and Socialist candidates immediately before and after achievement of 
statehood, it is significant to note that the state was bom in a 
period of national and local economic distress. The economic crisis 
of 1887 precipitated a new cycle of agrarian protest in the nation; in 
1890, when crop prices began to fall drastically, various state 
alliances organized independent political parties called Peoples' 
parties as a means of expressing their protests. And times were 
especially hard in the frontier area of (klahoma. Oklahoma Territory 
had not been opened in time to permit a majority of the new settlers 
to pleuat crops in I889; there followed a very dry year in I89O, when 
crops failed wholly or in part; then followed two years of meager pro­
duction.^ When prosperity returned nationally in the late 1890's 
farmers generally lost interest in building a new party and the 
Populist party passed out of existence. But the Panic of I907 was to 
revive the interest of Oklahcmta farmers in third party movements and 
to bring with it a heavy vote for the Socialist party.
In addition to the heavy voting for third party candidates, the 
hard times that accompanied the birth of Oklahoma and the strong protest 
movements generated by these hard times are reflected in the many liberal
3pan Baker, "The Populist Party" (unpublished master's thesis. 
Department of Government, University of Oklahoaui, 1926), p. 56.
11
prorlslons of the Oklahoma constitution, which was drawn up at the state 
constitutional convention in I906. Para and labor delegates of the 
Oklahoma federation of Labor and of the farmers Union met at Shawnee to 
draw up twenty-six demands upon the delegates to the constitutional
convention, and most of these were incorporated subsequently into the
I4.
constitution. Among them were provisions for the initiative and 
referendum, the Australian ballot, the direct primary, protection of 
labor, and regulation of railroads and of public service corporations. 
Among the provisions favorable to labor were those prescribing an 
eight-hour day on public projects, the right of unlimited recovery of 
daioages in fatal accidents, compulsory education, no child labor in 
mines or factories, no irrevocable franchises, and popular election of 
the corporation cwnaissioners, conoaissioner of labor, and mine in­
spectors.
2. Another era of agrarian protest and a period of weak political 
party ties. 1907-1918. Charles H. Haskell, a Democrat, became the first 
elected governor of Oklahoma in the election of I907. He received 53.4 
per cent of the total vote, a margin of victory which was close to the 
54.9 per cent Democratic average for all the gubernatorial elections 
from 1907 through 1962.5 His Republican opponent, former Territorial 
Governor Frank FTsuitz, received 42.7 per cent of the total vote, which 
likewise compares favorably with the 41.4 per cent Republican average 
for the year* 1907-1962.
^Scales, op. cit., pp. 32, 41-43.
^Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, Oklahwna 
Votes. 1907-1962 (Homan, Okla., 1964), p. 21.
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Haskell and two subsequent governors, Robert Lee Williams and 
William H. (Alflalfla Bill) Murray, emerged as the triumvirate of early 
Democratic party leaders; Murray was president of the I906 state 
constitutional convention. In the very earliest period the Democrats 
were united as to these objectives: securing immediate statehood,
ousting the carpetbaggers, curbing the corporations, and putting the 
Negro in his "place.” Once these were achieved, cliques and factions 
began to develop.^
One useful index for measuring relative party strength is the 
number of party members elected to the state legislature. Table 2 gives 
these figures for the 1907-1918 period.?
TABLE 2.— Number of Democrats and Republicans elected to the state
legislature, I907-I918
Year House Senate
Demo­ Repub­ Socia­ Demo­ Repub­ Socia­
crats licans lists crats licans lists
1907 92 17 39 5
1908 68 hi 3h 10
1910 83 26 31 13
1912 81 18 36 8
1914 76 17 5 38 5 1
1916 85 26 38 5 1
1918 7^ 30 34 10
Republican gains in I908 perhaps are attributable not so much to
"Edward Everett Dale and James D. Morrison, Pioneer Judge ; The 
Life of Robert Lee Williams (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, I958),
pp. 204, 227.
?Figures compiled from the Directory and Manual of the State of 
Oklahoma pp. l4$-177; published by the State Election Board.
13
the party's resurgence as to the fact that its real strength was not 
properly registered in the 1907 election, for ratification of the state 
constitution was also on the 1907 ballot and the Democrats were more 
favorable to ratification as they had dominated the state constitutional 
convention. The Republican party scored no statewide victories in the 
1907-1918 period. However, Republican candidates captured three of the 
five seats in the lower house of Congress in 1907* two in four of the 
succeeding elections through 1918, and one in 1914.
The salient political feature of the 1907-1918 period is the 
large vote cast for Socialist candidates in Oklahoma, a vote which 
reached its peak in 1914 when Socialist gubernatorial candidate Ared W. 
Holt received 20.7 per cent of the total vote.
The Panic of 1907 was on during Oklahoma's first state election 
and times were again hard in the state. Oscar Ameringer, who came to 
Oklahoma in 1907 to tour the state on behalf of the Socialist party, 
wrote that the Oklahoma farmer's living standard in many cases was 
"so far below that of the sweatshop workers of the New York east side
Q
. . . that comparison could not be thought of. The time was ripe 
for another cycle of agrarian protest, given voice this time through 
the medium of the Socialist party. Table 3 shows the percentage of 
the vote received by the Democratic, Republican, and Socialist 
candidates for governor in this period.
®Oscar Ameringer, If You Don't Weaken; The Autobiography of 
Oscar Ameringer (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 194o), ^  233.
llt-
TABLE 3.— Percentages of the vote received by the Democratic, Republican, 
and Socialist candidates for governor, 1907-I918
Year Democrat Republican Socialist
1907 53-k 42.7 3.8
1910 48.5 40.2 9-9
191k 39.6 37.8 20.7
1918 53.5 42.6 3.8
Here vas a state that was 8O.7 per cent rural in 19IO and 73-k per cent 
rural in 1920^ casting the largest Socialist vote proportionately of any 
state in the nation.
In his history of Oklahosa, Victor Harlow wrote that Socialist 
strength in Oklahoma came chiefly frmm unorganized common laborers and 
an increasing number of tenant farmers.But much recent research 
indicates that farm owners also probably participated heavily in the 
Socialist movement as well as other radical movements. Seymour Lipset 
found in his study of Great Plains radicalism that the stereotype of 
the American farmer as a ruggedly individualistic conservative is a 
myth that has been perpetuated without foundation. V. 0. Key added 
that the growth of farm tenancy may be contributing to the death of 
agrariaui radicalism; "when an owner becoaes a tenant he loses his spunk
9u.S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the Dhited 
States 1 19^1 p. 8 .
^®Victor E. Harlow, Oklahoma; Its Origins and Development (rev. 
ed.; Oklahmna City: Barlow Publishing Corporation, 1955), P* 351-
^Seymour H. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Cmnmon-
vealth Federation in Saskatchewsin: A Study in Political Sociology
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. 7.
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12and his concern about ipubllc affaire."
The Bhiverelty of Michigan Survey Research Center added a nev 
dimension to the understanding of vhy rural Oklahoma should have been 
a center of political radicalism in the early part of the century.
The Center found that farmers generally are aumong those with the 
weakest ties to the political parties; hence little wrenching is re­
quired for many of them to leave the party with which they have been 
identified to vote for candidates of another peurty, especially when 
their pocketbooks have been affected.This was more so in the 
early part of the century than it is today, but even since 1)48 the 
farmers' vote outside the South was found to have fluctuated more 
widely then that of any other occupational grouping. The principal 
reason given for the farmers' weaüc peurty ties is that he lives and 
works remote from the flow of political events and he is less exposed 
to political information. This was more tnie before the days of 
automobile and radio, but as late as 1952 it was found that only 7 per 
cent of non-Southern farmers were contacted by a political party worker 
during that casqpaign. For the great mass of farmers, their voting turn­
out is more irregulaur and they ane more likely to split the ticket than
either city residents or rural non-farmers. But the farmers' ties to
the third parties were as weak as they were to the major parties; hence,
when the economic grievance was relieved, the third panty movement 
collapsed.
^V.O. Key, Southern Politics In State emd Nation (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 19*^9), P- 18$.
^^ Cauqpbell, The American Voter, chap. xv.
lé
Map I shows the location of the heaviest Socialist voting in
Oklahoma in the igi4 gubernatorial contest. The shaded counties are
those in which the Socialist vote was 24.8 per cent or more. Oklahoma's
Socialist voting does not accord fully with the Lipset thesis that the
wheat growing areas have been the predominant centers of radicalism in 
l4the Great Plains. Census reports show that the following eighteen 
counties were the largest wheat producers in 1920: Alfalfa, Beaver,
Blaine, Canadiaui, Custer, Garfield, Grant, Harper, Kay, Kingfisher,
Kiowa, Major, Noble, Texas, Tillman, Washita, Woods, and Woodward. Only 
four of these counties are among those in which a Socialist vote of 
approximately 25 per cent or more was cast. The Socialist vote in the 
wheat belt ranged from 6 .4 per cent in Kay county to 20.1 per cent in 
Woodward county. Nor did the heaviest Socialist voting occur in those 
areas where unorganized common laborers would be most numerous; it 
definitely occurred in the most rural areas rather tham the more populous 
ones. Instead, it appears to conform primarily with areas of lowest soil 
fertility and areas most subject to drouth, and hence to areas of low 
farm income. The soil is poorest in the eastern third of Oklahoma and 
the western third is most subject to drouth. 15 Writing of the dis­
satisfactions abroad in Oklahoma in this period, historisuis Edward 
Everett Dale and James D. Morrison wrote that crops had burned up in 
western (Bclahoma and that crops were poor in eastern Oklahoma; times
l^Lipset, op. cit., p. l8 .
15John J. Klein and Others, The Oklahoma Econoay (Stillwater,
Okla.: The Publishing and Printing Department, Oklahoma State Dhiversity,
1963), pp. 19-24.
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were hard, crop prices were low, and many farmers were burdened by 
large mortgages and high taxes. The historians concluded that many 
Oklahomans felt that the Democratic party had failed them, that perhaps 
the whole capitalistic system was at fault, and that only socialism 
could relieve their distress.
3. Period of Republican successes, 1920-1928• Republicans won 
two of the three presidential elections in this period, Warren 0. Harding 
in 1920 and Herbert Hoover in I928. J.W. Harreld became the first 
Republican United States senator from Oklahoma in 1920 when he defeated 
former United States Representative Scott Perris, and Republican W.B.
Pine carried all but seven of the state's seventy-seven counties in his 
smashing victory over former Governor J.C. (Jack) Walton in the I92U 
United States senate race. Walton had been recently impeached suad re­
moved from office.
The effect of national political events and issues upon Oklahoma 
politics is shown rather clearly in the elections of this period. Re­
publicans won three of Oklahoma's eight congressional seats in the Re­
publican landslide years of 1920 and I928 and two seats in the presi­
dential year of 1924; but in the off-years of 1922 and I926 only one 
Republican was elected to the lower house of Congress in each year. The 
effect of national events also was reflected in the state legislative 
races, as shown by Table 4.
^^Dale and Morrison, op. cit., pp. 206-20?.
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TABLE 4.— Humber of Democrats and Republicans serving in the state
legislature, 1920-1928
Year House Senate
Demo­ Repub­ Demo­ Repub­
crats licans crats licans
1920 37 55 27 17
1922 93 Ik 32 12
192!^ 80 27 38 6
1926 87 21 35 9
1928 57 kl 32 12
Republicans obtained an actual majority in the state house of repre­
sentatives in 1920 for the first and only time in Oklahoma history; 
the fact that only half the state senators vere up for reelection in 
that year undoubtedly preserved the Democratic majority in that body.
In 192^ Democratic presidential nominee John W. Davis carried Oklahoma 
over Calvin Coolidge, and Republican W.B. Pine’s smashing victory in the 
senate race vas not enough to carry any considerable number of Republican 
legislative candidates into office. Though the Hoover landslide of 1928 
did not give the Republicans a majority in the lower house. Republican 
legislators vere able to select a Democratic speaker who was unfriendly 
to the Henry S. Johnston gubernatorial administration with the aid of 
Democrats who opposed the governor, and Qoverhor Jbhnstohcsubsegdently was 
impeached and removed from office. ^7
Republicans had no success in these years with respect to the 
governorship or the great majority of secondary state offices, for 
elections of these officials are insulated from the effects of national 
politics by virtue of the fact that they are held in the off years.
l^Scales, op. cit., pp. 297-298.
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Democrats J.C. Walton and Henry S. Johnston von the two gubernatorial 
contests in this period, and by the customary Democratic majorities of 
$4 and $5 per cent. In 1920 and 1928, however. Republican candidates 
made a clean sweep of all the statewide offices that were voted iq>on.
The salient political developments of the 1920-1928 period were 
(l) the Republican -ictqpiee already mentioned and (2) the change in 
strategy on the part of Oklahoma's "radicals," who decided in 1921 to 
work for their aims through one of the major parties rather than through 
a third party. The remainder of this section will be devoted to these 
two topics.
In 1920 the short-run influences favorable to the Republican 
party in Oklahoma were a deep split in the Democratic party and the 
sentiment against the League of Nations in this era of post-war dis­
illusionment. Portents of a voter revolt agsinst the 1920 Democratic 
nominees began to accumulate at least two years in advance of the 
campaign. In 19I8 Democratic state leaders refused to invite United 
States Senator Thomas P. Gore to address the Democratic state con­
vention because Gore did not support President Wilson's recommendation 
for a declaration of war against Germany; this was one of the early 
developments that led to the Democratic party split. Gore, who was 
to be up for réélection in 1920, had been a senator since 1907; he had 
received 75 per cent of the vote in the 19lk Democratic primary and he 
had many loyal Oklahoma followers. Another portent of trouble ahead for 
the Democrats was the victory of Republican Harreld in a special election
Tfl
Cortez A.M. Ewing and Royden J. Dangerfield, "History of Qkla- 
hoi» Politics" (typewritten), pp. 729-737.
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In Hbvenber, I919, to elect a successor to fifth district Congressman 
Joe B. Thompson, vho had died; Barreld, an Oklahoma City attorney, be­
came the first Republican to be elected to the lover house of Congress 
Arom the fifth district, which Includes Oklahoma City. He was to oppose 
Gore In the I92O senate race. In addition, the 1920 Republican state 
platform contained this plank: "We are unalterably opposed to the
surrender to any International administrative body the political or 
national Independence of this country; . . .  we refuse to permit any
combination of nations In the world to dictate to this country what It
19shall or shall not do." It seems evident that this sentiment was 
popular In Oklahoma, as Indicated In 1920 when President Eardlng became 
the first Republlcem presidential nominee to ceurry the state.
The Democratic party split deepened during the I92O caq;>algn, 
when the Democratic state convention passed a resolution condemning 
Senator Gore In February, prior to the primary election. In the primary, 
Perris defeated Gore In one of the most bitter primary campaigns In the 
Democratic party's history. Disgruntled Gore supporters formed the 
Jeffersonian Club to aid the Republican nominee's cause and to oppose
pA
the League of Rations. The result was a landslide victory for all the 
Republican candidates for statewide offices In the November election.
Two years later. In the off-year election of 1922, Democratic 
nominee Walton was elected governor and the Democrats made a clean sweep 
of the contests Ar statewide office. Since the Democratic party split 
was still by no means healed, the election Illustrates the strong role
% l d .. p. 76^. ^°Ibld.. pp. 7^3-747.
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that national issues played in 1920.
It vas in 192I; in advance of the 1922 elections, that dis­
affected Oklahoma farmers and vorkers decided to work for their aims by 
capturing control of the Democratic party rather than through a third 
party. ïhrm discontent vas brought on by the fact that commodity prices 
began falling in 1920 and by the nation's deflationist policies following 
the loss of European markets in the post-var period.Oklah«na’s farm 
and labor leaders had become interested in the activities of the Hon- 
Partisan League in North Dakota, vhich championed such causes as state 
ovnership of grain elevators and of farm credit facilities— and vhich 
had decided to vork for its aims by capturing control of the Republican 
party in North Dakota.
The genesis Of the nev Oklahoma farm-labor movement vas the 
formation of the Farmers' Non-Partisan League in 1918; but members of 
this organization could not agree upon a gubernatorial noainee in that
po
year. In September, 1921, the Farmer and Labor Reconstruction League 
vas organized at Shavnee, and it vas here that the three hundred fifty 
delegates decided to call upon their followers to vote as a unit in the 
Democratic primaries to capture that party. In February, 1922, the 
Reconstruction League endorsed Walton for governor at another meeting 
in Shavnee and drev up a platform similar to that of the North Dakota 
Non-Partisan League. This platform, as such, vas voted dovn at the 
Democratic convention in August, but a number of its planks vere in­
incorporated in the Democratic platform on vhich Walton ran. The
^^Ibid., pp. 786-790. ^^Ibid.. p. 704.
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Republican platform called upon Oklahomans to "choose between our 
established system of government and s o c i a l i s m . A  Democratic Antl- 
Valton Club was formed In Oklahoma City, but It failed to attract the 
expected following and the bolt against Walton did not materialize.
Walton defeated the able Republican John Fields, agricultural scientist 
and farm editor, who had lost the l$l4 gubernatorial contest to Robert 
L. Williams by only ^,693 votes. Fields carried most of the urban areas, 
Walton the rural areas— a further Indication that the early "radical" 
sentiment In Oklahoma was centered In the rural areas.
In 192k Republlcem W.B. Pine, Okmulgee oilman, won the Dhlted 
States senate race to become the lone Republican winner In that presi­
dential year. His Democratic opponent was Walton, who had been Impeached 
and removed from office In 1923 and who was nominated In the I92U Demo­
cratic primary with only 36 per cent of the votes. Walton's activities 
as governor did much to prepare the way for the Republican victory. He 
precipitated a new Democratic party split by excoriating the Ku Klux Klan, 
which was at the height of its influence In I923, "In order to divert
pli
attention from the deficiencies of his administration." Very few of
his platform planks were enacted into law. His fight with the Klan led 
him to declare martial law and suspend the writ of habeas corpus. In 
part of Tulsa county In August, In all of Tulsa county September 1, and 
throughout the state September 1$. Less than a month later state legis­
lators drew up twenty-two Impeachment charges and Walton subsequently 
was removed from office.
^3ibld., pp. 829-839. ^^Scales, op. cit., pp. 227-25^.
2k
Going into the 192k campaign the Democratic party vas still rent 
from the Fterris-Qore feud in 1920, the split in feeling over Walton's 
1922 platform, a division of sentiment about the Ku Klux Klan, and from 
Walton's impeachment. The Pbrmer-labor Progressive League, successor to 
the Reconstruction League, turned against Walton and some prominent Demo­
crats resigned from the Democratic state executive committee because of 
his candidacy. Then, in late September, Walton was quoted as saying 
that 95 per cent of Protestant preachers vere "lower than skunks." A 
Clean Government League was organized to oppose him, and churchmen spoke 
against him at district meetings. Retiring Democratic Senator Robert L. 
Owen came out against him. Friends of former Senator Gore, vho was de­
feated again in the Democratic senatorial primary, formed an Anti-Walton 
Club. The result: Republican nominee Pine received 6l per cent of
the vote in his senatorial contest with Walton, carried all but seven of 
the state's counties, and joined Republican Senator Harreld in the United 
States senate to give predominantly Democratic Oklahoma two Republican 
senators for a two-year period.
In 1926 Democratic gubernatorial nominee Henry S. Johnston, vho 
had received only 36 per cent of the vote in the Democratic primary, was
given 55 p#r cent of the vote in the general election. No Republican
candidates von statewide office in this off-year election.
In 1928, another Republican landslide year, the issues were 
largely national. The national Democratic party nominated Alfred £.
Salth, a Catholic and an advocate of repeal of prohibition. This time
25Ewing and Dangerfield, op. cit., pp. 85^-856.
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Oklahoma churchmen took an even more active part in the campaign than 
they had in the 1924 Walton-Pine contest.The Rev. Mordecai Bam, 
pastor of First Baptist Church in Oklahoma City, invited Dr. John Roach 
Straton of Hev York to address four indignation meetings in Oklahoma.
Former Senator Oven announced that he could not support the Democratic 
presidential nominee because of Smith’s liquor policy and Tammany 
connections. The Anti-Smith Democrats announced that they had obtained 
the signatures of seventy-six thousand persons pledged to vote against 
A1 Smith. The Ku Klux Klan sought unsuccessfully to block the endorse­
ment of Smith at the Democratic state convention, and its members formed 
another opposition bloc. In overwhelmingly Protestant Oklahoma, the 
religious issue alone probably would have been sufficient to bring about 
Smith's defeat.
The result: Herbert Hoover received 64 per cent of the vote in
the presidential contest to register the most lopsided victory of emy 
Oklahoma presidential or gubernatorial candidate up to that time. His
I
victory carried all Republican candidates for statewide office to victory j
and increased Republican representation in the lower house of Congress
Arom one to three. I
Î
4. The Hew Deal and Fair Deal period, 1930-1930. In Oklahoma, 
still a predominantly Democratic state despite the Republican successes 
in the 1920's, the main effect of the New Deal-Fair Deal appears to have 
been to increase the average Democratic percentage of the total vote 
over the party's averages for the entire 1907-1962 period: by roughly
26ibid., p. 940.
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3 per cent In the gubernatorial elections and by 11.5 per cent in the 
presidential elections. Democratic candidates received an average of 
58 per cent of the vote in the five gubernatorial elections from 193O 
through 19^6; Democratic presidential nominees received an average of 
63 per cent in the five presidential elections from 1932 through 19^. 
Oklahoma vas represented by a full slate of Deaocratic congrssssen fron 
1932 until 1940 and a (pin in 19I48. Table 5 shows the number of Demo­
crats and Republicans elected to the state legislature in these years.
TABLE 5.— The number of Democrats and Republicans serving in the a ta te
legislature, 1930-19^8
Year House Senate
Demo­ Repub­ Demo­ Repub­
crats licans crats licans
1930 88 9 32 12
1932 112 5 39 5
193% 111 8 43 1
1936 114 3 44 0
1938 102 13 43 1
19k) 113 7 42 2
191^ 2 94 24 40 4
19W^ 98 22 38 6
19*^ 6 95 23 37 7
19W 104 11 39 5
The rising number of Republicans beginning in 19^2 seems to indicate 
that the Rev Deal had begun to lose some of its magic in Oklahoma with 
the return of prosperity; however, when there was fear of an economic 
downturn in 19^ the voters apparently turned again to "the party of the 
common man" and the "party of social reform," indicating the possibility 
that the so-called conservative trend in Oklahoma since World War II may 
not be too solidly based.
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Republican statevide candidates registered only two successes 
in this twenty-year period. Cecil Talmadge O'Real became an associate 
Justice of the state supreme court in 1$46 when his Democratic opponent, 
Fletcher Riley, was declared ineligible to run because he had filed for 
both the United States senate amd state supreme court contests. By the 
tisc the state supreme court ruled that Riley's filing for United States 
senator had cancelled his filing for state supreme court Justice, it was 
too late for the Democratic party to put up another candidate.
The other Republican success was Ed E. Moore's surprise defeat 
of incumbent Democratic Senator Josh Lee in 19^2, when Moore received
54.8 per cent of the vote. Moore, a seventy-one-year-old Tulsa oil 
millionaire, was substituted on the ballot by the Republican central 
committee after the original Republican naainee, W.B. Pine, died during 
the caapaign. Moore said during the campaign that he still was a regis­
tered Democrat but was an anti-New Dealer. He had Joined with Demo­
cratic Governor Leon C. Phillips in opposing the nomination of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt for a third term in 19^0 and had organized the Democrats 
for WiUkie organization in Oklahoma.
The short-term influences operative in 19*»-2 generally were 
favorable to the Republicans. The country had been at war only a short 
time and political interest was low. The war situation worsened in the 
summer and fall of 19^2, and the African offensive that brightened up 
the home front did not take place until a week after the election. 
Feeling against organized labor was rather strong, and newspapers were
^Tscales, op. cit., p. k2k.
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playing up the strikes in war plants. Moore and the newspapers hammered 
hard at the pensions for congressmen which the Democratic-controlled 
Congress had voted. Lee reportedly had neglected his correspondence with 
his constituents and was somewhat difficult for them to contact in Washing­
ton. And further, Lee remained in Washington until ten days before the
28general election and thus was able to conduct only a meager campaign.
A substantial decrease in voter turnout in the Democratic strong­
hold of Little Dixie in southeastern Oklahoma and an increase in turnout 
in strongly Republican Tulsa county was another factor in Senator Lee's 
defeat. Only slightly more than 370,000 voted in the senatorial election. 
But the vote increased by 21 per cent over the 193^ turnout in Tulsa 
county and decreased by as much as 42 per cent in the Little Dixie 
counties—42 per cent in Atoka county and 35 per cent in Choctaw county, 
for example. Lee's 1942 vote was 35 per cent below his 1936 total, and 
his general election vote was 22,000 votes below what he had received in 
the Democratic primary a few months earlier, indicating the possibility 
that many Democrats thought the Democratic ticket was a sure winner and 
did not go to the polls.
The other political events of the 1930-1950 period are stories 
of Democratic successes, though the increasing size of the Republican 
vote beginning in 1942 is noted in the presidential, gubernatorial, and 
senatorial contests as well as in the legislative races. William H. 
(Alfalfa Bill) Murray was elected governor in 1930 with 59 per cent of 
the vote, E.W. Marland in 1934 with 58.2 per cent, Leon C. Phillips in
^^Ibid., pp. 428-440.
29
1938 vith 70 per eent^ Robert S. Kerr in 19^2 with 51.8 per cent, emd 
Roy Turner in 1946 vlth $2.4 per cent. In the 1944 presidential contest 
Roosevelt's vote declined to $6 per cent front his high of 73 per cent 
In 1932. In the three senatorial contests from 1932 through 1938 the 
Democratic nominees won vlth an average percentage of 66.3 per cent; 
following the Republican senatorial victory in 1942, Democrat Elmer 
Thomas von In 1944 vlth 55.6 per cent of the vote. Ed Moore did not 
seek reelectlon to the senate when his term expired In 1948 and he vas 
succeeded by Democrat Robert S. Kerr, vho vent on to become hailed by 
some as the "uncrowned king of the senate" before he died on lev Year's 
Day, 1963.
Among the sources of disaffection with the national Democratic 
party In the 1940's and early 1950's vere theset In 1942 there vas con­
cern over the fact that the Allied war effort vas going badly; In 1946 
there vas resentment against continued price controls; In 1950 the dis­
affection reached Its peak with United States entry Into the highly un­
popular Korean war and with the ensuing aggravation of the nation's 
inflation.
5. Period of political uncertainty and of more Republican succes­
ses, 1950-1962. In 1950, In the first gubernatorial election of this 
period. Republican nominee Jo 0. Ferguson polled 48.6 per cent of the 
vote, the highest ever received by a Republican gubernatorial candidate 
up to that time. In 1952 Oklahomans cast 54.5 per cent of their votes 
for Elsenhower, and there followed further presidential victories In 
1956 emd i960 emd the Republlcems' firsL gubernatorial victory In 1962.
But the political signs of the period vere contradictory In
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many respecta, and that Is vhy the period has been labeled one of 
political uncertainty. Despite the Important Republican victories just 
enumerated, no Republican has been elected to a statevide office belov 
the level of governor or senator In a contested race since I928. At the 
local level, fever Republican county officials vere elected In 1958, 
i960, and 1962 than at any time in Oklahoma history except for 1932.^^ 
Participation in Republican primary elections vas lover In 1950-1962 
than in 1922-193 »^-; In 1962, vhen the first Republican governor vas 
elected, the Republican primary vote vas only 11.6 per cent that of the 
Democratic primary vote for governor.3® The Republican congressional 
delegation did not Increase In size In the 1950's: Republican repre­
sentatives served six terms from I9W through 1948 and the same number 
from 1950 through 1998. And Oklahomans still vere electing a pre­
ponderance of Democrats to the state legislature, as shovn by Table 6.
TABLE 6.— Number of Democrats and Republicans serving In the state
legislature, 1950-1962
House Senate
Demo­ Repub­ Demo­ Repub­
crats licans crats licans
1950 99 19 40 4
1952 , 101 22 38 6
1954 102 19 39 5
1956 101 20 40 4
1958 110 9 41 3
i960 107 14 40 4
1962 95 25 38 6
In short, by most Indices commonly used to measure relative party
^^See Table 28 In chap. Iv. 
See Table 26 In chap. Iv.
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strength, the Republican party in Oklahoma vas not shown to be improving 
its position with respect to the Democratic party to any appreciable 
degree. And yet the party scored victories in four major contests.
The reasons for the Republican successes appear to lie at least 
as much in what was going on outside Oklahoma, in national trends and 
developments, as in what was taking place within Oklahoma. Perhaps the 
two national developments most responsible for the change in political 
climate in Oklahoma and nationally, beginning about 19 0^, were these:
1) Frustration over the Korean war, "with its overtones of defeat and 
slight prospects of victory," and over the cold war in general.
2) The increasing tax burden, plus the spiral of inflation that was 
aggravated by the Korean war.3^
"Some change in political climate" did take place nationally be­
tween the time of the Truman victory in I9W and the Eisenhower victory 
in 1952, the Michigsux Survey Research Center found, emd the Research 
Center singled out the Korean war as perhaps the chief source of dis­
affection with the national Democratic administration throughout the 
early 1950's. The United States intervened in June, 1950, in the Korean 
war, probably the least understood war in American history. "If the 
personal appeal of Hr. Eisenhower is ignored for the moment," Research 
Center writers said in I96O, "we may say that a Democrat was kept out 
of the White House after 1952 as much by negative attitudes provoked
31Csjq»bell, The American Voter, pp. 10-11.
3^ Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (2d ed. rev.; 
Garden City, H.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), pp. 173-178.
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during the Korean action as by any other fbctor.33
Inflation vas equally important in contributing to the change 
in political climate beginning about 19$0, in the viev of Samuel Lubell. 
With fear of financial depression removed, Lubell vrote, the threat of 
inflation produced a changed attitude toward government aid. When de­
pression is feared, farmers and others look to the government for help 
and this brings a Democratic trend; vhen fears of inflation are upper­
most, resentment against government spending grows and this brings a 
Republican trend.3^ Lubell sees today's voting balance as hinging upon 
the shifting fears of these two threats, with some voters seeking a 
middle position by voting for a Republican president and Democratic 
congressmen to try to balance one party against the other. 35
Two sets of statistics alone appear to explain much about the 
change of political attitude that occurred in the 19W's and 19$0's.
With one set of figures V.0. Key points up the fact there vere not so 
many have-not families to support Rev Deal in 195% as there vere in 
1939; his figures compare the number of income units with annual incomes 
of $5,000 or more in 1939 with the number earning $5,000 or more in 195^1
1939 .......  2.3 per cent
195^........32.0 per cent
And Samuel Lubell points up the increasing tax burden being borne by
33campbell, The American Voter, p. 555*
3^^bell, op. cit., pp. 173-178-
35samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (Rev York; Harper & 
Brothers, 1956), p. II8.
3^V.0. Key, Politics. Parties. And Pressure Groups (4th ed.;
Rev York; Thomas Y. Crowell Ccmpany, 1958), pp. 276-277.
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these erstvhlle ohanplons of government spending programs with figures 
which cosqpare the percentage of the federal tax burden home by those 
with incomes of $5^000 or more in 1936 with the percentage being borne
VT
by the same income group in
1936.........5«0 per cent
1952........33.3 per cent
Hence there vere far more persons earning $$,000 a year or more by the
early 19$0's and their tax burden was much higher than it was in the
1930's.
Yet, in 1958, following a recession under Eisenhower in 1957, 
the Democrats registered a striking national victory in the congressional 
elections,38 which seems to support the Lubell thesis that many Americans 
are uncertain as to just how much governmental activity they want or need. 
The effort of voters to play one party against the other in their efforts 
to avoid both inflation and depression adds to the political uncertainty 
of the period.
In Oklahoma in the 19$0 's a bifurcation deveD.cped as between 
the voting for President on the one hand and that for governor and Qhited 
States senator on the other. The Republican vote for United States 
senator levelled off at about 44 per cent, with Republican candidates 
receiving 4$.l per cent of the vote in 1950, 43.6 per cent in 1954, 44.6  
per cent in 1956, and 44.6 per cent in 1960. In the gubernatorial contests. 
Republican candidates received 41.3 per cent of the vote in 195^ and 19>9
^^Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates, p. Il4.
^Converse, op. cit., p. 273*
3^
per cent In the Democratic landslide year of 1958, vhen Democratic 
nominee J. Howard Edmondson carried every county in the state.
But there vere three successive Republican presidential 
victories beginning in 1952, and it is difficult at this time to assess 
their isqportance with respect to their effect iqpon the future course of 
Qiriahc?a. politics. On tho one hand, they probably broke sany Oklahcnans 
of the habit of voting the straight Democratic ticket and they unquestion­
ably generated increased Republican party activity in the state; on the 
other hand, many voters did not look i^on war hero Eisenhower as a "real" 
Republican89 &nd the Hixon victory in I96O unquestionably resulted from 
an anti-Catholic vote.
The accession of lyndon Johnson to the presidency in Movember,
1963, following President Kennedy's assassination, gave promise of having
a strong impact upon Oklahoma politics. The nev President was well known
in Oklahoma; he had been invited to come to Oklahoma City in May, I963,
to address a Democratic fund-raising dinner and to try to heal a serious
Desmcratic party split. He was the presidential choice of the Oklahoma
delegation to the 1960 Democratic party national convention. Otis
Sullivant, long-time political writer for The Daily Oklahoman, made this
appraisal of the nev President's possible influence upon Oklahoma
politics four days after Johnson took office:^
President Johnson can't win the support of the great majority 
of state Democrats for the Kennedy civil rights program, but 
there will be less bitterness tovaird him than there was toward 
Kennedy. Johnson's liberalism also will not incite as much
^^Campbell, The Voter Decides, p. 64. 
^The Daily Oklahoman, November 26, 1963.
35
opposition among conservatives.
I4.I
About three weeks later Sullivant wrote:
The deep-seated opposition to the late President is out and, 
if economic conditions are good, [if] the nominee for vice 
president isn't too distasteful, and [if] the civil rights 
proposals are modified, Johnson is likely to return the state 
to the Democratic column for President by the normal Democratic 
majority of 100,000 or more.
Whether emy major voter realignment is taking place in Oklahoma will be
much clearer in eight or ten years than it was in 1964.
Brief Notes on the Oklahoma Political System 
The Oklahoma governor's term is four years, and he is prohibited 
from succeeding himself immediately. The governor has been the recognized 
leader of the Democratic party prior to I962, but the prohibition on his 
succession in office has prevented the development of durable factions. 
Very few Oklahoma governors have been successful in designating their 
successors.
Gubernatorial candidates eire self-nominated for the most part. 
There are no political bosses,combinations of interest groups, leaders 
of party factions, or unofficial party associations that regularly 
assume the task of recruiting and backing party candidates.
Since legislative leaders and members of the congressional 
delegation often are able to continue in office for many years, and 
since they have their own sources of patronage, their influence may be­
come highly iaq>ortant in the state's politics. The terms of state 
senators are four years sued those of state representatives two years.
^^Ibid., December 15, 1963*
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Legislative sessions are held biennially.
Because the Republican party elected no governor until I962 and 
has had relatively few other elected officials, power in that party was 
centered primarily in its national cwmitteemen until very recently.
CHAPTER II 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
Amoag the non-political factors that intrude into the political 
process are these: urbanization and its effect upon the state's urban-
rural equation; the income and occupational status of the voters as 
these may affect political attitudes; the number of foreign-bom, Negroes^ 
and Catholics, whose political views might be shaped by their minority 
group status; and the age groupings of the electorate.
Population, Population Movement, 
and Urbanization
OklGihoma's population has been relatively stable since 1920.
The greatest variation in state population since 1920 has been less than 
four hundred thousand, and Oklahoma's 196O population exceeded its 1920 
population by only three hundred thousand. Table 7 gives some of the more 
significsmt population data for Oklahoma, including the proportion of 
rural and urban population since I91O. Two columns are required for the 
urban-rural data because the Census Bureau changed its method of computing 
urban population after the 19^0 census. Uhder Method 1, in use up to I9W, 
only persons living in incorporated towns or cities of 2,$00 population 
or more were considered as urban residents. Under Method 2, beginning 
with the 19$0 census, persons living in the densely settled Aringes of 
urban centers were considered urban residents whether or not they lived
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in an incorporated town or city. Under Method 1, Oklahoma became pre­
dominantly urban early in the 1950*s; under Method 2, it became pre­
dominantly urban late in the 1 9 ^ 's.
TABLE 7 *— Oklahoma population data, 19IO-I960
Total Pet. Gain Voting Age^ Pet. Urban^ Pet. Urban
Population or Loss Population Method 1 Method 2
1910 1,657,155 421,000 19.3
1920 2,028,283 22.4 960,000 26.6
1930 2,396,040 18.1 1,277,000 34.3
1940 2,336,434 - 2.5 1,362,000 37.7
1950 2,233,351 - 4.4 1;376,000 49.6 51.0
i960 2,328,284 4.3 1,416,000 61.0 62.9
These figures show that Oklahoma reached its population peak in 1930, 
suffered a population loss during the dust bowl days of the 1930*s, then 
began gaining population again in the 1950's with the increasing in­
dustrialization that began during World War II. With increasing in­
dustrialization came increasing urbanization, and by 1950 Oklahoma ranked 
twenty-ninth in percentage of urban residents among the states of the 
nation. 8
Table 7 points up the recency of the urbemization movement in
Oklahoma, and this seems to call for caution in efforts to impute the
sEuae political iiiqpact to urbanization in Oklahoma as has been found in 
the older sections of the country. The United States as a whole was
45.8 per cent urban in I91O, when Oklahoma was 19*3 per cent urban; when
^1961 Statistical Abstract, p. 360.
^19^ Statistical Abstract, p. 8; 1961 Statistical Abstract, p. 22.
81953 Statistical Abstract, pp. 28-29.
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the nation becama predominantly urban in 1920,^ Oklahoma still vas only 
26.6 per eent urban. Manufacturing did not show a sharp increase in 
Oklahoma until about twenty years ago, 5 and the state has been pre­
dominantly urbem for only about fifteen years.
Over a longer span of time urbanization probably has greater 
potential for bringing about changes in traditional political party 
allegiances and for altering the partisan division of the vote in Okla­
homa than any other socio-economic factor except vide fluctuations in
income. V.O. Key wrote that urbanization "probably” will lead to "wider
!
shifts in partisan attachment than would have been expected of the rural 
electorate of an earlier day," but he added that this will not occur 
overnight.^ Much evidence has been presented that party allegiances are 
highly durable and generally are not subject to wide fluctuations in 
short periods of time.
Among the more significant facts with respect to industrialization 
and urbanization in Oklahoma, in addition to the recency of their develop­
ment, are these:
1) Recent Oklahoma population increases have been concentrated in a 
small number of cities or counties. Only eleven counties have shown 
population increases between 19kO and i960, and the really significant 
increases have been confined to the state's three standard metropolitan 
areas of Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Lawton. Hence, if urbanization has
^19*»0 Statistical Abstract, p. 8.
^KLein and Others, op. cit., p. 38.
^ey. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, pp. 274-275.
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bad any significant political Isqpact In Oklahoma^ Its principal effects 
should be noted in these three areas.
2) The largest population losses within Oklahoma between 1950 and I960 
occurred generally In the state's most rural counties. Twenty-three 
counties lost 20 per cent or more of their populations In this period. 
Since seventeen of these Eire strongly Democratic counties, the population 
movement factor appears to be operating In a manner unfavorable to the 
Democrats.
3) The Influx of residents from outside the state has been relatively 
small In recent years. And, despite the fact that much Is heard about 
the Influx of executive personnel from the northern cmd eastern sections 
of the nation Into Oklahoma City and Tulsa, more Immigrants Into those 
cities have come from the South than frost any other section.
4) Thoufpi some degree of correlation may be found between Increased 
Republican voting and heavier population concentrations In Oklahoma, the 
correlation Is by no means perfect. Moreover, It seems doubtful that 
there Is a cause-effect relationship between these two factors at this 
time. The traditional Republican areas of the state contain a larger 
number of the state's more populous counties, thus giving some seeming 
substance to the aforementioned correlation. The seeds of change may
be there, but the development seems too recent to have altered Oklahoma 
voting habits appreciably by I962.
The recency of Industrialization and urbanization In Oklahoma.—  
Prior to 1929 the manufacturing sector of Oklahoma's economy was 
relatively small, and as late as 1939 the state's manufacturing activity 
was centered largely Buround the products of Its agriculture and mining.
kl
Then, vlth World War II, came the aircraft industry and a sharp increase 
in manufacturing that continued to rise steadily until 19$6, vhen a 
levelling off occurred. During this period of industrial growth the 
production of metal products and of oil field tools and machinery in­
creased substantially. Among the smaller manufacturing firms, there 
uas a zarked increase in the aanufaeture of clothing products. The 
amount of industrial growth in this twenty-year period may be pictured 
from the fact that wage and proprietor's income from the manufacturing 
sector of the economy increased from $6$,000,000 in 1940 to $442,000,000 
in i960, whereas income frcm the farm sector increased from $153,000,000
to $327,000,000J
Location of Oklahoma population gains and the reasons therefor.—  
Bringing in of new industries and increases in personnel at federal 
military installations account for most of the population increases in 
the eleven counties that have shown population gains since 1940. Those 
eleven counties and the amounts of population gains of each are shown in 
Table 8 .
TABLE 8 .— The eleven counties that have shown population gains since 1940
and the amount of gain in each
Oklahoma 195,3t7 Cleveland 19,872 Stephens 6,900
Tulsa 152,675 Washington 11,748 Texas 4,260
Comanche ' 51,815 Oarfield 7,491 Kay 3,958
Jackson 7,028 Cimarron 842
Oklahosmi and Tulsa counties have registered the really significant 
population gains because most of the state's manufacturing activity is
Tglein and Others, op. cit., pp. 37-42, 83-94.
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centered there^ as attested by the fact that the tvo counties accounted
for $2.5 per cent of the value added by manufacturing for the entire state
o
In 1958. Kay county ranks third In this respect, but a rather distant 
third. Table 9 gives the value added by manufacturing In 195® for the 
state's six leading counties:^
TABLE 9*— The six Oklahoma counties where value added by manufacturing
vas largest
Tulsa $2k0,0kk,000 Garfield $26,521,000
Oklahana 140,253,000 Muskogee 22,315,000
Kay 53,169,000 Pottawatomie 19,982,000
Much of the population Increase In Comanche county Is attributable 
to an Increase In military personnel at Fort Sill army base, and In 
Jackson county to the Increased personnel brought In to develop the 
missile sites around Altus Air Force Base. Because of their high per­
centages of military or transient personnel, Comanche and Jackson counties 
were the only two counties In the state where less than 40 per cent of the 
eligible voters (persons over twenty-one years of age) cast ballots In the 
1962 gubernatorial election. The voter turnout In Comanche county was
25.9 per cent and that In Jackson county was 28.6 per cent.^^ Cleveland 
county Is the site of the University of Oklahoma, and some of Its recent 
growth Is attributable to the fact that university students recently have 
been Included In the census count of the county In which they attend 
school; some of the remainder Is owing to the county's proximity to the 
military and manufacturing establishments In adjacent Oklahoma county.
^Ibld.. p. 9k. ^Ibld., p. 88.
^^Unlverslty of Oklahwaa Bureau, op. clt., p. I06.
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For the state as a whole^ increases in births over deaths and 
increases in military personnel are the tvo principal reasons why Okla­
homa gained rather than lost population between 1950 and I960, according 
to a study made by Dr. James D. Tarver of Oklahoma State University. He 
found that only four counties, Oklahaui, Tulsa, Comanche, and Jackson, 
attracted more civilian migrants than they lost by emigration.
Location of Oklahoma population losses.— Of the twenty-three 
counties that lost 20 per cent or more of their populations between 
1950 and i960, twelve are 100 per cent rural farm or rural non-farm and 
all but two are more than 50 per cent rural farm or rural non-farm.
Hence they are predominantly agricultural counties with little or no 
manufacturing, and their young residents are leaving to seek job oppor­
tunities. These counties, and the percentages of population loss of 
each, are listed in Table 10.
TABLE 10.— Percentage population declines of the counties showing the
largest population losses
Haskell 31.5 Atoka 27.5 Major 24.0
Coal 31.2 Hughes 26.7 Choctaw 23.4
Dewey 31.2 Jefferson 26.3 Grant 22.2
Roger Mills 31.2 Ellis 25.5- Kiowa 21.7
Seminole 31.0 Greer 2k.k Cotton 21.1
Okfuskee 30.9 Pushmataha 24.3 Alfalfa - 21.1
McIntosh 30.6 Love 24.1 Latimer 20.1
Harmon 27.6 Pawnee 20.1
The exodus of young persons fraa. the rural areas and from the state.
^^James D. Tarver, County Population Trends in OklahMsa, 1950- 
1959 (Stillwater, Okla. : Experiment Station, Oklahma State Uhiversity,
Processed Series P-35I, May, i960), pp. 3, 9-13-
l^ censtts Bureau, Oklahoma Social and Economic Characteristics
(i960), pp. 1!H-142.
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coupled vlth a proportionate increase in numbers of the oyer>sixty-fire 
age group, has been recognized as one of the state's nain problems in 
recent political caaqpaigns. Asked to point out Oklahoma's biggest 
problem at the outset of the I962 general election campaign, Steve Stahl, 
executive vice president of the Oklahoma Public Expenditures Council, a 
private organisation that serves as a vatchdog of state expenditures, 
vrote:^3
We believe Oklahoma's biggest problem can be best expressed in 
a headline which would read; Oklahoma Loses 178,000 Workers.
That is the number of wealth-producing, tax-paying citizens 
between the ages of 20 and 44 Oklahoma lost frms 1930 to 196O, 
according to U.S. Census reports.
Our loss in this age group from 1950 to 196O was 77>700, al­
though the state's total population showed a gain of 9^,933*
A continuation of this trend would be disastrous. It simply 
means that year after year the burden of caring for more aged 
people and educating more children will fall on fewer suid fewer 
shoulders.
Immigration from other states.— The influx of residents from other 
states in recent years does not appear to be large enough to alter ap­
preciably the political complexion of the localities in which they settle. 
Census data show that 27,411 persons living in the city of Tulsa in i960 
were living in a different state or abroad in 1955; the number of such 
Oklahoma City residents was only 2,189.^^ Of the Tulsa immigrants,
10,187 came from the South; 9;390 came from the north central states;
4,909 frcm the West; 1,582 from abroad; and 1,335 from the Northeast.
Of the Oklahoma City immigrants, 916 came from the South; 462 from the
^^Sapulpa Daily Herald. August I6, 1962.
^Sj. S., Bureau of the Census, Oklahoma: Detailed Population
Characteristicst I96O, pp. 281-282.
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north central statesj 437 from, the West; 297 from abroad; and 77 from 
the Northeast. Hence the Influx of out-of-state residents does not 
appear to be so' much from the dominantly Republican areas of the nation 
as Is often assumed. More Is heard about the executive personnel brought 
In by the large manufacturing firms, but they are outnumbered by the less 
heralded influx from neighboring southern states.
The influx of residents over a longer period of time also shows 
that a larger number have come to Oklahwsa from the South thsm from any 
other region. A total of 869,891 Oklahmna residents In i960 either were 
born In another state or their place of residence was not reported. Of 
these, 417,012 were b o m  In the South; 282,726 In the north central 
states; 59,874 In the West; 30,827 In the Northeast; 5,039 were bom 
abroad or at sea of native parents; 1,136 in the outlying possessions 
of the United States; 20,003 were foreign-born; and the place of birth 
of 73,274 was not reported.
The city and the suburb in Oklahoma.— Most new residents of 
Oklahoma's three standard metropolitan areas of Oklahoma City, Tulsa, 
and Lawton are settling in these cities rather thsui In the suburban 
areas around them, though there has been a fairly substantial growth 
around Oklahoma City and Lawton. The Oklahoma City metropolitan area 
c«q»rlses Oklahoma, Clevelemd, and Canadian counties; the Tulsa area In­
cludes Tulsa, Creek, and Osage counties; the Lawton area comprises Comanche 
county only. The relative growth of these principal cities and of the 
suburban areas around them Is shown by the data In Table 11.^ ^
^^Ibld., pp. 175-190.
^^1961 Statistical Abstract, pp. 14-19*
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TABLE 11.— Percentage increases in population of the central cities and 
suburbs of Oklahoma's three standard metropolitan areas, 1950-19^0
Metropolitsm
Area
Pet. Gain, 
Central City
Pet. Gain, 
Suburbs
Oklahoma City 33.2 25.9
Tulsa 43.2 8 .4
Lawton 77.5 42.6
Oklahoma's principal cities do not fit the classic pattern described as 
existing in the North, where the central city is overwhelmingly Demo­
cratic and the suburban areas around them overwhelmingly Republican. 
Rather, Oklahoma City and Tulsa appear to follow more the pattern found 
in the South, where the cities are potential sources of Republican 
growth. Among the points of similarity between Oklahoma's principal 
cities emd those of the South are these; (l) They have only moderately 
active labor union movements by comparison with those in many northern 
cities. In I962 there were approximately 18,000 to 19,000 union members 
in Oklahoma county and 21,000 in Tulsa county; the total union member­
ship in the state is about 75,000. ( 2) They have small numbers of 
foreign-born residents or ethnic minorities that might be expected to 
support liberal or Democratic causes. Oklahoma City had a foreign-born 
population of 1.1 per cent in i960, and only 3.4 per cent of its popu­
lation was born of foreign or mixed parentage; the comparable figures 
for Tulsa were 1 and 3.3 per cent.^® (3) Though there have been modest 
industrial gains in Oklahoma's two principal cities, they are not smoke-
Interview with Len Yarborough, vice president of the Oklahoma 
AFL-CIO, July 26, I962.
1Ô
Census Bureau, Oklahoma Social and Economic Characteristics;
, p. 139.
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blackened, slum-ridden metropolises where the more successful residents 
are pushing pell-mell into the suburbs and leaving the less successful 
behind in the cities. Hence there is not the political cleavage be­
tween city and suburb in Oklahoma that exists in some northern cities.
Does Republican voting increase as county populations increase 
in Oklahoma?— In a paper analyzing the 1$62 Oklahoma gubernatorial 
election, Dr. Harry Holloway of the IMiversity of Oklahoma wrote that 
he found a "neat linear correspondence of size of county and Republican 
vote" in all the gubernatorial and presidential elections since 1950.
After classifying the state's seventy-seven counties into five population 
categories, then commuting the average Republican percentage of the vote 
in the elections mentioned, he reported that the Republican percentage 
of the total vote increased as county populations increased in all but 
one category of counties. Only the middle (third) category of counties 
did not fit the pattern of a steadily higher Republican vote as the 
sizes of the counties increased. His findings were shown in the following 
table.
County Categories 
By Population
Average Républicain 
Percentage of Vote^  
Gubernatorial
Republican
Percentage,
Presidential
1. 100,000 or more population 
two counties
50.000- 99,999 
four counties
25.000— 49,999 
nineteen counties
4. 10,000— 2k, 999
thirty-two counties 
Less than 10,000 
twenty counties
2.
3.
5.
61.5
58.8
49.4
55.4 
53.3
^%brry Holloway, "Oklahana Goes Republican: Emergence of a
Party or a Non-Party Vote?" (lijimeographed, I963), pp. 9-10.
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The question is vhether there is a cause-effect relationship between 
the tvo yariables of size of county and size of Republican vote, or 
whether the data constitute simply a description of the fact that the 
populations of the counties that normally return Republican majorities 
are generally larger than the populations of the counties that normally 
return Eeaocratic majorities.
An analysis of the past voting records of the individual 
counties that are included in the five population categories listed in 
the foregoing table appears to lead to the conclusion that no cause- 
effect relationship exists. Each of Oklahoma's counties was classified 
as Democratic or Republican on the basis of its past voting record, by 
a process that will be described in Chapter III. Table 12 shows the 
number of Democratic and Republican counties that are included in the 
last four population categories in the Holloway table; the ratio of 
Democratic to Republican counties in each category also is given.
TABLE 12.— The number of Democratic and Republican counties in each 
category of counties classified according to popuiatipn <
Democratic
Counties
Republican
Counties
ikmooratic to 
Republican ratio
2 . 50,000—  99,999
four counties 2 2 2 —  2 ;
3. 25,000.-49,999
nineteen 15 4 7.5 -  2 1
4. 10,000— 24,999
thirty-two 20 12 3.3 -  2 !
5. Less than 10,000
twenty 13 7 3.7 -  2
The data in Table 12 show that the largest ratio of Democratic counties 
to Republican counties is found in Category 3 of the Holloway table, 
the category in which the Republican vote is the smallest; the next
ks
highest Democratic ratio is found in Category where the Republican 
vote is next smallest. The most favorable Republican ratio is found 
in Category 2, where the Republican vote is second highest. Category 
1 in the Holloway table includes only tvo counties : Tulsa county, which
is strongly Republican, and Oklahoma county, where the voting has been 
very evenly divided in recent years; hence the Republican ratio is 
higher here than in Category 2. In other words, party allegiances, as 
demonstrated by the past voting records of the residents of the various 
counties, appears to be the critical factor in understanding the voting 
behavior in these counties.
Size of county population (urbanization) does not appear to be 
playing a critical role as yet in influencing the voting behavior of 
the residents of the various counties. Party allegiances appear to be 
holding quite firm in the more populous counties in the fhce of the 
increasing industrialization and urbanization of the last twenty years. 
Table 13 shows the Republican percentage of the total vote in Oklahoma's 
twelve most populous counties in all the gubernatorial contests since 
19^2. The counties are listed in order of size, with the largest county 
first. The last column gives the voting tradition of each county, with 
the strongly Democratic counties shown as St. Demo, The Democratic- 
oriented counties as Demo-or., the Strongly Republican counties as St. 
Rep., and the Republican-oriented counties as Repror.
50
TABLE 13.--Republican percentage of the total vote in the gubernatorial 
contests, 19^2-1962, in the most populous counties
County 19^2 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 Tradition
Oklahoma kk.e $0.0 $6.0 46.8 20.8 $8.2 Swing
Tulsa 62.7 66.6 6$.4 53.3 21.3 6$. 3 St. Rep.
Comanehe 32.0 32.1 36.4 27.3 7.8 42.0 St. Demo
Muskogee 42.6 39,3 44.3 32.1 13.4 4$.4 St. Demo
Garfield 68.5 66.9 64.7 63.0 27.6 71.8 St. Rep.
îfey 58.4 62.0 57.8 53.7 24.4 67.6 St. Rep.
Cleveland 38.7 40.7 $1.8 39.1 16.4 53.1 Demo-or.
Payne 52.7 50.7 52.3 46.9 23.8 60.0 Rep.-or.
Washington $6.8 61.6 62.8 57.5 2$.0 69.2 St. Rep.
Pottawatomie kk,k 43.9 42.9 35.4 14.1 $1.6 Demo-or.
Creek 54.7 53.7 $2.2 39.9 20.$ 53.2 Rep.-or.
Carter 23.9 22.2 29.4 23.2 8 .$ 42.3 St. Demo
The foreign-born.Oklahoma never has had a large foreign-born 
population; they totalled only 3-9 per cent of the total population in 
1900^ and nine-tenths of 1 per cent in I96O; second-generation foreign 
stock totalled only 3 per cent in 1960.®^ The political impact of the 
foreign stock population is slight not only because of their small 
numbers, but also because they are widely distributed throughout the 
state. Only three counties had more than 10 per cent foreign populations 
in 196O: Major, with I3.6 per cent; Ellis, 10.7; and Kingfisher, 10.
Most counties with foreign populations of 7 per cent or more are wheat 
belt counties in the north central and northwestern sections of the 
state. A number of Syriams and members of other nationality groups have 
played or are playing important roles in politics, but they perform these 
roles as individuals rather than as leaders of ethnic blocs.
^^1905 Statistical Abstract, pp. 4$-46.
21Census Bureau, Oklahoma Social cuid Economic Characteristics: 
i960, p. iki.
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The Negroes.— Negroes constituted 6 .6 per cent of Oklahoma's 
total population in 196O; and their number has been fairly constant
Op
throughout the state's history. They made up 8 .4 per cent of the 
population in l890> and that mark has not been exceeded since.
One fact that distinguishes Oklahoma political history from 
that of other southern and border states is that the only slavery that 
ever existed in the state vas on Indian plantations in Indian Territory. 
Hence there is no body of white descendants of former slave owners to 
constitute a political force in the state.
There is some feeling against Negroes among some residents of 
southern Oklahoma counties that have larger than average Negro popu­
lations. Among the counties with more than 20 per cent non-white 
populations are McCurtain, with 2$.k per cent; McIntosh, 2k.2; Choctaw, 
23.3; and Muskogee, 22.3. However, there was no Little Rock or 
Birmingham-type crisis in Oklahoma following the 195^ supreme court 
decision ordering school integration. Both Governors Johnston Murray 
and Raymond Gary handled the integration issue with skill and without 
ostentation. On April $, 1955, Oklahomans approved a legislative 
referendum to erase the constitutional provision calling for separate 
financing of Negro and white schools by a vote of 231,097 to 73,921.
By 1963 integration of schools bad been accomplished in all but portions
2kOf the southeastern section of the state.
22Census Bureau, Oklahoma General Population Characteristics:
i960, p. 31.
^^Allan A. Saxe, "The Early Development of State Policy on De­
segregation of Public Schools in Oklahasa" (unpublished master's thesis. 
Department of Government, University of Oklahoma, 1963).
2kJack Dodson, "The Extent and Pattern of Segregation in Oklahoma's 
Public Schools" (Mimeographed, 1963).
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Religious groups.--One f&ct alone demonstrates the important role 
that religious affiliation has played in Oklahoma politics: the Demo­
cratic percentage of the vote for President in Oklahoma has exceeded that 
for the nation as a whole in every election except the tvo in which 
Catholic nominees represented the Democratic party. Table l4 gives the 
Oklahoma and the national percentage of the Democratic vote for all the 
presidential elections.
TABLE Ik.— Democratic percentage of the total vote for President in 
Oklahoma compared with that of the nation, 1908-I960
Year National 
Per Cent
Oklahoma 
Per Cent
Year National 
Per Cent
Oklahoma 
Per Cent
1908 k3.17 k8.1 1936 62. k5 66.8
1912 kl.91 k6.9 19kO 5k. 98 57. k
1916 k9.k2 50.6 19kk 53.77 55.5
1920 3k. 3 kk.5 19k8 k9.8 62.7
192k 28.98 k8.k 1952 kk.67 k5.k
1928 kl.2k 35.k 1956 k2.25 kk.8
1932 59.14 73.2 i960 50.08 ko.9
Only in I928, when Alfred E. Smith was the Democratic nominee, and in 
i960, when John P. Kennedy headed the Democratic ticket, did Oklahoma 
fail to return a larger Democratic vote than the nation as a whole. 
Oklahoma is not only overwhelmingly Protestant, but it is also pre­
dominantly Southern Baptist, and anti-Catholic preachments are not un­
common.
Oklahoma is 91 k per cent Protestant, with 863,551 members of 
Protestant faiths as against 80,1]2 Roman Catholic parishioners and 
3,971 members of the Jewish faith. Slightly more than 70 per cent
^^Bureau of Research and Survey, National Council of the Churches 
of Christ in the USA, Churches and Church Membership in the United States: 
An Enumeration and Analysis by Counties, States, and Regions (3 vols.;
New York City: By the Council, 1956), I, Issue No. 2, Series A, Table 2.
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of the total ohurch membership of all faiths is Southern Baptist and 
Methodist, with Baptists outnumbering Methodists by about tvo to one. 
The percentage of membership of the leading faiths to total Oklahoma 
church membership is given in Table 1$.^^
TABLE 1$.— Percentage of membership of largest Oklahoma church de-
ntminations to total church membership in the state
Southern Baptist .........  46.2
Methodist.................. 23.9
Disciples of Chirst......... 11.5
Ronan Catholic............. 8.5
Presbyterian .............  4 .2
Assemblies of God............1.6
All Others................. 2.1
Baptists predominate in sixty of the state's seventy-seven counties, 
Methodists in thirteen, and Disciples of Christ in four.^ Methodists 
outnumber members of other faiths in these counties: Alfalfa, Blaine, 
Canadian, Cimarron, Custer, Ellis, Grant, Harper, Major, Novata, Texas, 
Woods, and Woodward; most of these counties are in the northwest section 
of the state, where Republicans also predominate. Disciples of Christ 
predominate in Dewey, Garfield, Kingfisher, and Noble counties. The 
Southern Baptists are especially predominant in the southern and north­
eastern sections of the state, where Democrats predominate.
Church leaders played prominent roles in the 1924 Qhited States 
senate race between J.C. Walton and W.B. Pine, as well as in the I928 
and i960 presidential contests. They also constituted the leadership 
of the United Drys organization which fought the repeal of prohibition
^^Ibid., III, Issue No. 7, Series B, Table 12.
^^Ibid., III, Issue No. 46, Series C, Table 102; and Issue No.
47, Series C, Table 103.
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in 1959* Southern Baptiste constituted a large segment of the following 
of "Baptist Bob" Kerr and of former Governor Gary, both prominent Baptist 
lay leaders.
The young and the aged.— Oklahoma's young men and women have been
declining in numbers in recent years, while its population of older
28residents has been growing, as shown by the following census data:
1930 19^ i960
Age 20-kk 890,633 8 6 8 ,^ 5 712,000
Over 65 96,888 144,229 249,000
As a voting bloc, at least the more vocal and politically active young 
persons in Oklahoma eure believed by many to be predominantly conservative 
and Republican. Several Republican leaders said more young persons were 
seen at Republican rallies than at Democratic rallies during the I962 
election cEunpaign, and several Democratic leaders expressed the view 
that more must be done to attract young people to the party. If the 
more politically active young persons appear to be predominantly Re­
publican, one possible explanation might be that there is more room for 
recognition and for active roles in the Republican party in Oklahoma be­
cause of the much smaller number of Republican registered voters. An 
article in the Daily Oklahoman put it this way:^^
Since the Democratic party has long ruled in Oklahoma, 
party workers emd state employees from precinct chairmen 
emd clerks on up are, for tho most part, long-time job 
holders.
p. 29.
281941 statistical Abstract, pp. 42-43; I96I Statistical Abstract, 
^^The Daily Oklahomem, Jemuary 20, I963.
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This doesn't leave much room at the bottom— or at the top 
— for members of the Young Democrats vho vant to participate 
actively in party work.
The concept of the "political generation" has been used by some to ex­
plain differences in voting behavior between younger and older people.3^
In the 1930's young voters were predominantly Democratic, it is said, 
because they shared the distress of the Great Depression; in the 1950’s 
they were more likely to be Republican because they shared the frustrations 
of the Korean war. The University of Michigan Survey Research Center found 
that the vote of the newly eligible electors "differed only negligibly 
from that of the nation as a whole" in the I960 presidential election.^
As to Oklahoma's aged, the number of residents over sixty-five 
years of age has grown to the point where Oklahoma ranked eleventh in the 
nation in i960 in the percentage of persons over sixty-five to the total 
population.The IMited States Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare has forecast that Oklahcma will rank seventh in this respect in
331970. Generally the counties with the largest amount of manufacturing 
and hence of Job opportunities, plus those with large military bases, 
have the smallest number of residents aged sixty-five or more.
Because the revenue from Oklahoma's 2 per cent sales tax is ear­
marked for welfare purposes, the state's more than 8$,000 old age assistance
^^Robert K. Carr, Marver H. Bernstein, and Walter F. Murphy,
American Democracy in Theory and Practice X^th ed. ; New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., I963), p. 269.
31Converse, op. cit., p. 2?2.
^Fajsily Life Institute, Extension Division, University of Okla­
homa, Aging in Oklahoma (October, I961), p. 5-
33ibid., July, 1962, p. 6.
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recipients have become an important voting bloc with a vested interest 
in maintaining the velfhre status quo. Undoubtedly they are predominantly 
Democratic.
Population differentials between eastern and western Oklahoma.—  
□imatic variations explain why western Oklahoma is primarily agrarian and 
sparsely populated, while eastern Oklahoma is more densely populated and 
industrialized. Western Oklahoma has the most productive soil, but rain­
fall is lightest and evaporation is heaviest there. Hence, in I95O that 
portion of Oklahoma "lying west of the thirty-inch annual mean pre­
cipitation line (k3 per cent of the state's land area) possessed only 
22.8 per cent of the state's population, I7.8 per cent of its urban 
population, and 17.5 per cent of its manufacturing employment, but ac­
counted for approximately 6l per cent of the state's cash farm income.
The area west of the thirty-inch annual mean precipitation line com­
prises those counties west of Kay, Noble, Logan, Oklahoma, Grady,
Stephens, and Jefferson counties, which lie roughly in the center of 
the state. Political ceunpaigning is heavier in the central and eastern 
sections of the state, where the heavier population concentrations are.
Map II shows the density of population per square mile for each of the 
counties in the state^^ and the location of the state's three standard 
metropolitan areas.
General Economic Characteristics
The three sectors of the economy which contributed most to
3^KLein and Others, op. cit., p. 17.
S., Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book; A 
Statistical Abstract Supplement; 1962, pp. 292, 302.
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Oklahoma's total personal Income in 1929  ^ in order, were: agriculture,
retail and wholesale trade, and mining (particularly oil and natural gas). 
In i960 the chief producers of personal income, in order, were: trade,
government, and manufacturing. The major changes in the Oklahoma economy, 
then, have been a shift in primacy from agriculture and mining to govern­
ment employment and manufacturing as sources of employment and producers 
of i ncome.The growth of retail and wholesale trade has tended to re­
flect the general well-being of the state's economy rather than being a 
determinant of it.
Expansion of federal civilian payrolls during the depression was 
the immediate cause of the increase in the relative importance of govern­
ment as a source of employment in Oklahoma. Federal, state, and local 
government payrolls have continued to expand since the 1930's, to the 
point where they contributed 23.8 per cent of the state's total Income 
in i 9 6 0 . The importsmce of federal installations to the state's 
economy can hardly be overestimated. Four members of the Oklahoma State 
University department of economics reported:^
The federal government [alone] employs almost as mamy people as 
the state's leading private business— the oil industry.
The largest single employer in Oklahoma is Oklahoma City Air Materiel
Area (Tinker Air Force Base), located in southeast Oklahoma City, which
employed 18, 529 persons from twenty-four counties in 196O; its payroll
in 1963 was $1^5,000,000 a year.39 The Veterans Administration regional
3^Klein and Others, op. cit., pp. 38-42, I08.
3'^Ibid.. p. 95. 38ibid.. p. 104.
3%he Daily Oklahoman. October 9> 19^3.
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office and hospital provides the largest payroll in Muskogee county, and
the various army and air force bases in the state provide the largest
payrolls in most counties where they are located. The importance of
these installations to the state's economy was pointed up by the following
editorial in the Oklahoma City Times:^
The map of population changes [in Oklahoma between 1950 and I96O]
. . .  is a sober reminder of how much Oklahoma's prosperity in 
recent years has depended upon military installations and defense 
contracts. With the possible exception of Washington county, auay 
[county] showing a census gain of 10 per cent or more either has 
a major defense installation or is right next door to one. In a 
state where sentiment is against centralization in Washington and 
federal spending in general, this situation should give pause.
In i960 there were 42,000 federal civilian employees in Oklahoma, 29,000
state government employees, and 60,000 local government employees.
The rise of the manufacturing sector of the state's economy, with 
its sharp increase at the beginning of World War II, was discussed earlier. 
In i960 manufacturing contributed I3.2 per cent of the state's civilian
lip
income and accounted for approximately 10 per cent of the labor force.
Though agriculture still constitutes a major sector of Oklahoma's 
economy, it dropped from first place as a contributor to personal income 
in 1929 to fifth place in I96OJ its contribution declined from 22.2 to 
9.7 per cent. ^3 Leading agricultural products, in order, are: cattle,
wheat, cotton, and dairy products. The leading wheat counties are in the 
north central and northwestern sections of the state, where Republicans 
predominate, and the leading cotton counties are in the southwestern
^Oklahoma City Times, May 8, 1963.
^^XLein and Others, op. cit., p. 104. ^^Ibid., pp. 83, 94.
^3ibid., p. 38.
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section, where Democrats are in the majority.
Mining provided employment for approximately 1^5,000 persons in 
i960, down from a peak of 53,000 in 1956.^^ The leading mineral pro­
ducts are oil and natural gns, which account for more than 93 per cent 
of the total value of minerals extracted. Though mining furnishes less 
than 8 per cent of the state's non-farm wage and salary employment, the 
industry is a large source of employment in particular counties, such as 
Washington, Seminole, Osage, Nowata, Garvin, and Carter.
Overall, the Oklahoma economy ranks roughly in the third quartile 
of states, according to selected economic Indices, as shown in Table I6, 
which gives Oklahoma's national rsmking as to each. 5^
TABLE 16.— Oklahoma's national ranking as to selected economic and
population characteristics
Total population  .........27
Per Capita Income.............. 37
Manufacturing:
Number of employees........... 3^
Value added by manufacture . . 32
Farming:
Cash receipts................ 10
Farm value per acre...........37
Trade;
Retail sales .  ............ 27
Wholesale sales .............. 26
If the top twelve states are regarded as constituting the first quartile, 
the next thirteen states the second, the next twelve the third, and the
^Ibid.. pp. 58, 62.
^^1961 Statistical Abstract.
6l
bottom thirteen states the fourth quartile, then the third quartile of 
states would be those that ranked from twenty-sixth through thirty- 
seventh according to the various indices. Oklahoma's economy thus is 
seen to rank below the national average, but not among the lowest one- 
fourth of all the states.
Per capita personal Income and median family income by counties.- 
Oklahoma per capita personal income in 196O was $1,8U8 , or 83.1 per cent 
that of the nation as a whole. In 19^1, just prior to World War II, it 
was only 6o.^ per cent that of the nation as a whole because of in­
dustrial underdevelopment. Then, with the industrial growth that came 
with the war, the state's personal income rose more rapidly than that of 
the nation from 19^2 until the end of the war. Since that time Oklahoma 
has increased its personal income relative to that of the nation, but at 
a lesser rate than during the war.^^ In I96O Oklahoma ranked thirty- 
seventh in the nation in this respect.
The state's highest income counties are scattered, while its 
areas of lowest income are relatively concentrated in southeastern Okla- 
home and along the eastern border. Map III shows the median family in­
comes of each county, classified according to whether the median income 
is from $1,900 to $3,000, from $3,000 to $5,000, or over $5,000.^^ They 
range from a low of $1,919 in Adair county to a high of $6,279 in 
Washington county.
Since there is relatively little industry in the areas of lowest
^^Klein and Others, op. cit., pp. 5-9«
^^Census Bureau, Oklahoma Social emd Economic Characteristics:
i960, pp. 142-143.
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income^ there Is a rather close correlation between low fhrm incomes and 
low median incomes there. Eastern Oklahoma has the highest rainfall, 
but the lowest soil fertility. In addition, average farm sizes are lowest 
in eastern Oklahoma; Adair county has the smallest average farm size,
137.6 acres. The fact that Roger Mills county is the lowest income 
county in western Oklahoma is explained in part by the fact that it has 
the lowest non-farm employment in the state; 62.2 per cent of its residents 
are employed in agriculture.
Location of the highest income counties is explained generally 
by the presence of industry, high soil fertility, larger average farm 
sizes, or deposits of oil and gas. Western Oklahoma has the lightest 
rainfall but the highest soil fertility in the state. The average farm 
size in Cimarron county is 2,001 acres.
The highest income counties.— Counties that have median family 
incomes of more than $5,000 a year are Tulsa and Washington, in north­
eastern Oklahoma; Kay, in north central; Cimarron, Harper, and Texas, in 
the northwest; Oklahoma and Cleveland, in central Oklahoma; and Stephens, 
in the south central or southwest. If the classification of highest 
income counties were begun at $4,500 instead of $5,000, they still would 
be rather widely scattered over the state, but a slightly stronger con­
centration of northern tier counties would emerge; Republicans predominate 
in the north central and northwestern sections of the state. The counties 
that would be added to the highest income classification would be Beaver, 
Canadian, Comanche, Garfield, Osage, and Woodward.
^KLein and Others, op. cit., p. 55-
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Two economic factors alone appear to go far toward explaining 
why the nine counties first mentioned have median family incomes of more 
than $5,000 a year: (l) the dollar average value of all farm products
sold per farm and (2) the number of manufacturing wage earners. Only 
Cleveland county does not appear among the top ten in one of these two 
respects, but this is explained by the fact that many Cleveland county 
residents work in Oklahoma county. Table 17 shows the ten leading 
Oklahoma counties in each of these two categories, with the counties 
ranked in order in the two listings.
TABLE 17.— Leading manufacturing and agricultural counties in Oklahoma
according to selected indices
Value of Pkrm Products Sold^^ 
Per Rarm in 1954
Number of
.I n n T " ? = » = = = = =
Manufacturing Wage 
Earners
1. Cimarron 6. Grant 1. Tulsa 6. Okmulgee
2. Texas 7. Woods 2. Oklahoma 7. Garfield
3. Alfalfa 8. Jackson 3. Kay 8. Ottawa
4. Tillman 9. Harmon 4. Muskogee 9. Stephens
5. Harper 10: Kingfisher 5- Pottawatomie 10. Washington
Of the nine highest income counties, four are strongly Republican and three 
are Republican-oriented in their voting; one is strongly Democratic emd 
one is Democratlc-orlented.
High income undoubtedly has played an important role as a factor 
that has reinforced the Republican proclivities or traditions of the 
residents of these high income counties. But it seems doubtful that the 
income factor can be called the determinative factor. For an examination 
of Map III shows that median family incaaes are between $3,000 and $5,000
49Ibid., p. 53.
^Qlbid., p. 88.
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In nearly all the counties of western Oklahoma; yet the northwestern 
counties are predominantly Republican and the southwestern counties 
are predominantly Democratic. There is some disparity in median in­
comes as between the northern and southern counties in western Oklahoma^ 
but the disparity is hardly wide enough to be determinative of the 
divergent voting traditions as between the northern and southern counties. 
Table 18 shows the median family incomes by counties of the northwestern 
Republican counties and of the southwestern Democratic counties.
TABLE 18.— Median family incomes in the Democratic and Republican
counties of western Oklahoma
Normally Republican Normally Democratic
Alfalfa # , W 6 Harper $5,113 Beckham $3,821 Jackson $4,120
Blaine 3,527 Kingfisher 4,053 Comanche 4,624 Kiowa 3,658
Ellis 4,164 Major 3,681 Cotton 3,130 Roger Mills 2,976
Garfield 4,893 Woods 4,413 Grady 3,095 Stephens 5,039
Grant 4,237 Woodward 4,8l4 Greer 3,358 Tillman 3,330
Harmon 3,693
Though Major county is regarded as the strongest Republican county in 
Oklahoma, its median income is lower than that of a majority of the Demo­
cratic counties. Major county is the only Oklahoma county that returned 
a Republican majority in the 193^ presidential election, it is one of 
only two counties in which Republican voter registrations outnumber 
Democratic registrations, and its 8O.3 per cent Republican majority in the 
1962 gubernatorial election was the highest in the state. Strongly 
Republican Kingfisher county is separated by one county from strongly 
Democratic Grady county, and the Kingfisher median family income is only 
$158 a year higher than the Grady county median income.
It appears that primacy must be given to party allegiances, or
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past voting traditions, as the determinant of the vote in most elections. 
Short-run economic and other factors may override party allegiances auad 
cause some heavy switch voting in some elections; this occurred in 19^8, 
when fear of an economic downturn apparently caused many residents of 
the northwestern counties to vote for Harry Truman. But, since 1907, 
residents of the northwestern counties have been quite constant in their 
Republican voting and those of the southwestern counties equally constant 
in their Democratic ways.
The low income counties.— Of the nineteen counties where median 
family incomes are less than $3,000 a year, eighteen are in southeastern 
Oklahoma or along the eastern border. The major activity in these counties 
is agriculture, along with lumbering in the eastern border counties. Soil 
fertility is low and average farm sizes are small. Table 19 lists the 
twenty-one counties where the average value of all farm products sold per 
farm in 195^ emd 1959 vas the lowest among the state's seventy-seven 
counties; the counties are ranked in order.51
TABLE 19.--Oklahoma counties where the value of all farm products sold
per farm in 195^ and 1959 was lowest
Rank County Rank County Rank Count}
57. Delaware 
5S. Pottawatomie 
59* McIntosh
60. Hughes
61. Pittsburg
62. Haskell
63. Carter
64. Lincoln
65. Atoka
66. Okfuskee
67. LeFlore
68. Adair
69. Okmulgee
70. Choctaw
71. Seminole
72. Sequoyah
73. Cherokee
74. Latimer
75. Creek
76. McCurtain 
77" Pushmataha
All but five of the counties with the lowest median family incomes are
5]-Ibid.. pp. 53-5 .^
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included in this listing. The seven higher income counties included in 
the listing of course benefit from such non-agricultural producers of 
income as industry and mining.
Ibturally there is a close parallel betveen the areas vhere 
incomes are lowest and those vhere public assistance rolls are highest.
There are frequent references to Oklahoma as "the number one 
welfare state in the United States" because it leads all other states in 
per capita expenditures for welfare purposes, and the cost of public 
assistance to the needy is a continuing issue in Oklahoma politics.
Map IV shows the counties with the largest number of public 
assistance recipients, with the counties classified according to those
in which public assistance is received by 20.2 per cent or more of the
52population, from 11.2 to 20.1 per cent, emd less than 11.2 per cent.^
It shows that more than 20 per cent of the population received as­
sistance in these four counties : Adair, Choctaw, McCurtain, and
Sequoyah. More than 11.2 per cent receive assistance in twenty-six 
other counties.
The scope of the Oklahoma welfare problem was set forth in the
first of a series of articles in the Tulsa World in 1963:^^
More than one of every I3 persons in Oklahoma receives state 
assistance. It takes about one of every three state tax 
dollars to support them.
All told their ranks last year averaged I8I,316 each month.
During the year the state spent more than $55 million on 
welfEure emd the federal government provided an additional 
$88 million.
%^)ulsa World, February 6, I963.
^^Ibid., January 27, 1963-
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The 181,316 Oklahomans who received welfare last year did not 
include an additional 126,235 people in the state who received 
some $100 in Social Security benefits and received no form of 
welfare assistance.
Thousands of other Oklahomans received unemployment compensation 
and did not receive welfare assistance . . . Last year welfare 
was Oklahoma's most costly program. Including state and federal 
matching funds, it devoured more than twice the amount spent on 
highways in the state, about twice as much as the common school 
program, almost three times as much as the higher education program 
and more than 12 times as much as the mental health program.
Moreover, the burdens and benefits are unevenly distributed. With federal 
matching funds included, Adair county received $19.81 in welfare payments 
for each dollar of sales taxes paid in I96I-I962, while Kingfisher county 
had a return of only thirty-two cents for each dollar. Though Oklahoma 
and Tulsa counties combined contributed per cent of the 1962 sales 
tax receipts, which are earmarked for welfare purposes, less than 6 per 
cent of their residents received public assistance.5^
Residents of the low income counties have acquired a vested inter­
est in the public assistance program, and because of their numbers they 
have become a voting bloc to be reckoned with. All but one of the thirty 
counties where the public assistance rolls are highest are predominantly 
Democratic, and the low income status of the residents of these counties 
undoubtedly reinforces their Democratic synq)athie8. However, it should 
be noted that Adair county, the heaviest welfare county in the state, is 
less consistently Democratic than Stephens county, one of the state's 
nine highest income counties.
^^Ibid., January 29, I963.
PART II
LONG-RANGE OKLAHOMA POLITICAL INFLUENCES
CHAPTER III 
GEOGRAPHICAL BASES OF PARTY STRENGTH
The geographical location of Democratic and Republican party 
strength in Oklahoma has been fairly stable throughout the state's 
history. Broadly, Republican strength has been centered in a northern 
tier of counties, tvo to three counties deep, that occupy roughly two- 
thirds of the northern tier of counties below the Kansas border; these 
counties extend westward from Washington and Tulsa counties. Democratic 
strength has been centered in the southern half of the state, two to 
five counties deep. No single element of physical geography adequately 
marks off the division between the northern tier of Republican counties 
and the southern tier of Democratic counties; the Democratic section of 
the state is sometimes designated loosely as being south of the Canadian 
River or south of the Rock Island Railroad, but this is not entirely 
accurate.
The strongly Republican counties, which are mostly in north 
central and northwestern Oklahoma, are separated from the strongly Demo­
cratic counties by a band of middle tier counties that may be designated 
as political swing counties. The location of the twenty-four swing 
counties is shown on Map V. They are designated as swing counties be­
cause the majority vote for presidential and gubernatorial candidates
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bas alternated more In these counties since 19^2 than in the remaining 
fifty-three counties. The swing counties extend from the northeast corner 
of Oklahoma roughly across the center of the statej they provide no 
separation between Republican Tulsa county and Democratic Okmulgee 
county or between Republican Ellis county and Democratic Roger Mills 
county. The three Panhandle counties of Beaver, Texas, and Cimarron are 
separated geographically ffom the remainder of the swing counties.
As would be expected from a situation in which party strength is 
split into north-south areas, in Oklahoma the Republican vote generally 
is higher near the Kansas border and becomes progressively smaller in 
the counties to the south; the Democratic vote is higher near the Texas 
border and becomes progressively smaller in the counties to the north.^ 
This has produced some virtually imperceptible shadings of relative 
party strength in the central portion of the state; for exaa^le, the 
average Democratic percentage of the vote in Oklahoma county in the 
last eleven presidential and gubernatorial elections has been 49.8 per 
cent. Map YI shows the Republican percentage of the total vote in each 
county in the 1962 gubernatorial election, as well as the counties 
carried by the winning Republican candidate. In addition to illus­
trating in a general way the previously discussed shadings of voting 
as one moves toward or away from the Kansas or Texas borders, the map 
also illustrates how teuq)orary local situations may deflect the vote 
Arom normal expectations; strongly Democratic Marshall county, on the 
Texas border, returned the first Republican majorities in its history
^An exception to this general rule is found in the northeastern 
section of the state, for reasons that will be explained.
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In 1962 because of a Democratic party split.
This produces a situation in which nearly all the swing counties 
show a definite orientation in their voting toward either the Democratic 
or Republican party. The swing counties adjacent to the strongly Demo­
cratic counties generally return more Democratic than Republican 
majorities, and those adjacent to the strongly Republican counties re­
turn more Republican than Democratic majorities. For this reason, all 
but one of the swing counties will be designated as Democratic-oriented 
or Republican-oriented swing counties. Only Oklahaaa county, the most 
populous county in the state, will be designated as a crucial swing 
county, for reasons to be explained later.
The Method Used to Classify the Counties Politically
In classifying Oklahoma's seventy-seven counties politically, it 
was decided to employ only the voting results since 19^2, to produce a 
result more in conformity with the present situation; Republican guber­
natorial candidates began to poll a substsmtially larger percentage of 
the vote in 19H^2. Further, it was decided to employ only the results of 
the eleven gubernatorial and presidential elections in the 19^2-1962 
period; the United States senate races were not included because of the 
Oklahomans' rather pronounced tendency to return incumbents to office.
The voting for secondary state officials was not considered because the 
voting in these contests has shown a rather consistent 60-U0 Democratic 
majority;^ since the focus of this study is upon the gubernatorial election, 
it was deemed necessary to consider only those races in which the maximum
2
See Table 2k in chap. iv.
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amount of swing voting takes place. To employ only gubernatorial contests 
since 19^2 would yield too few contests to permit proper classification 
of the counties; to employ gubernatorial contests over a longer period 
would produce deviations from the current political positions of some 
of the counties.
A combination of two methods was used to characterize each county's 
political position:
1. Alternating majorities. First, each county was classified 
according to the number of times its majority vote had alternated be­
tween Democratic and Republican candidates in the eleven gubernatorial 
scad presidential elections since 19^2. Three alternations was set as the 
minimum for designation of a county as a swing county. Counties with an 
8-3 record of alternation would constitute a set of swing counties with 
the smallest number of alternations and therefore with the strongest 
orientations toward either the Democratic or Republican party; those with 
7-^ records were adjudged to be somewhat more likely to swing their votes, 
and those with 6-5 records to be the most truly swing counties.
2. Voting percentages. The results obtained ftrom the alter­
nating majorities method were corrected or revised by taking into account 
the average Democratic percentage of the vote in each county in the seuse 
elections. Counties showing the most even voting divisions, between k$ 
and 51 per cent Democratic, were considered the most truly swing counties—  
those with the least stable orientation toward either the Democratic or 
Republican party. Those with average Dooocratic voting percentages of
43 to 49 per cent were considered Republican-oriented, and those with 
Democratic percentages of 51 to 58 per cent to be Democratic-oriented.
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The alternating majorities method produced these results:
a.) The 8-3 Democratic-oriented swing counties were: Beckham, Caddo,
Cherokee, Ottawa, Pottawatomie, Roger Mills, and Washita.
b.) The 7-^ Democratic-oriented counties were: Craig, Custer, Delaware,
Mayes, and Texas.
c.) The 6-5 or 5-6 swing counties were: Adair, Cisarron, Cleveland, and 
Oklahoma.
d.) The 7-^ Republican-oriented counties were ; Bearer, Creek, Osage,
and Rogers.
e.) The 8-3 Republican-oriented counties were: Canadian, Dewey, Lincoln,
Nowata, Pawnee, Payne, and Wagoner.
When the voting percentage of each county was taken into account. 
Pawnee county was re-classified as strongly Republican and Beckham and 
Roger Mills counties were re-classified as strongly Democratic. Pawnee 
county voters not only have compiled a rather strong Republican voting 
percentage, but they also have returned Republican majorities in the 
last eight senatorial contests, in the face of the rather, pronounced 
statewide tendency to return Democratic incumbents to office. Roger 
Mills county voters had voted Democratic by an average percentage of 
60.5 per cent in the last eleven gubernatorial and presidential elections; 
the Democratic percentage in Beckham county was 59*9 per cent, and in 
addition Beckham county is one of only nine counties in the state that 
has never returned a Republican majority in a county election. As to 
the evenly divided swing counties (those with 6-5 records of alternating 
majorities), only Oklahoma county's average Democratic percentage of the 
vote was between 4$ and 51 per cent. Hence, both because of the even
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division of its vote and because of its large population, Oklahoma county 
vas designated as the crucial swing county of the state. All the other 
swing counties were designated either as Democratic-oriented, or Re­
publican-oriented swing counties.
As revised, Oklahoma's seventy-seven counties were classified 
as follows % thirty-seven as strongly Democratic, thirteen as Democratic- 
oriented swing counties, sixteen as strongly Republican, and ten as 
Republicem-oriented swing counties. In addition, Oklahoma county was 
singled out for special treatment as a cmcial swing county. The 
counties in each classification are:
Strongly Democratic--Atoka, Beckham, Bryan, Carter, Choctaw,
Coal, Comanche, Cotton, Garvin, Grady, Greer, Harmon, Haskell, Hughes, 
Jackson, Jefferson, Johnston, Kiowa, Latimer, LeFlore, Love, McClain, 
McCurtain, McIntosh, Marshall, Murray, Muskogee, Okfuskee, Okmulgee, 
Pittsburg, Pontotoc, Pushmataha, Roger Mills, Seminole, Sequoyah,
Stephens, and Tillman.
Democratic-oriented--Adair, Caddo, Cherokee, Cimarron, Cleveland, 
Craig, Custer, Delaware, Mayes, Ottawa, Pottawatomie, Texas, and Washita.
Strongly Republican— Alfalfa, Blaine, Ellis, Garfield, Grant, 
Harper, Kay, Kingfisher, Logan, Major, Noble, Pawnee, Tulsa, Washington, 
Woods, and Woodward.
Republican-oriented— Beaver, Canadian, Creek, Dewey, Lincoln, 
Nowata, Osage, Payne, Rogers, and Wagoner.
Crucial swing county— Oklahoma.
In addition to giving special consideration to the voting be­
havior of the residents of Oklahoma county, special account also will
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be taken tram time to time of the voting behavior of the residents of 
Tulsa county. Tulsa county is the second most populous county in the 
state and, as such, it is the anchor county of the bloc of sixteen 
strongly ^ publican counties.
Voting Age Populations 
A setting forth of the voting age populations of each of these 
categories of counties will help to picture the Oklahoma political 
situation in a very broad way and to point up the relative inqportance of 
Oklahoma and Tulsa counties in Oklahoma elections. By voting age popu­
lation is meant the number of residents over twenty-one years of age, as 
shown by the census data.3
TABLE 20.— Voting age populations of the strongly Democratic, strongly
Republican, and swing counties in I960
Voting Age 
Population Totals
Per Cent 
Of Total
Strongly Republican 378,1^7 y 26.7
Republican-oriented 134,01k 9.4
Republican 512,161 36.1
Strongly Democratic 467,545 33.0
Democratic-oriented 172.521 12.2
Democratic 64o,o66 45.2
Oklahoma county 263,923 18.6
Oklahoma county's role as a crucial swing county can be seen from the 
foregoing data. If its voting age population (or votes) were divided 
equally between the Republican and Democratic blocs of counties, this 
would produce a Democratic-Republican ratio approximating 55-^5; a
Bcensus Bureau, General Population Characteristics :
i960, pp. 9^-99-
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heavy preponderance of its vote* for either party would be controlling. 
Tulsa county has 1À .7 per cent of the state's voting age population, while 
the other fifteen strongly Republican counties have 12 per cent; hence 
the designation of Tulsa county as the anchor county of the strong 
Republican bloc.
Historical Origins of Oklahoma's 
Geographical Voting Pattern
Now that the geographical bases of Democratic and Republican 
strength in Oklahoma have been set forth, there remains to be discussed 
how and why this geographical voting pattern developed.
As previously mentioned, what is now Oklahoma was made up of two 
federal territories, Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory, from the 
time central Oklahoma was opened to white settlement in 1889 until 
achievement of statehood in 1907. Map VII shows the line of division 
between the two territories as of 1907-
The political predilections of the Indian and white residents 
of Indian Territory were not known with certainty prior to 1907 because 
they were not electing a territorial delegate to Congress as were the 
residents of Oklahoma Territory, but most observers of that day had 
strong reason to believe that Indian Territory was predominantly Demo­
cratic, and this later proved to be correct. The Indians of the Five 
Civilized Tribes, who constituted the bulk of the Indian population, had 
come to Indian Territory Arom the Deep South states of Florida, Georgia, 
Alabama, Tennessee, amd Mississippi. Moreover, the tribal Indians had 
taken part in the Civil War and, though tribal factions fought on both 
sides in that conflict, the majority of the Indians sympathized with
at
?
X
001*^ **
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the Confederacy. The overwhelming majority of Choctaws and Chlckasaws 
and probably a majority of the Cherokees were Confederate synqpathlzers, 
as were some factions of the Creeks and Semlnoles, and their descendants 
remain Democratic In their party affiliations to this day. But some 
factions of the Creeks, Semlnoles, and Cherokees sympathized with the 
Union cause and, as a result there are some precincts in Adair, Delaware, 
and Cherokee counties that today are as "Republican as Vermont.
Further evidence of the kinship between members of the Five 
Civilized Tribes and the ways of the Deep South Is shown by the fact 
that these Indians were slaveholders— the only slaveholders In Oklahoma 
history. It was through the Cherokees that slavery was extended Into the 
northeast section of Oklahoma, and the Southern sympathies of these 
Indians has contributed to the political distinctiveness of northeastern 
Oklahoma; that section might othezvlse be considered a logical locale 
for strong Republican sentiment because of Its proximity to Kansas and 
because most of the remainder of the northern tier of Oklahoma counties 
Is Republican. It Is estimated that there were about 14,000 to 1^,000 
Negro slaves on the lands of the Five Civilized Tribes shortly before 
the Civil War.5
Another factor that contributed to the preponderantly Democratic 
sentiment In Indian Territory Is that the bulk of white settlers came 
there from Texas and Arkansas,^ which adjoined Indian Territory on the
If.
Scales, op. cit., chap. 1.
^Interview with Miss Muriel Wright, author of A Guide to the 
Indian Tribes of Oklahoma, December 26, 1962.
^Ewlng and Dangerfield, op. cit., p. 373.
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south euid east. These settlers penetrated into Indian Territory singly 
or In small groups rather than by "runs" (official openings of large 
blocs of land under federal auspices). Large numbers of the vhlte 
settlers vere tenant farmers on Indian lands.
Oklahoma Territory, on the other hand, vas settled rather 
s-uddenly by a series of runs beginning In I889. And here, as la Indian 
Territory, the Civil War syn^thles or the dominant politics of the 
states of origin of the vhlte settlers constituted the primary factors 
In establishing the geographical voting pattern of the territory.
An estimated fifty thousand vhlte settlers lined up around the 
rim of the district to be opened to settlement on April 22, I889, the 
larger number along the Kansas border; others gathered at Purcell and
other places along the southern boundary of the district, vhlle a smaller
7
number encamped on Indian reservation lands to the east and vest.
Northern migrants tended to settle closer to the border from vhlch they 
entered and southern migrants did the same. The tvo streams of Immi­
grants came together roughly In the center of the state suad gsve central 
Oklahoma a more mixed political make-up and a more even division of the 
voting as betveen Democrat and Republican than Is found In the northern 
amd southern sections of the state. It Is In the central and north­
eastern sections of Oklahoma that the political svlng counties are 
located.
Oklahoma Territory vas gradually enlarged by subsequent runs 
Into other areas In I891, 1892, l893> and I895, and In each run northern
^Edvard Everett Dale aind Morris L. Wardell, History of Oklahoma 
(Nev York: Prentlce-Eall, Inc., 19 8^ ), pp. 248-293.
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migrants tended to settle the more northerly areas of the state and 
southern migrants the southern portion. Moreover, the settlers brought 
their politics with them, and the northern tier of counties lying vest 
of that fork of Indian Territory that extended into the northeast corner 
of the state soon became predominantly Republican, whereas the southern 
tier of counties early became established as a Democratic stronghold. 
Settlers who arrived after these patterns became established often took 
on the political complexion of the area in which they settled.
The economic characteristics of the various sections of Oklahoma 
also contributed to the settlement pattern: the cotton farming areas of
southwestern and south central Oklahoma drew farmers from Texas, Arkansas, 
and Mississippi, while the wheat-growing area of north central and north-
Q
western Oklahoma generally drew farmers fras the Northern Plains.
But Oklahoma's present geographical voting pattern did not be­
come established immediately; rather, it was not until about the middle 
of the 1900-1910 decade that the present pattern began to take form. As 
a matter of fact, Oklahoma Territory was predominantly Republican in the 
1890*8 and early portion of the 1900's. A majority of the early settlers 
voted Republican in the territorial delegate elections because they came 
from northern states or because they were homesteaders who were grateful 
to the national Republican administration for having enacted the basic 
law which permitted them to settle upon their lands. They elected 
Republicans to serve as territorial delegates to Congress in seven of 
the eight elections between I890 and 1904; only in I896 was the Demo-
®McReynolda, op. cit., pp. 4l4-4l5.
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cratlc-Popullst fusion candidate able to defeat his Republican opponent. 
Table 21 shows the voting divisions in these elections in Oklahoma 
Territory.^
TABLE 21.— Voting divisions in elections of delegates to Congress from
Oklahoma Territory, 1890-1904
Year Repub­
lican
Pet. Demo­
cratic
Pet. Pop­
ulist
Pet.
IÔ90 k,39Ü 52.1 2,5^3 30.1 1,464 1 17.3
1892 9,390 44.5 7,302 34.6 4,396 i 20.9
1894 20,449 42.2 12,058 24.8 15,988 33.0
1896 26,267 48.9 27,435* 51.1
1896 28,456 58.3 19,088 39.1 1,262 2.6
1900 38,253 52.1 33,529* 45.7
1902 45,893 48.7 45,409 48.1
1904 51,454 47.1 49,868 45.7 1,836 1.7
* Fusions of Democrats and Populists
The voting for Socialist and Prohibitionist candidates is not shown in 
Table 21.
Though the election results show Republican predominance in Okla­
homa Territory in these early days, they also show that the Democrats 
constituted a strong minority.
The critical factor in establishing Oklahoma as a predominantly 
Democratic state in its entirely about the middle of the I9OO-I91O decade 
is this: only 30,000 migrants csuse into Oklahoma frcmi Kansas in this
decade, while 109,000 came in from Texas, 82,000 from Missouri, and
70,000 ftom Arkansas.
The election of I906, when delegates to the state constitutional
^he Oklahoma Almanac and Industrial Record (Oklahoma City: The
Daily Oklahoman, I908), pp. 164-165.
lOScales, op. cit., p. 23.
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convention were chosen ftrom both Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory, 
may be said to mark the beginning of Democratic dominance throughout 
Oklahoma.^ The citizens of the two territories elected 98 Democrats,
13 Republicans, and one Independent to the Oklahoma Constitutional 
Convention. Democrats polled 53*1 per cent of the vote In Oklahoma 
Territory and 5^-5 per cent In Indian Territory. In the first statewide 
election In I907, Democratic gubernatorial nominee Charles N. Haskell 
polled 53'k per cent of the vote.
Maps VIII through XI show the evolution of the voting In the 
various counties In the first four gubernatorial elections, from 1907 
through 1918; by 1918 the present geographical voting pattern had become 
fairly well established. The 1907 election results, shown on Map VIII, 
probably do not represent a true Democratic-Republican division of the 
vote because the question of ratification of the state constitution was 
on the ballot along with candidates for state offices, and the Democrats 
were Identified with ratification because they controlled the constitutional 
convention. By I91O the present voting pattern had virtually taken shape, 
but Tulsa county did not return a Republican majority until 191k, In the 
election that was complicated by a heavy Socialist vote.
If this Is the manner In which Oklahoma's geographical voting 
came Into being, what has kept It that way through the years? V. 0. Key 
wrote that the maintenance of Democratic or Republican traditions Is 
"reflective of a highly Integrated community life with a powerful capacity 
to Induce conformity," and he added that this Is more so In rural and small
^Ewlng and Dsingerfleld, op. cit., p. 385.
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town a r e a s . T h e  University of Michigan Survey Research Center found 
that the longer the association with a "group" the stronger the attach­
ment to it; and it was found that belonging to a political party is much 
akin to belonging to other types of social groups. Reference was made 
in Chapter II to the question of whether urbanization might be breaking 
down this sectional voting pattern, and the view was expressed that this 
development is too recent to have altered the pattern significantly as 
yet.
The East-West Split
The geographical voting pattern heretofore referred to has 
focused upon a north-south split between Republicans and Democrats, and 
this remains the principal division. However, there also has been a 
less pronounced split between eastern and western Oklahoma that grew out 
of the early division of the state between Oklahoma Territory and Indian 
Territory. In this sense, the terms "east" and "vest" do not refer so 
much to the areas east and west of the state's geographical center as 
they do to a division roughly approaching that between the two terri­
tories; most of central Oklahoma is considered "western Oklahoma."
The east-west split was much more in evidence in early Oklahoma 
history than it is today, though as recently as 1958 some eastern Okla­
homa residents were heard to utter such sentiments as, "It's high time 
we elected a governor from eastern Oklahoma."
Possibly the outstanding example of political party deference to 
east-west sentiment came in I907 when Democratic party leaders agreed
^V.0. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 227-22Ô.
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that the state's first two United States senators should be selected on 
this basis: every voter was to have two votes for United States senator,
but the Indian Territory candidate with the highest number of votes was 
to be appointed as one senator and the leading Oklahoma Territory cemdidate 
the other.13 These were the results of the 1907 Democratic primai-y:
Robert L. Owen (Indian Territory). . . 48,88$
Henry Furman (Indian Territory). . . . 39,113 
Thomas P. Gore (Oklahoma Territory). . 38,288
Though Furman received more votes than Gore, Governor Haskell appointed
Owen and Gore to serve as senators euid both were elected formally by the
state legislature later.
Economic characteristics provide the basis for some difference 
in viewpoint as between the two sections on some issues and in some 
elections. Of the nineteen Oklahoma counties where median family in­
comes were below $3,000 a year in 196O, eighteen were in eastern Oklahoma. 
Of the twenty-nine counties with median family incomes above $4,000 a 
year, twenty-one were in western or central Oklahoma. Also, a residue 
of the esorly east-west feeling may be evidenced occasionally in arguments 
over such matters as distribution of highway funds.
Overall, however, the early east-west feeling appears to be on 
the wane as a political factor.
Oklahoma a Border State
The geographical voting pattern set forth in this chapter is 
described by John H. Fenton as being typical of some of the states
13scales, op. cit., pp. 72-75*
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classified politically as border states. In his study of four border 
states in the 1950's. Fenton referred to the "unique settlement pattern 
of the border states and the differential reaction of elements of the 
population to the Civil War" as factors that shaped the politics of 
these states. He added that the position of these between North and 
South gave them rather distinctive political systems. Fenton character­
ized the border states as being neither North nor South, but as partaking 
of the elements of both; "essentially they are middle states.
The research staffs of both the Republican National Committee 
and Democratic National Committee classify Oklahoma as a border state.
The Republican staff designates the following as border states: Kentucky,
Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.The Democratic staff 
adds Tennessee to the list.^^
^^John H. Fenton, Politics in the Border States: A Study of the 
Patterns of Political Organization, amd Political Change. Common to the 
Border States--Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri (New 
Orleans: The Bauser Press, Galleon Books, 1957%  pp. 11, 204.
^^Research Division, Republican National Committee, The I962 
Elections: A Summary Report With Supporting Tables (3d ed.; Vfeishington,
April, 1963), p. Ô.
^^esearch Division, Democratic National Committee, The 1960 
Election Report (Washington, January, 1962), Appendix, Table ?•
CHAPTER IV
RELATIVE PARTY STRENGTH* DOES OKLAHOMA HAVE 
A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM?
There were no official statewide party registration figures in
Oklahoma prior to i960, when county election boards first were required
to file county registration figures with the state Election Board under
terms of a recently adopted law. The party registration figures that
do exist are highly misleading as indices of the relative strength of
the Democratic and Republican parties, because thousands of Oklahomans
who vote Republican regularly are registered as Democrats so that they
may take part in what many consider to be the more meaningful or more
interesting Democratic primaries. For the record, however, the party
registration figures as of January I5, I963, were:
Democrats . . . .  978,115 
Republicans . . . 227,144
Independents . . 4,763
These figures would seem to indicate that Republican candidates normally
could expect to poll 10.8 per cent of the two-party vote in a statewide
election. Actually, Republicem candidates have never done that poorly.
The closest approximation to it in a major race occurred in 1958, when
the Republican gubernatorial nominee received only 19-9 per cent of the
total vote. But this was highly abnormal, for over the years Republican
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candidates have received a substantial percentage of the total vote in 
the major statewide races, as shown by Table 22, which gives the average 
Democratic percentage of the total vote in the presidential, gubernatorial, 
and senatorial contests, both for the entire span of the state's history 
and for relatively recent years.^
TABLE 22.--Average Democratic percentage of the total vote in gubernatorial, 
presidential, and senatorial races, 1907-1962 and recently
All Elections Recent Contests
Gubernatorial contests 5^*9 (1907-1962) 55*^  (19^2-1962)
Presidential contests $1 .4 (1908-I960) 43.7 (1952-1960)
Senatorial contests $4 .3 (1912-1962) $6 .0 (1948-1962)
The figures show that Oklahomans have been somewhat less Democratic in 
their voting for President than for governor and senator, but not sig­
nificantly so except for the 1952-1960 period. The fact that the Demo­
cratic percentage of the vote has averaged less than $$ per cent since 
1907 might even seem to indicate that Oklahoma always has had a genuine 
two-party system of politics; however. Republicans have won relatively 
few statewide contests, as shown in Chapter I, and a reasonable prospect 
of victory, as demonstrated by past electoral successes, is one of the 
generally accepted criteria of two-partyism.
The Schlesinger criteria of two-partyism.— Among the more recent 
studies aimed at finding adequate criteria for measuring party competition
within the states is one by Joseph A. Schlesinger, who lays down these two
2criteria for measuring party competition:
^Ijbiversity of Oklahoma Bureau, op. cit., pp. 19, 21, 23.
2
Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying 
the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," The American 
Political Science Review, XLIX (December, 1955)» 1120-1128.
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1) The number of elections won by the two parties. He characterizes a 
state’s political system as competitive where the dominant party has won 
6$ per cent or less of the elections over a reasonable span of time.
2) The rapidity with which parties alternate in control of an office, 
such as governor or senator. His criterion of a two-party system from 
this standpoint is that there be a c>a.nge of party control in per cent 
or more of the elections.
Judged by these standards, Oklahoma would be classified in 
Schlesinger’8 terms as a "one-party predominant state" with respect to 
its gubernatorial and senatorial elections, and possibly a "one-party 
cyclical state" with respect to its presidential elections. For, as to 
Schlesinger’s first criterion. Democrats have won 93*3 per cent of 
Oklahoma’s gubernatorial elections, 83.3 pcr cent of its senatorial 
elections, and 64.3 per cent of its presidential elections since 1907*
As to the second criterion, there have been alternations of party control 
of the governorship in 6.7 per cent of the elections, of the senatorial 
office in 16.7 per cent of the elections, and of presidential successes 
in 21.4 per cent of the elections. Schlesinger describes a "one-party 
predominant state" as one in which the minority party wins only 
occasional single victories because of some sudden vulnerability of 
the majority party, a major national trend, or a split in the majority 
party.
The R&nney-Kendall criteria of two-partyism^— In another such 
study, Austin Hanney and WiUmoore Kendall laid down these criteria 
for measuring party coj^tition;^
^Austin Ranney and WiUmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," 
The American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 477-48$.
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1) The percentage of victories by the two parties in presidential, 
gubernatorial, and senatorial elections over a reasonable span of time. 
They characterized a two-party system as one in which the minority 
party wins 23 per cent or more of these elections.
2) To distinguish between "modified one-party states" and "one-party 
states" in those states where the minority party has won less than 25 
per cent of the presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial elections, 
this criterion was provided: a "modified one-party state" is one in 
which the minority party receives a substantial percentage of the total 
vote. To be precise, a modified one-party state is one in which the 
minority party receives 30 per cent of the vote in more than 70 per 
cent of the elections and more than 40 per cent of the vote in more
than 30 per cent of all the elections.
Judged by these standards, Oklahoma would be classified as a 
modified one-party state. Republicans have won nine of the forty-seven 
presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial elections since 1907> or
19.1 per cent. Table 23 shows the number of elections in which 
Republican candidates received more than 30 per cent and more than 40 
per cent of the vote.
TABLE 23.— Percentage of presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial 
elections in which Republican candidates received more than 30 per 
cent or more than ko per cent of the vote
Per Cent of Vote President Governor Senator
30 per cent or more 92.9 86.7 88.9
1+0 per cent or more 64.4 73.3 66.7
Neither of these studies indicates what minimum span of time
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might be acceptable as the basis for the data to be used in 
characterizing a state's political system. Schlesinger used the 
period from I870 to 195O in his study, and Ranney and Kendall used 
the period from 1914 to 1952 in theirs. Only by using the time period 
of 1950-1962 could the Oklahoma political system be made to appear more 
competitive.
V.O. Key provides additional indices for Judging the competitive­
ness of a state's political system: (l) the division of the vote in the
elections of secondary state officials; (2) relative participation in 
Democratic and Republican primaries; and (3) average party membership 
in the lover house of the state legislature.^ Discussion of these 
criteria will throw additional light upon the present status of Oklahoma 
politics.
The vote for secondary state officials as an index of two- 
partyism.— An examination of the voting statistics for all of Oklahoma's 
statewide contests shows that Oklahoma has been Democratic by an 
approximate 6o-4o ratio , in the voting for secondary state officials; 
when Oklahoma voters wish to register approval or protest they do so 
in their voting for the more highly visible offices of President, governor, 
or senator, and this has the effect of narrowing the ratio to approximately 
55-45 in the gubernatorial and senatorial races and to less thaui 52-48 in 
the presidential contests.
Key is one authority who believes that the vote for secondary 
officials is a better index of true relative party strength than the vote
^ey. Politics, Parties, And Pressure Groups, pp. 312-31?.
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for the more highly visible offices. He distinguished between the voting 
for governor and for such lesser officials as state legislative candidates 
when he referred to the "high visibility of the governor's office" and 
to the fact that social tension is sometimes discharged by "temporary 
banishment of a Democratic governor" in one-party states.^  Referring 
to national rather than to state elections, the Michigan Research Center 
reported in 1961, "Our ntudies have shown that the popular vote for 
lesser offices is a more party-determined vote than the vote for Presi­
dent. Oklahoma has one of the longest ballots in the nation, and it 
is highly unlikely that most voters take the time to acquaint themselves 
with more than a few top-level candidates. It seems plausible to suspect 
that they might be more likely to vote their party affiliations rather 
than their personal preferences when voting for the long list of 
secondary state officials.
Oklahoma voters have been remarkably consistent in their voting 
for the secondary officials, as shown by Table 24, which gives the Re- 
publiceui percentage of the total vote in the contests for lieutenant 
governor, corporation commissioner, and state auditor. The impact of 
the Republicaui presidential victories of 1920 and I928 and of the 
Roosevelt-Truman victories in the 1930-1948 period is reflected in the 
corporation commissioner races of those periods; these mark the biggest 
deviations from a highly consistent voting pattern throughout the 
state's history.
5Xey, American State Politics, p. 70.
^Converse, op. cit., p. 280.
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TABLE 2k.— Average Republican percentage of the vote for three secondary 
state offices, 1907-1918, 1920-1928, 1930-19^, 1950-1962
Office 1907-
1918
1920-
1928
1930-
1948
1950-
1962
1907-
1962
Average
Corporation comm'r. 
(all years)
37.5 44.4 35.7 39.1 38.4 39.0
Corporation comm'r. 
(presidential yrs.)
3k. 9 46.7 35.6 39.1 38.6 39.0
Corporation comm'r. 
(off years)
39.0 40.1 36.0 39.1 38.1 38.5
Lieutenant governor 38.8 40.4 30.4 38.3 35.4 36.9
State Auditor 38.3 39.4 36.1 32.6 36.3 36.6
Average 37.7 42.2 34.8 37.6 37.4 38.0
An examination of the voting for secondary state officials in the 
Democratic, Republican, and sving counties shows that only the sixteen 
strongly Republican counties can be counted upon to return Republican 
majorities in these contests. Oklahoma county and the Republican- 
oriented swing counties regularly return Democratic majorities. Table 25 
pictures the voting for corporation commissioner in 1952, 1956, and I96O.
TABLE 25.— Republican percentage of the total vote for corporation 
commissioner in the last three presidential years
1952 1956 i960 Average
Republicaui counties 55.7 52.9 42.2 50.3
Republicam-oriented 45.2 44.0 36.9 42.0 ’
Democratlc-oriented 42.0 38.1 33.5 37.9
Democratic counties 28.2 27.4 26.1 27.2
Oklahoma county 43.2 43.0 35.7 40.6
Since Eisenhower and Nixon received 5^*5> 55.1, and 59*0 per cent of 
the vote in Oklahoma in these years, presumably they were years of 
maximum advantage for Republican state candidates.
The results of the contests for lieutenant governor and state
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auditor in these counties in the 1950-1962 period were comparable to 
those for corporation commissioner in the presidential years.
It appears^ then, that Oklahoma is Democratic by at least a 
60-40 ratio in its voting for secondary state officials. To appraise 
what such a ratio signifies, most authorities appear to agree that it 
represents a decisive rather than marginal superiority in party strength. 
The research staffs of both the Republican and Democratic national 
committees concur in regarding a 55-^5 per cent division of the vote as 
marking the breaking point between a marginal victory and a decisive 
victory. They refer to "safe" seats in Congress as those held by in­
cumbents who won by a margin of 55 per cent or more. ^ Malcolm Moos 
regards a 51.5-48.5 per cent division of the vote as indicating a
"critical-marginal" victory, a 55-45 per cent or less division a marginal
8
victory, and a vote of more than 55 per cent as a decisive victory. 
According to this index, Oklahoma could be said to be moving into a two- 
party system when the Republican percentage of the vote starts to 
approach 45 per cent in the contests for secondary offices.
Relative participation in Democratic and Republican primsiries 
as an index of two-peirtyism.— V.O. Key found in his study of state 
political systems that the Democratic percentage of the total vote for 
governor averaged 48 per cent in Massachusetts and 43 per cent in 
Kansas over a period of years up to 1952. Yet, despite the narrpw spread 
between the Democratic vote in these two states, it was a matter of
^Republican National Committee, op. cit., p. 23; Democratic 
Rational Committee, op. cit., Table IX.
Û
Quoted in Ivan Hinderaker, Party Politics (New York; Henry 
Holt and Company, 1956), p. 435.
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common knowledge that the Democratic party was very much stronger in 
Massachusetts than in Kansas. Key therefore employed the index of the 
primary participation ratio, or the ratio between the number of votes 
cast in the Democratic primaries to those cast in the Bepublican 
primaries, to provide a clearer indication of relative party strength 
in the two states. The results were; a 76.7 per cent ratio in 
Massachusetts and a 38.8 per cent ratio in Kansas.^
Table 26 shows the relative participation in Oklahoma primaries 
for each year since 19IO.
TABLE 26.— Relative participation in Oklahoma's Democratic and Republican
gubernatorial primaries since I9IO
Democratic 
Primary Vote
Republican 
Primary Vote
Participation
Ratio
1910 123,73k 8k,158 .68
191k 131,7kl 31,770 .2k
1918 107,919 kl,kok .38
1922 269,538 87,809 .33
1926 237,580 68,859 .29
1930 3kO,569 76,137 .22
193k 513,k86 69,070 .13
1938 593,695 52,5k9 .09
19k2 39k,392 35,921 .09
19k6 385,952 kl,l39 .11
1950 507,936 55,kll .11
195k 522,lk6 55,773 .11
1958 513,59k 61,518 .12
1962 53k,298 61,873 .12
Average .216
It appears that the morale of Republican partisans may have dropped 
sharply following the second successive Democratic sweep of all state­
wide offices in 19IO, for participation in the 191^ Republican primary 
declined by nearly two-thirds.
%ey, American State Politics, pp. 100-111.
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The email number of registered Republican voters and the lack 
of interest in Republican primaries appear to be problems that the 
Oklahema Republican party must overcome if Oklahoma is to have a system 
of genuine two-party politics. The small number of Republican registrants 
seriously hampers Republican leaders in their efforts to recruit strong 
candidates for statewide offices and has led to numerous instances of 
Republican failure to enter candidates in statewide contests in recent 
years. A full slate of Republican candidates was offered from 1907 until 
1918, but there have been numerous failures to file for office since then, 
as shown by Table 27.
TABLE 27.— Number of statewide contests in which no Republican candidate
was entered, I918-I962
1918. . 3 1938- .5 195^. .11
1922. . 1 19^2. .5 1956. . 4
1926. . 1 1946. .5 19^. .13
193k. • 3 1950. .9 i960. . 4
1962. .13
Paradoxically, the period of the greatest number of failures to file 
for office in recent years coincides with the period of the most numerous 
Republican successes. This seems to lend support to the previously 
stated view that recent Republican successes are attributable as much 
or more to such national developments as inflation and an increasing 
tax burden than to Republican resurgence within the state.
Ployd Carrier, former Republican state chairman and more recently 
administrative assistant to Governor Bellmon, confirmed that Republican 
failure to recruit candidates for the secondary state offices, and for 
county and district races as well, was a serious problem for the party.
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He speculated that Jo Ferguson vould hare been elected goveraor in 1950 
"If even half the state ticket had been filled.” Ferguson, the Re­
publican candidate, lost the contest by l6,000 votes. Carrier put It 
this way: the more strong candidates a party has on the ballot at all
levels, the more numerous are the Arlends of these candidates who will 
bs drawn to the polls to vote where they otherwise would have stayed 
at home. As these voters are drawn to the polls to vote for a party's 
candidate for county clerk or state auditor, they also will cast their 
votes for the party's candidates for governor or President.
However, recent strong Republican efforts to Induce Democrats- 
reglstered-ae-Republlcans to re-reglster have been only modestly en­
couraging at best. In 1962 the Democratic gain In registrations was 
5.35 per cent, as against a Republican gain of 4.92 per cent. In I963 
Republlceui gains exceeded Democratic gains percentage-wise, but not 
numerically. The Republican gain was 2 .7 per cent and the Democratic 
gain nine-tenths of 1 per cent. The Republican numerical gain was 
6,094, the Democratic gain 8,355*
Average membership In the lower house of the state legislature 
as an Index of relative party strength.— V.O. Key's studies of state 
political systems showed that the dominant party In the definitely one- 
party states generally holds approximately 90 per cent of the seats In 
the lower house of the state legislature.^  The number of Democrats 
and Republicans serving In the lower house was given for each historical
^^intervlew with Floyd Carrier, former Republican state chair­
man, September 4, I963.
^^Key, Politics, Parties, And Pressure Groups, p. 314.
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period in Chapter I. The data in Table 6 shov that Republican member­
ship has averaged slightly more than 15 per cent since 1950 and that 
it rose to slightly more than 20 per cent vith Bellmon*s victory in 
1962. Average Republican meimbership in the lover house since 1907 has 
been l8 .2 per oent.^ Obviously, a number of Democratic legislators 
are being elected from counties or districts that normally vote 
Republican for President and govenor. Possibly many voters are ex­
pressing the feeling that the Democratic party is dominant in the Okla­
homa legislature and that more can be accomplished for the home district 
by electing representatives vho can work vith the legislative majority.
Number of county officials elected as an indicator of grass roots 
party strength.--While it is true that the electorate often votes more 
on the basis of personality than of party affiliation in political races 
at the county level,still the control of the county courthouses by 
the dominant party is an important factor in its grass roots strength. 
These county officials ceui constitute a political nucleus of party 
activists in local party affairs. Of at least equal significance is the 
importance of having a full slate of popular cemdidates for county offices 
on the ballot to drav a maximum number of their friends to the polls and 
thus to increase the party vote, as Just discussed.
In Oklahoma, fever Republican county officials have been elected 
in the 1930-1962 period than vere elected from 1907 through 1928, emd 
their number has been declining rather than increasing in recent years. 
Republican failures to file for county offices also have been increasing.
University of Oklahoma Bureau, op. cit., p.
:ey, American State Politics, p. 227.
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The number of Republicans elected to county office since 1907 
is given in Table 28.^^ Because the number of county offices filled 
differs among the various counties, figures were conqpiled only for the 
eleven most commonly elected county officials: county Judge, county
attorney, court clerk, county clerk, sheriff, treasurer, superintendent 
of schools, assessor, and three county commissioners. The total number 
of these county officials elected in the state every two years is 8k7; 
hence the number of Democratic county officials elected each two years 
can be ascertained by subtracting the number of Republicans elected 
from that figure. FOr convenience, the election figures have been 
divided according to the historical periods discussed in Chapter I.
TABLE 28.— Number of Republicans elected to eleven county offices,
1907-1918, 1920-1928, 1930-19*^, 1950-1962
1907-1918 1920-1928 1930-1948 1950-1962
1907 • .121 1920 . .378 1930 . .180 1950 . .Ik3
1910 . .199 1922 . .189 1932 . .104 1952 . .152
1914 . .183 1924 . .246 193k . .151 195k . ■ Ikl
1916 . .222 1926 . .245 1936 . .125 1956 . .133
1918 . .250 1928 . .259 1938 . .145 1958 . .110
1940 . . l4o i960 . . 10k
1942 . .154 1962 . .105
1944 . .158
1946 . .177
19k8 . .136
In their peak year of 1920, Republicans were elected to approximately 4$ 
per cent of the eleven elective county offices throughout the state. At 
their nadir in 1932 and I96O, they were elected to 12.3 per cent of these 
county offices. That I920 should be a peak Republican year conforms to
^^Figures compiled from the State Election Boeurd's Directory and 
Manual of the State of Oklahoma and Roster of State and County Officers.
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normal expectations, in view of the Harding landslide. And it would be 
expected also that 1932 would mark a low point in Republican successes, 
in view of the depression and the Roosevelt victory. But it hardly 
would be expected that i960 and I962 would also mark a low point in 
Republican successes, in view of the Hixon and Bellmon victories in 
those years.
A partial explanation of the small number of Republican county 
officials being elected in recent yesirs lies in the fact that no Re­
publicans are filing for county offices in a large number of counties.
In 1962 no Republican candidates filed in forty-one counties, and in 
nineteen other counties Republicans failed to contest a majority of the 
county offices, according to the Daily Oklahoman. T h i s  means that 
Republicans contested a majority of the offices in only seventeen 
counties. Democratic candidates were entered in all seventy-seven 
counties, and only in Major and Kingfisher counties did they fail to 
contest a majority of thé county offices. There was a stirring of 
Republican activity in Oklahoma county, where Democrats "faced stubborn 
Republican opposition for the first time" in six races in I962, but none 
was victorious. Map XII shows the sixty counties in which Republicans 
either failed to file for any county office or to contest a majority of 
the county offices.
Conclusion
At this time it appears that Oklahoma must be characterized as 
a "modified one-party state" or, with respect to presidential elections.
^^The Daily OkleUioman, November 7, 1962. 
^^Ibid., November "J, I962.
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a "one-party cyclical state," according to those indices which focus 
upon long-term trends. To characterize the Oklahoma political system 
as a two-party system on the basis of one gubernatorial and three 
presidential victories since 19$2 seems a bit premature, especially in 
the light of the fdct that many voters did not look upon Elsenhower as 
a "real" Republican and the fact that Ninon rode to victory on an anti- 
Cathollc vote. The present period may mark the beginning of a transition 
toward a two-party system, and the events of the next decade should dis­
close whether this Is the case.
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CHAPTER V 
SWITCH VOTING
Two important fticte stand out about recent switch voting in 
Oklahoma that go far toward explaining the Republican successes be­
ginning in 1942:
1) The increase in Republican voting was greater in the thirty-seven 
strongly Democratic counties than in the sving counties or strongly 
Republican counties in the 1942 Republican senatorial victory^ Eisen­
hower's 1952 and 1956 victories, and Nixon's I96O victory. The in­
crease in Republican voting in the strongly Democratic counties in the 
1962 gubernatorial election was substantial and important. Switch 
voting in the strongly Democratic counties perhaps has been less evident 
than in the sving counties because it has resulted much less often in 
Republican candidates carrying a strongly Democratic county. In the 
swing counties, where the division of the vote has been nairower, less 
switch voting is required to push them into the opposing party's column. 
But the fact is that generally Republicans must hold down the usual lop­
sided Democratic majorities in the strongly Democratic counties in order 
to win.
2) The increase in Republicam voting since 1952 has been as iGirge in 
Oklahoma's rural Democratic counties as in the populous counties. The
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Belimon victory and the three Republican presidential victories have 
been attributed widely to the "big city vote" or to the drawing out of 
"new voters" in the big cities and their suburbs. These have been im­
portant, but the equally important role of the rural counties in these 
victories apparently has been overlooked. The ten least populous of 
Oklahoma's strongly Democratic counties registered an average 20 per 
cent increase in Republican voting in 19^2 as compared with 19 4^8, and 
an approximate 30 per cent increase in i960 as compared with I9UÔ. The 
increase in the five populous counties of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Garfield, Kay, 
and Washington averaged 15 per cent in 1952 and I6 per cent in I960, as 
compared with 1948.
Increases in Republican Voting 
in Democratic emd Rural Areas
The increases in Republican voting in the strongly Democratic 
counties and in the rural counties have been confined mostly to those 
years in which a strong Republican tide was running in the state. In 
1954 and 1958f when the Democratic tide was strong, these counties re­
turned their usual lopsided Democratic majorities.
The increase in Republican voting in the strongly Democratic 
counties in the good Republican years.--Table 29 shows the number of 
Republican votes cast in the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties, 
the thirteen Democratic-oriented counties, the ten Republican-oriented 
counties, the sixteen strongly Republican counties, and in Oklahoma 
county in 1938 and 1942. Democrat Elmer Thomas defeated Republican 
Harry 0. Olasser by 148,000 votes in 1938, and Republican Ed Moore 
defeated Democrat Josh Lee by 37,500 votes in 1942. Both were off-year
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elections.
TABLE 29. — The number and percentage of Increased Republican votes cast 
in the Democratic and Republican counties in 1930> 19^2
1938 1942 Per Cent 
Increase
Strongly Democratic 36,515 50,365 37.9
Democratic-oriented 24,235 28,275 18.5
Republican-oriented 27,103 33,685 24.3
Strongly Republican 59,733 73,331 22.8
Oklahoma county 12,148 18,057 48.6
Although the percentage increase in Republican voting vas greater in the 
strongly Democratic counties than in the Democratic-oriented swing counties^ 
it resulted in pushing only four of the thirty-seven strongly Democratic 
counties into the Republican column, as against nine of the thirteen Demo­
cratic-oriented counties.
A total of 185,712 switch votes was required to convert a I938 
Democratic senatorial plurality of 148,202 into a 1942 Republican 
senatorial plurality of 37,510. Of the required 185,712 switch votes, 
the strongly Democratic counties contributed 39.9 per cent, the Demo­
cratic-oriented counties 15<3 per cent, the Republican-oriented counties
13.3 per cent, the strongly Republican counties 21.6 per cent, and Okla- 
haaa. county 9*8 per cent.
There was a similar heavy increase in Republican voting in the
strongly Democratic counties in the 1952, 1956, and i960 presidential
elections, as shown by Table 30. The data in Table 30 relate the size
of the Democratic or Republican vote pluralities in 1948, the year of 
the last Democratic presidential victory, to those of the three years 
in whiv'h Republicans won.
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TABLE 30.— Vote pluralities in the Democratic and Repuhlicem counties 
in the last four presidential elections
1948 1952 1956 i960
Strongly Democratic 
Democratic-oriented 
Republican-oriented 
Strongly Republican 
Oklahoma county
131,829 D 
27,261 D 
13,687 D 
8,595 R 
19,793 D
47,566 D 
12,674 R
15,353 R 
81,352 R 
25,293 R
40,729 D
6,801 R 
13,244 R
80,989 R
27,883 R
4,566 R 
17,800 R
18,857 R 
82,361 R 
38,344 R
A total of 271,071 switch votes was required to convert a 1948 Demo­
cratic presidential plurality of 183,965 into a I952 Republican 
presidential plurality of 87,106. Of this number, the strongly Demo­
cratic counties contributed 31*1 per cent, the Democratic-oriented 
counties 14.7 per cent, the Republican-oriented counties 10.7 per cent, 
the strongly Republican counties 26.8 per cent, and Oklahoma county 
16.6 per cent.
The number of Democratic votes decreased by 84,263 in the 
strongly Democratic counties as between 1948 and 1952. Eisenhower's 
plurality in the entire state in 1952 was 87,106.
In i960, the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties re­
turned an actual Republican plurality of 4,566.
The increase in Republican voting in the niral Democratic 
counties in the good Republican years.— The rural Democratic counties 
chosen to demonstrate that there was a larger percentage increase in 
Republican voting in these counties than in the state's most populoxis 
counties were selected on these bases: (l) that each county have a
population of less than ten thousand emd (2) that each be classified 
as strongly Democratic. The eleven counties that meet these criteria 
are listed in Table 3I, which relates the Republican percentage of the
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total rote in each for the year 1948 to that of 1952, 1956, and 1960.
The Increase in Republican voting in these rural Democratic counties 
will then be coiq>ared with the Republican increase in Oklahoma, Tulsa, 
Garfield, Kay, and Washington counties; the first four of these counties 
are among the state's six most populous counties and Washington county 
is the ninth most populous.
TABLE 31*‘-'-Republican percentage of the vote in the eleven least populous 
strongly Democratic counties in 1948, 1952, 1956, and i960
1948 1952 1956 i960
Coal 17.9 38.6 36.5 44.5
Cotton 22.0 47.2 42.5 49.7
Harmon 10.2 35.6 32.4 47.4
Haskell 30.2 41.6 42.4 52.0
Jefferson 14.3 32.5 31.8 40.8
Johnston 16.5 35.0 34.1 44.1
Latimer 26.5 42.2 41.0 48.6
Love 10.2 29.0 29.3 39.2
Marshall 16.0 34.4 35.4 42.4
Pushmataha 20.9 38.8 39.7 51.4
Roger Mills 18.9 52.9 43.9 64.3
Average 18.5 38.9 37.2 47.7
The 1948 figures show the small percentage of the vote which Republicem 
candidates often receive in the strongly Democratic counties. The 1952, 
1956, and i960 figures show the more substantial vote percentages which 
Republicans may receive in those years when a strong Republican tide is 
running in the state.
Table 32 shows the Republican percentage of the vote for the 
same years in five of Oklahoma's most populous counties. Oklahoma and 
Tulsa are the two most populous counties; the other three are the 
largest of the strongly Republican counties.
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TABLE 32.— Republican percentage of the vote in five of the state's most 
populous counties in 19*^, 1952, 1956, and i960
1948 1952 1956 Ï560" " "  "
Oklahoma 40.1 57.6 59.7 61.4
Tulsa 52.6 61.2 65.5 63.0
Garfield 55.7 71.3 69.3 • 69.3
Kay 47.0 66.2 64.7 64.7
Washington 52.2 64.5 69.3 71.4
Average 49.5 64.2 65.7 66.0
The increases in the average Republican percentage of the vote 
over that of 1948 in the tvo sets of counties were;
1952 1956 i960
Rural Democratic counties 20.4 18.7 29.2
Populous counties 14.7 16.2 16.5
The importance of the foregoing data may be challenged on the 
ground that there are not enough votes in the small counties to be of 
significemt import in the election of a Republican. However, the intent 
vas to picture the increased Republican voting in the very smallest 
Democratic counties preparatory to shoving the increased Republican 
voting in the entire bloc of thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties, 
the greatest number of vhich eire more rural than urban. Their average 
population is 20,730 and nineteen of the thirty-seven have populations 
of less than fifteen thousand.
Table 33 cosqpares the numerical increase in Republican voting as 
between 1948 and 1952 in the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties 
with that in the populous counties of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Garfield, Kay, and 
Washington. The two sets of counties had approximately equal populations 
in 1950 : the combined population of the strongly Democratic counties was
Il6
500,552 and that of the five populous counties vas 46 +^, 338.
TABLE 33.— The 1952 numerical increase in Republican voting in the 
strongly Democratic counties compared vith that in five populous,
mostly Republican counties
Democratic
Plurality,
1948
Plurality,
1952
Republican
Increase,
1952
Strongly Democratic 131,829 47,566 D 84,263
counties
Five populous 13,923 76,143 R 90,066
counties
The tvo sets of counties, with relatively equal populations, contributed 
almost equally to the 1952 Republican voting gain.
The remaining increase of 9^,752 in Republican votes in 1952 was 
contributed by the state's other thirty-five counties, the greatest number 
of which are more rural than urban. Hence it must be said that Oklahoma's 
miral counties contributed at least as much to the increased Republican 
vote as did the more populous areas.
Other Significant Aspects of 
Oklahoma Switch Voting
The role of the swing counties.--The voting age populations of. 
the swing counties in i960 were: the Democratic-oriented counties,
175,521; the Republican-oriented, 134,01k; and Oklahoma county, 263,823. 
The Democratic-oriented counties had 12.2 per cent of the state's total 
voting age population, the Republican-oriented counties 9 *^  per cent, 
and Oklahoma county I8.6 per cent.
Table 3^  shows the Democratic or Republican pluralities re­
turned by the swing counties in the last four presidential elections.
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as related to the plurality of the entire state.
TABLE 3!^ .— Democratic or Republican pluralities returned by the entire 
state and by the swing counties in presidential elections
1948 1952 1956 i960
Entire state 
Republican-oriented 
Democratic-oriented 
Oklsdioma county
183,975 D
13,687 D 
27,261 D
19,793 D
87,106 R
15,353 H
12,674 R
25,293 R
88,188 R 
13,244 R 
6,801 R 
27,883 R
161,928 R 
18,857 R
17,800 R 
38,344 R
Net plurality of the 
swing counties 60,741 D 56,054 R 47,928 R 75,001 R
When the swing counties vote alike, they make a substantial contribution 
to election outcomes. And, since they are the more politically sensitive 
counties, they often do vote alike when the short-term influences 
definitely favor the Democratic or Republican party. For example, they 
contributed neeirly 65 per cent of the total state Republican plurality 
in 1952, when they all voted Republican.
However, the division of the Democratic-Republican vote is 
usually rather narrow in these counties. Hence, when they vote different­
ly the plurality in one set of counties sometimes virtually cancels out 
the plurality for the opposing candidate in the other set of counties.
For example, in the 1950 gubernatorial election the Republican-oriented 
counties returned a Republicein plurality of k,6k6, the Democratic- 
oriented counties a Democratic plurality of 9,029, and Oklahoma county 
a Republican plurality of 11,038. The net result of the voting in all 
twenty-four counties was a Republics^ plurality of 6,655. But this was 
a very close election; the Democratic plurality in the entire state was 
16,103.
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The role of Oklahoma and Tulsa counties.--The combined voting 
age populations of the state's tvo most populous counties in i960 vas
33.3 per cent of that for the entire state, or exactly one-third. In 
terms of actual votes cast in recent elections, the combined vote of 
the tvo counties rose from 19.7 per cent of the state total in 19^ to 
3^.^ per cent in I96O.
As explained previously, Oklahoma county has been characterized 
as the state's crucial sving county eind Tulsa county as the anchor county 
of the strong Republican bloc. As vith the sving counties, vhen Oklahoma 
and Tulsa county voters return pluralities for candidates of the same 
party, the combined votes of these tvo counties may have a significant 
impact upon election outcomes for the state as a vhole. But vhen they 
return pluralities for candidates of opposing parties, as they often have 
in the past, the impact of their combined vote is considerably reduced.
Table 35 shovs the Democratic or Republican pluralities re­
turned by Oklahoma and Tulsa counties and by the state as a vhole in the 
presidential elections from 1944 through 1956. The net plurality of 
Oklahoma and Tulsa counties is also given, so that the effect of their 
combined vote may be related to that of the state as a vhole.
TABLE 35 •'**Voting pluralities in Oklahoma end Tulsa counties related to 
total state pluralities in four presidential elections
1944 1948 1952 195^
Entire state 
Olüahoma county 
Tulsa county
82,125 D 
15,348 D
9,227 R
183,965 D
19,793 D
9,344 R
87,106 R
25,293 R
27,134 R
88,188 R
27,833 R
39,414 R
Net plurality 6,121 D 10,449 D 52,427 R 67,247 R
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In 19^ 4- and 1948 the two counties combined contributed only 7*5 and 5*7 
per cent of the state's total Democratic pluralities, but in 1952 and 
1956 the two counties voted alike and contributed 62.6 and 76.3 per cent 
of the state's total Republican pluralities.
In the 1954 gubernatorial election, Oklahoma county voters re­
turned a Democratic plurality of 5,6lk, while Tulsa county voters re­
turned a Republican plurality of $,206. The net plurality of the two 
counties combined thus was 4o6 Democratic, or less than four-tenths of 
1 per cent of the total state Democratic plurality of 105,578. But in 
1962 both counties voted Republican, and together they contributed ex­
actly two-thirds of the total state Republican plurality of 76,959 by 
which Bellmon was elected; Oklahoma county returned a Republican plurality 
of 21,691 and Tulsa county a Republican plurality of 29,561, making a 
combined Republicem plurality of 51,252.
Extensive switch voting is not a recent phenomenon in Oklahoma.-- 
Examples of switch voting may be found in the elections that suitedate 
statehood. In 1902, both Kay and Noble county voters returned Re­
publican majorities in the contest for delegate to Congress and Demo­
cratic majorities in the contests for seats in the upper house of the 
territorial legislature.
A rather glaring exanple of switch voting occurred in two 
successive senatorial elections in Tillman county in 1920 and 1924.
The total voter turnout varied by only twenty-five persons in the two 
election years, smd presumably it was largely the same persons who 
were voting in both elections. The results were:
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1920 Vote 1924 Vote
Democrat Republican Democrat Republican
2,667 1,571 852 3M 9
A 60.9 per cent Democratic majority in 1920 vas converted into a 78.4  
per cent Republican majority in 192l4. This occurred in a strongly Demo­
cratic county, and in a year in vhich the Democratic presidential nominee 
carried Tillman county by a vote of 2,653 to 1,326, a majority of 63.7 
per cent.
An examination of all political contests extending back to 1907 
and dovn to the county level shovs that Love county is the only county 
in the state that has returned majorities for the candidates of only 
one party in all the county, district, and statevide contests.^ Love 
county definitely is the most Democratic county in the state; its voters 
have registered the highest Democratic percentages in the voting for 
both governor and United States senator since I907 and the second highest
p
percentage in the voting for President. Johnston county is the only 
other county that has never returned a Republican majority in a state­
vide contest, but its voters have elected three Republican county 
officials since I907. Meirshall county voters returned their first 
Republican majorities of any kind in I962, vhen the Republicem guberna­
torial and senatorial candidates carried the county.
Only nine Democratic counties have never elected a Republican 
county official: Beckham, Bryan, Greer, Biarmon, Jackson, Love, Me Curtain,
Marshall, emd Pontotoc. Eovever, all these counties except Love county
^Source of this data is the individual issues of the State 
Election Board's Directory and Manual and Roster of State and County 
Officers, each published biennieüJy.
p
Uiiversity of Oklahoma Bureau, op. cit., pp. 19, 21, 23.
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have bolted the party In one or more statevide contests. All their bolting 
occurred in the 1924 or I962 United States senate races, the I928 or i960 
presidential elections, or the I962 gubernatorial contest.
There has been much more svitch voting in the strongly Republican 
counties than in the strongly Democratic counties. In Major county, the 
strongest Republican county in the state, a full slate of Republican 
county officials vas elected in only six of the tventy-eight elections 
examined since I907. Alfalfa elected a full Republican slate in five 
elections and Garfield in three. The folloving strongly Republican 
counties have never elected a full slate of Republican county officials 1 
Grant, Harper, Kay, Pavnee, Tulsa, Washington, and Woodvard. Bolting 
the party in the state legislative races and in the voting for secondary 
state officials is fairly common in these Republican counties.
Since 1920 the Oklahoma protest vote has been cast for major 
party candidates rather than for third party candidates.— The heavy vote 
for Populist cemdidates in the 1890's and for Socialist candidates from 
1907 through 1918 vas noted in Chapter I, as vas the decision of Oklahoma 
faxm and labor leaders in the I918-I92I period to vork for their aims 
through the Democratic party rather than through a third party. The 
largest third party vote polled since I920 has been the 4l,l4l votes 
cast for the Phrmer-Iabor party presidential candidate in 1924, vhen 
the combined Parmer-Labor and Socialist paurty vote amounted to 8.7 per 
cent of the total. The next largest non-major party vote vas the 31,840 
votes cast for Independent candidate D.A. Jelly Bryce in the 1958 guber­
natorial election.
The Dixiecrats and Henry Wallace Progressives failed to meet
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the constitutional requirements for getting their electors on the 
ballot in 19tô, and hence there is no good measure of extremist 
sentiment in Oklahoma in recent years.
However, the Republican percentage of the vote has been markedly 
higher since 19^2, and the thesis was set forth in Chapter I that much 
of this vote may represent a protest against higher tax burdens and 
rising prices. The 1928 and i960 Republican presidential victories were 
protests against the Catholic nominees of the Democratic party. The 1952 
and 1956 Republican presidential victories embodied some protest against 
Democratic entry into and handling of the Korean war in particular and 
the handling of cold war problems in general.
A graphic picture of Oklahoma switch voting.— To complete the 
picture of Oklahoma switch voting, a series of ten maps is presented to 
show the counties carried by Republican and Democratic candidates in nine 
elections in which switch voting was very significant.
Map XIII is offered to represent what may be considered as a 
relatively "normal" election from the standpoint of the counties carried 
by the Democratic and Republican candidates. It shows the counties 
carried by Democratic gubernatorial nominee Robert S. Kerr in 19*f2 when 
he defeated Republican nominee William J. Otjen. The Republican nominee 
carried all the strongly Republican counties and all the Republican- 
oriented swing counties except Beaver and Canadian.
The remainder of the maps represent deviations from the so-called
norm.
Maps XIV through XIX picture Republican victories and show the 
elections in which Democratic switch voting was heavy. Maps XX through
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XXII picture Democratic victories and point up the fact that Republican 
switch voting also can be heavy.
Maps XIV, XV, and XVI show how deeply the Republican tide 
penetrated into the strongly Democratic counties of southern Oklahoma 
in the 1920 presidential election, the 1924 senatorial election, eind the 
1928 presidential election. Map XVII shows the counties carried by Re­
publican senatorial cemdidate Ed Moore in a somewhat narrower Republican 
victory in 1942; here the Republican trend penetrated into the swing 
counties, but not into the strongly Democratic counties. Nap XVIII shows 
the strength of the sentiment for Eisenhower in 1952; Eisenhower carried 
all the Republican counties and all the swing counties, plus a couple 
strongly Democratic counties in southwestern Oklahoma. Map XIX shows 
the strength of the anti-Catholic sentiment in i960, when Nixon carried 
a large number of strongly Democratic counties.
Map XX shows the counties carried by Democrat Barry Truman in 
the 1948 presidential election, when fear of an economic downturn ap­
parently caused many strongly Republican counties to return Democratic 
majorities. Map XXI shows the inroads made into Republican territory by 
Democratic gubernatorial nominee Raymond Gary in 1954, Just two years 
after Eisenhower had scored his impressive presidential victory— a 
reversal of voting which gives pause to one trying to find signs of a 
definite trend toward either major party in the 1950's. Map XXII gives 
the percentage of the vote received by Democratic gubernatorial nominee 
J. Howard Edmondson, who carried every county in the state in 1958; this 
constitutes the ultimate in Republican switch voting.
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CHAPTER VI 
VOTER TURNOUT
On the national level, the theory has been widely held that a
light voter turnout is favorable to the Republican party, though this
is subject to some dispute as to given locations and given elections.
The theory and at least one notable exception to it are stated by
Michigan Survey Research Center writers:^
[It is a] commonly held belief that a large turnout in national 
elections should favor the Democratic party. This belief is 
based on the fact that the traditionally pro-Republican classes 
uniformly have a high turnout, even vhen the vote as a whole is 
light, so that increases in size of vote might be expected to 
come mainly from working-class groups. This expectation was 
clearly not fulfilled in the 1952 election.
. . . [R]o single demographic class was responsible for the 
great increase in the Republican vote. . . . General Eisen­
hower won because virtually every major demographic group in 
American society gave him more votes than it had given the 
preceding Republican nominee.
In Oklahoma, the theory has been advanced by Otis Sullivant, 
political writer for the Daily Oklahoman, that a light voter turnout is 
favorable to the Democratic party rather than the Republican party. ^ 
This theory is based upon the idea that there is a "hard-core Democratic 
vote" of approximately 300,000 to 350,000 in the voting for governor;
■kjampbell. The Voter Decides, p. 75.
2Interview with Otis Sullivant, November 20, I963.
13»^
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therefore, the total vote must be more than twice these figures if the 
Republican candidate is to overcome the hard-core Democratic vote. The 
size of the hard-core Democratic vote was arrived at by an examination 
of Democratic voter turnout in fairly recent elections. Table 36 gives 
the size of the vote for all candidates, the number of Democratic votes, 
and the percentage of the Democratic vote for each gubernatorial election 
since 1930.
TABLE 36.--The size of the Democratic vote related to the size of the 
total vote in all guvernatorial elections since 1930
Total Vote Democratic Vote Per Cent
1930 511,320 301,921 59.0
1934 628,426 365,992 58.2
1938 507,956 355,740 70.0
19^2 378,781 196,565 51.8
1946 494,600 259,491 52.4
1950 644,276 329,308 51.1
1954 609,194 357,386 58.6
1958 538,879 399,533 74.1
1962 709,763 315,357 44.4
Average 559,022 320,144
The table shows that Democratic nominees won every election except 
that of 1962, when the off-year voter turnout exceeded 700,000 for 
the first time in Oklahoma history.
In his newspaper articles Sullivant elaborated upon his 
theory that a light vote benefits the Democratic party in Oklahoma 
in this way; "Democrats benefit by the so-called welfare vote, 
[control of] the state and federal set-ups and the county set-ups, 
and voters influenced by party organization strength, " whereas "the 
heavy vote brings out voters in the cities and suburbem areas, where
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the trend is with the GOP."^ He added that "the big majorities in the 
last three presidential races of Eisenhower and Nixon resulted from 
heavy turnouts in the big city areas.
However, despite the fact that the election of Oklahoma's first 
Republican governor was accompanied by a heavier thsuc usual voter turn­
out, it has been impossible to establish a positive correlation between 
an increase in the total vote and an increase in the Republican vote. 
Full acceptance of the theory is subject to some question on the 
following groundst
1) When the average percentage of voter turnout for the state and the 
average percentage of the Republican vote in all gubernatorial elections 
since 1907 are plotted on a chart, no consistent relation between the 
two factors emerges, as shown by Figure A. During some periods of
Oklahoma history the Republican vote decreased as voter turnout in­
creased. In Figure A, the range of voter turnout extends from that of 
the county with the lowest percentage of voter turnout to that of the 
county with the highest turnout percentage. The solid line represents 
the average percentage of turnout for the state as a whole; the broken 
line shows the average statewide Republican percentage of the total 
vote for each election. It seems clear that the Republican vote has 
not always increased as voter turnout increased.
2) The data in Table 36 do not wholly support the theory. It is true
that the two best Republican showings in the history of Oklahoma
3paily Oklahoman, September I6, I962.
^Ibid.. September 26, 1962.
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gubernatorial elections came in the high turnout years of 1950 and I962. 
But, on the other hand. Democrat Gary received $8 .6 per cent of the 
vote in 195^ when the turnout was 609^19 >^ while Democrats Robert Kerr 
and Roy Turner received only $1.8 and $2 .4 per cent of the vote in 
1942 and 1946 with light turnouts of 378,781 and 494,600. Table 37 
relates the percentage of voter turnout to the percentage of the 
Republican vote in all the gubernatorial elections since 1942. The 
figures for the six gubernatorial elections are arranged so as to 
begin at the left with the election in which the Republican vote per­
centage was the lowest; they continue in the order of the next best 
Republican showing, with the I962 Republican victory at the far right.
If the theory under examination were wholly valid, there should be a 
steady increase in voter turnout percentages from left to right to 
correspond with the steadily increasing Republican vote percentages.
TABLE 37.--Republican percentage of the vote related to percentage of 
statewide voter turnout in six gubernatorial elections
1958 1954 1946 1942 1950 1962
Republican pet. 
of total vote 
Percentage of 
voter turnout
19.9
38.2
41.3
43.6
45.9
35.9
47.6
27.6
48.6
46.6
55.2
49.8
While the 1950 and 1962 election results would seem to constitute argu­
ments for the fact that a large voter turnout is favorable to the 
Republican party, the 1954 and 1958 results appear to be arguments for 
the fact that popular Democratic caindidates can attract large numbers 
of votes from Republican areas, including the big city areas. It seems 
plausible to suspect that there would be a better correlation between
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Republican candidate popularity and size of Republican vote than 
betveen size of voter turnout and size of Republican vote, modified 
in some elections by campaign issues or national trends.
3) It vas shown in Chapter V that the hard-core Democratic areas are 
capable of switching their votes to Republican candidates when these 
candidates are especially popular or when the short-term influences 
bearing upon a particular election favor the Republicans. The Eisen­
hower and Nixon victories are attributable only in part to large turn­
outs in the big city and suburbem areas. The popularity of these 
cemdidates extended into Oklahoma's rural areas, and the increase in 
Republican voting was almost as great in the rural areas as in the 
populous areas. Moreover, the increase in Republican voting was al­
most as great in the strongly Democratic areas as in the strongly 
Republicem areas. It appears that the Eisenhower and Nixon victories 
are attributable more to heavy Democratic switch voting than to a 
drawing out of "new voters" in the cities and suburbs. 
h) In the Oklahoma general elections, voter turnout highest in the 
sixteen strongly Republican counties and lowest in the thirty-seven 
strongly Democratic counties, as shown by the figures in Table 38*
This table gives the average percentage of voter turnout for the 
Republican, Democratic, and swing counties and for Oklahoma county in 
five recent elections. The data show a steady decline in voter turn­
out as the voting areas become less strongly Republican and more strongly 
Democratic. Hence it is mostly Democrats who are staying at home on 
general election day, not Republicans. If there were as many Republican 
partisans as Democratic partisans in Oklahoma, the advantage in a year
iko
of light voter turnout should, be with the Republicans. For the voter 
turnout in the strongly Democratic counties has been averaging approxi­
mately l4 per cent less than that in the strongly Republican counties.
TABLE 38---Average percentage of voter turnout in the Republican, Demo­
cratic, and swing counties in five recent elections
1948 1950 1954 i960 1962 Avg.
Pres. Gov. Gov. Pres. Gov.
Strongly Republican 59.8 61.5 57.4 73.4 55.6 53.1 "
Republican-oriented 58.1 55.2 51.7 69.4 58.5 58.6
Democratic-oriented 57.1 51.7 50.1 66.1 57.3 56.5
Strongly Democratic 50.2 43.6 42.3 60.6 51.1 49.6
Oklahoma county 49.4 41.6 38.6 63.5 46.6 47.9
5) That large numbers of politically conscious Democrats in the strongly 
Democratic counties are staying at home on general election day is sub­
stantiated by the fact that the total vote in the general election is 
considerably lower than the total vote in the primaries in these counties. 
In the Republican counties, the total vote in the general election is 
considerably higher than the total vote in the primaries, This meauis 
that there is a rather large reservoir of politically conscious voters 
in the Democratic counties who are not voting in the general election.
The term "politically conscious voters" is stressed in the light of 
studies which indicate that the "group of non-voters is relatively 
constant over time. In other words, roughly the same persons vote 
in most elections; the others are so low in political involvement that 
they are drawn to the polls with the greatest difficulty. Table 39 
compares the voter turnout in the Democratic emd Republican primaries 
in the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties with that in the 
sixteen strongly Republican counties for the years 1950, 195 ,^ and I962.
Campbell, The American Voter, n. I5, p. 111.
l4l
TABLE 39*— Size of primary and general election vote in Democratic counties 
compared with that In the Republican counties
Yeeur Demo.Vote 
In Primary
Repub.Vote 
In Primary
Demo.Vote 
Gen.Elec.
Repub.Vote 
Gen. Elec.
1950
Democratic counties 247,9?8 2,658 139,895 69,118
Republican counties 76,476 34,522 66,403 114,963
195^
Democratic counties 242,310 3,344 144,457 47,657
Republican counties 83,639 34,795 76,157 100,033
1962
90,644Democratic counties 235,211 4,063 123,241
Republican counties 93,040 38,457 64,328 137,142
The figures show a decline of approximately 100,000 Democratic votes In 
the strongly Democratic counties as between the primaries and general 
elections. Since the Republican vote Increased by an average of 
approximately 50,000 votes In 1950 and 195 ,^ this would Indicate that 
approximately half the 100,000 decline In Democratic votes In those 
years resulted from Democrats staying at home. In I962 the total vote 
In the general election showed less of a decline from the total vote In 
the Democratic and Republican primaries, but the Democratic vote dropped 
sharply In the general election; this means that fewer Democrats stayed 
at home but that there was a much higher degree of switch voting.
Summary
The assumption that there Is a good-sized reservoir of stay-at- 
home voters In the Republican areas who are drawn to the polls In years 
of high voter turnout does not seem warranted from the foregoing data. 
Rather, it appears that the greatest reservoir of politically conscious 
voters who are staying at home during the general elections Is In the 
strongly Democratic areas.
Ik2
Recent Republican successes appear to be attributable more to 
the offering of popular candidates, to Democratic switch voting, to 
Democratic party splits, and to other short-term Influences favorable 
to the Republican party rather than to high voter turnout.
With continued urbanization, a more consistent relation might 
develop between high voter turnout and an Increase In Republican voting. 
For, as explained previously, there are more populous centers In the 
Republican areas of the state than In the Democratic areas; also, 
seventeen of the twenty-three counties that lost 20 per cent or more 
of their populations between 1950 and I96O were rural Democratic 
counties. A continuation of this trend would be favorable to the 
Republican party.
General Voter Turnout Statistics,
1928-1962
Table 40 gives the average percentage of voter turnout In 
Oklahoma for the nine presidential elections since 1928 and for the 
nine gubernatorial elections since 1930.^  Here again voter turnout 
percentages are based upon the number of those who voted In relation 
to the total number of Oklahoma residents over twenty-one years of age. 
The most marked trend appears to be a higher motivation to vote In the 
presidential elections beginning In 1952. Otherwise, It appears that 
voter turnout Is determined for the most part by how much Interest Is 
generated by the candidates or Issues In given elections. In the 
gubernatorial elections, turnout was relatively low In I938 and I958, 
the years In which Democratic candidates won by the biggest majorities;
^University of Oklahoma Bureau, op. cit., pp. 6^-68, 88-IO6.
1^3
it vas relatively high in I950 and I962, years of strong Republican 
showings, indicating that the prospect of a close race may bring out 
the voters.
TABLE 4o.— Average percentage of voter turnout for the state as a whole 
in presidential and gubernatorial elections since I928
Gubernatorial Elections Presidential Elections
1930 . . . . 39.7 1928 . . .50.1
1934 . . . . 47.6 1932 . . .54.0
1938 . . . . 37.5 1936 . . .56.1
19*^ 2 . . . . 27.6 1940 . . .60.3
19*^ 6 . . . . 35.9 1944 . . .52.5
1950 . . . . 46.6 1948 . . .52.3
19514- . . . . 43.6 1952 . . .68.3
1958 . . . . 38.2 1956 . . .61.2
1962 . . . . 49.8 i960 . . . • 63.7
CHAPTER VII
REPUBLICAN PARTY LEADERSHIP
AND ORGANIZATION
Since Oklahoma Republicans elected no governor until 1962 and 
since only three Republicans have been elected to the United States 
senate for single terms^ leadership of that party necessarily has 
rested primarily with party organization officials, especially with 
its national committeemen, rather than with elected public officials, 
as has been the case with the Democratic party. And, except for one 
four-year period, the Republican national committeeman was a Tulsa 
area oil millionaire from 1916 until 1956.
The real power of the national committeeman in the Republican 
party began with Jim McGraw, the wealthy Ponca City and Tulsa banker- 
oilman, who assumed that office in 1916. Federal patronage was the 
source of the national committeeman's power in the party, and Oklsihoma 
got little federal patronage prior to I916. According to Parker LaMoore, 
Daily Oklahoman political writer, McGraw was the nearest approach to a 
political boss that Oklahoma had in its early history.^
McGraw was succeeded as national committeeman in 1920 by Jake L. 
Hamon, Ardmore oilman, who was killed shortly after assuming the post.
Ipaily Oklahoman, August I8, I929.
14)4.
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Following his death a three-way fight for control of federal patronage 
in Oklahoma broke out between Eamon's successor, James A. (Big Jim) 
Harris, Wagoner merchant; Hamon*s lieutenants; and newly elected United 
States Senator J.W. Harreld, the first Republican to be elected to the 
senate from Oklahoma. It was Senator Harreld who soon got control of 
most federal appointments, and his slate of party officials was elected 
over the Harris slate at the I92I+ Republicem state convention.^
It was at this same 1924 state convention that W.G.(Bill) Skelly, 
wealthy Tulsa oilman, first was nominated for the post of national 
committeeman, a position he was to hold from 1924 until 1940. Born in 
Erie, Pennsylvania, the son of an oil field teamster, Skelly began his 
career as a tool dresser in the Pennsylvania oil fields at eight dollars
a week. He entered the oil business on his own in Indiana when he was
twenty-three years old. Shortly thereafter he moved to Oklahoma, formed 
the Skelly Oil Company in 1919, bought into the Burkbumett, Texas, oil 
field when it was first opened in 1923, almost went under financially in 
the 1930's, and then rebuilt the conqaany to a point where its capital 
exceeded $100,000,000 by 1948.
Skelly, his successor Lew Wentz, and Patrick J. Hurley consti­
tuted the core of the Republican party leadership in the 1924-1940 
period. 3 Hurley, who served as secretary of war under President Herbert 
Hoover, has been Oklahoma's only cabinet appointee.
There is some difference of opinion as to which of the two long-
^Oklahoma City Times, April 24, 1924.
3Interview with Herbert Hyde, prominent Republican, July I9, 19^3.
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time national committeemen. Bill Skelly or Lew Wentz, was least inter­
ested in building up the Republican party at the grass roots in Oklahoma. 
Both appeared to operate under the philosophy that it was impossible to 
elect a Republican governor in Oklahoma, and hence it was wise to send 
the big party donations to Washington and be content for the most part 
with receiving federal patronage. The combined terms of the two as 
national committeemen spanned a lengthy period, from 1924 to 1949* and 
little effort was expended in building up the party in those twenty-five 
years.
There were several revolts against Skelly's leadership, par­
ticularly in 1928 when the Lew Wentz-Grant McCullough faction demanded 
that State Chairman Byron Shear be replaced by Frank A. Parkinson. A 
dispatch from the Daily Oklahoman Washington bureau said in 1928:^
Since the death of Jim McGraw of Tulsa, Oklahoma Republicans 
have been without a leader from the standpoint of the powers 
that be in Washington. . . .
Senator John W. Harreld has been retired to the ranks. Neither 
Senator W.B. Pine nor Representative M.C. Garber, the two Re­
publicans in Congress, evidence either the inclination or the 
adaptability to become party bosses in the accepted sense.
William G. Skelly of Tulsa is on the national committee, but 
Skelly with many interests does not spend much time on matters 
political outside of campaign years and a leader is wanted who 
is on the Job year in and year out.
But Skelly weathered all the storms until he and Wentz had a serious
difference of opinion over whom to support for President in 1940. Wentz
was strongly for Dewey emd Skelly for Willkie.
In 1940 the post of Republican national committeemem went to 
Wentz, a bachelor-philanthropist who also rose mercurially in the oil
4paily Oklediomem, June 5, 1928.
1^7
'business from humble beginnings. Born in Mount Vernon^ lova, the son 
of a blacksmith, his family moved to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, when he 
was young. He came to Ponca City in 191I to look after the financial 
interests of John G. McCaskey of Pittsburgh. In 1924, after McCaskey's 
death, he organized the Wentz Oil Company and a few years later he was 
reported to be one of seven persons in the United States who was paying 
federal income tax on a yearly income of more than $5>000,000.^  He gave 
heavy donations to crippled children's funds, played Santa Claus to Ponca 
City children and inmates of the county home, and provided several 
hundred thousand dollars for scholarships for Oklahoma university 
students.^ In 1948 Wentz led the fight for Dewey for President, and it 
was reported that he was to become secretary of the interior if Dewey 
won. Some of his friends believe that the disappointment over Dewey's 
loss and the strenuous effort he put into the campaign contributed to his 
death on June 9> 1949*'^
Bailie Vinson of Tulsa, owner of the Vinson Supply Compsiny, 
which is in the oil refinery and oil field equipment field, succeeded 
Wentz. Vinson was a Skelly protege, and he was opposed for the post by 
a Wentz protégé, Herbert K. Hyde, Oklahoma City attorney. Supporters 
of Vinson stressed that he was privately wealthy and therefore could 
afford to devote time to party work. Heal Sullivan, of Hewkirk, a Hyde 
supporter, wrote the following to the Republican central committee members
^Oklahoma City Times, June 29, 192?•
^Ponca City Hews. September 10, 1939*
^Daily Oklahoman, June 10, 1949.
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in reply to this argument:®
This is one of the things wrong with the Republican party in 
Oklahoma. We are pointed out as the party of millionaires 
instead of the party of the people.
This letter proved to be one of the harbingers of change in Republican
party leadership in Oklahoma, for it was during Vinson's tenure that a
group of Republicans who wanted to build the party at the grass roots
wrested some control from the Tulsa group.
The change in Republican party leadership began to take form 
shortly after the election of Eisenhower in 1952. The Tulsa oilmen had 
backed Robert Taft for the Republican presidential nomination. The 
Oklahoma City and wheat belt Republicans were for Eisenhower. Skelly, 
a strong Taft man, led the Oklahoma delegation to the 1952 Republican 
national convention. G.E. Bames, Oklahoma City attorney, who had 
served as Republican state chairman firom 1948 until 1950, was the leader 
of the Eisenhower forces in the Oklahoma delegation. When Eisenhower 
won the nomination, "the Taft leaders, headed by Skelly, did not take 
their defeat kindly" and their ill feeling extended into the post-election 
period.^
The grass roots Republicems of this post-1952 period were led by 
Bames; Floyd Carrier, who was Republican state chairman from 1950 until 
1954 and who had served as a state legislator from the Enid area since 
1935; and Ifrs. E.H. Sayre, Republican national committeewoman.
The Republican party had been without federal patronage since
®Ibid.. September 9> 1949*
^Paul T. David and Malcolm Moos (eds.), Presidential Ruminating 
Politics in 1952 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), III, 292-
312. See chap. xiii on "Oklahoma" by Cortez A.M. Ewing and Mrs. June 
Benson.
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1932, and now a strong difference of opinion developed betveen the grass 
roots Republicans and the Tulsa group over distribution of the newly 
found patronage that came with Eisenhower's election. The pro-Eisenhower 
group wanted State Chairman Carrier to dispense it; the Tulsa group wanted 
National Committeeman Vinson to make the decisions.
This intra-party strife was a strong factor in the failure of the
party to capitalize immediately upon the Eisenhower victory with a strong
grass roots movement. Otis Sullivant wrote in 1953
When Floyd Carrier, state chairman, and his forces took charge of 
the central committee to name Robert L. Aitken [Oklahoma City 
filling station operator] party treasurer, it cut out the Tulsa 
Republican leaders who have been counted upon to finance the 
party in the past.
It is no secret that party headquarters is having trouble 
raising funds. . . .
Table 27 in Chapter IV showed that Republican failures to enter statewide
contests increased rather sharply in 1950 and continued through that
decade and into the present one. The Tulsa group became less interested
in supplying campaign funds, and this hurt the party.
In the contest for Republican state chairman in 1954 the Vinson 
forces supported Douglas McKeever, Enid attorney who was serving as 
assistant solicitor in the Postoffice Department in Washington. The 
Barnes-Carrier group backed Aitken. The state committee chose McKeever, 
and he worked out this compromise on the distribution of patronage: 
local appointments were to be made upon the recommendation of local 
Republican committees; the higher appointments were to be made upon 
recommendation of a committee composed of the state chairman, the
^^Daily Oklahoman, August 8, 1953*
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national c(»onltteeman, emd the national committeevoman.^^ This ap­
parently eased, but did not end, the party strife.
In 1956 Vinson announced that he vould not be a candidate for 
national committeeman and threv his support to Reuben Sparks, Woodward 
lawyer-ranoher, who had been the party's gubernatorial nominee in 195^* 
His selection made Sparks the first non-Tulsa area oil millionaire to 
hold the post since 1924. But Sparks lived in the northwest corner of 
the state, far removed from the state capital, and he was unable to 
devote the time required for building up the party.
In i960 Sparks did not seek reelection and it was reported that 
"there seems to be less interest in the post than in the past." 3^ xt 
was about this time that William Robbins, county chairman of Oklahoma 
county, placed an advertisement in the Oklahoma City newspapers asking 
Republicans interested in becoming candidates for political office to 
contact him. Party morale was not at all high.
However, State Chairman John Tyler, of Bartlesville, operator 
of the Portland Cement Company at Dewey, oilman, and rsmcher, announced 
his candidacy and was chosen virtually without opposition. As state 
chairman in 1959* Tyler had devised a neighbor-to-neighbor Republican 
program in which local party workers were asked to call upon every 
registered Republican in their areas to solicit funds and to ask for more 
party participation. The program, which began in May, 1959* vas designed 
to answer the question: What would happen if the party tried to organize
^Interview with Douglas McKeever, September 6, 1962.
'^^ Daily Oklahoman, December 2, 1959* ^^Ibid., February 1, I960.
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by precincts and to raise funds when no election campaign was in prog- 
ress?^^
Henry Bellmon, as county chairman of Noble county, orgEinized 
one hundred party workers and they called upon approximately twelve 
hundred of the eighteen hundred registered Republicans in Noble county. 
They raised $870 in party funds, as opposed to the usual $85 to $100 
that was raised during previous election campaigns. Bellmon's efforts 
attracted Tyler's attention, and after Tyler became national committee­
man he asked Bellmon to take the post of state chairman.
It was under the Tyler-Bellmon leadership that the seeds of 
grass roots Republicanism planted by Carrier, Barnes, and Mrs. Sayre 
began to bear some fruit. There were token county organizations in all 
but seven of the state's seventy-seven counties when Bellmon took over 
as state chairman, but not more than thirty were at all active. And 
there was no money in the state party treasury; the party had $3,000 
left after the I960 campaign, but this was spent to finance the recount 
in the Clyde Wheeler-Victor Wickersham sixth district congressional race. 
It was only after six weeks' deliberation that it was decided to keep 
the Republican state headquarters office open year round.
A two-year party building program called Operation Countdown 
was devised to raise money and to strengthen the Republican county 
organizations. It was aimed at giving the newly elected party officials 
some tasks to perform in order to keep them interested in party affairs. 
But also it was designed to bring out the weak places in the party organ-
^^Interview with Governor Bellmon, August 28, I963.
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Izatlon by permitting Chairman Bellmon to learn which party committeemen 
were willing to work and which were not. In addition, with the Democrats 
In power In Oklahoma, the Republican party needed some publicity to 
maintain public Interest In Its afflalrs.
In addition to revitalizing Republican county organizations, the 
Operation Countdown program was aimed at (l) raising funds for the party 
throughout the state, to relieve the party's dependence upon the Tulsa 
group and (2) to Induce "the 300,000 Democrats who voted for Republican 
candidates In the last three presidential elections" to change their 
party registrations. The success of the latter phase of the program was 
discussed In Chapter IV. The program was carried out under the direction 
of a state task force, fifteen regional task forces, and as many county 
task forces as were needed to take over where the regular Republican 
county committee would not function.
Ifeder party rules In I96O, the state chairman could not replace 
ineffective county chairmen, who were elected by local Republicans. Hence, 
where county officials did not perform the tasks assigned to them In the 
Operation Countdown program, a separate county task force was appointed 
to perform the program's functions in that county. Asking county leaders 
to do some work caused some to resign; appointment of a special task force 
in some counties caused others to do the same. Invariably, Chairman 
Bellmon appointed younger men to replace the older hands who resigned—  
men who had less of a defeatist view about Republican prospects. At the 
1961 Republican state convention the party rules were changed to permit 
the state executive committee to remove Ineffective or disloyal party
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officials.
That Chairman Bellmon himself had no defeatist views about 
Republican prospects in Oklahoma was shown by the fact that Republican 
county chairmen and vice chairmen were named in the seven counties where 
no county organizations existed: LeFlore, Latimer, Coal, Johnston, Murray,
Marshall, and Delaware counties.
The foregoing shows that power in the party no longer is concen­
trated so much in the hands of the national committeeman; it is being 
shared more with the state chairman and other party officials. Nor is 
it necessary any longer that the party leader be privately wealthy so 
that he may devote time to party affairs. Chairman Bellmon was paid 
$100 a month for expenses when he first became state chairman in 196O; 
this soon was increased to $600 a month. Forrest Beall, who became state 
chairman in March, 1962, received a salary of $10,000 a year plus ex­
penses. The present state chairman, William Burkett, receives $15,000 
a year plus expenses.And, since Bellmon's tenure, the state head­
quarters has been kept open the year round. New life has been infused 
into the party and the competition for top party posts has become 
spirited.
Legal Obstacles to Republican 
Growth in Oklahoma
Because the Democratic party has dominated the lawmaking process 
^^Rules of the Republican Party of the State of Oklahoma (May
27, 1961), p. S.
^^Stephen Jones, "Oklahoma Politics in State and Nation" (Type­
written, 1963), pp. 135-136.
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for all but two years since 1907, the state’s election laws have been 
designed to flavor the Democratic party and to retard the growth of the 
Republican party.
The election laws that do the most to help the Democratic party 
are theset
1) The provision that gubernatorial elections and contests for most 
statewide offices shall be held in the off years rather than in the 
presidential years. The only state officials elected in the presidential 
years are one corporation commissioner, one judge of the criminal court 
of appeals, three or four justices of the state supreme court, and some­
times a United States senator. The purpose is to isolate the election
of the governor and most statewide officials from national trends in the 
presidential yeaurs so that a strong Republican presidential nominee or 
a strong trend favorable to the Republican party will not carry an 
entire slate of Republican state officials into office.
2) The law, enacted in 19^3, which provides for four separate general 
election ballots: for county, state, congressional, emd presidential
contests. State legislators had their contests put on the county 
ballot, where revolts against Democratic leadership are least likely 
to be expressed. The purpose here is to hold down straight-ticket 
voting for all offices in a strong Republican year, whether it be a 
presidential year or off year.
3) The gerrymander of the state's congressional districts in such a 
way as to make it difficult for Republicans to elect more than one of 
Oklahoma's six United States representatives. Although the Democratic 
percentage of the congressional vote has varied from 54.8 per cent in
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i960 to 6k.9 per cent in 195 ,^ five Democrats and one Republican have 
been elected in every biennium since 1952, vhen the number of repre­
sentatives vas reduced from eight to six.^ '^  An examination of Map 
XXIII, which outlines the present congressional district boundaries, 
shows the following combinations of counties in the six districts: 
District 1 contains ten Republican counties, including a slight stretch 
to include populous Tulsa county, emd generally is conceded to the 
Republicans; District 2 contains five Republican and ten Democratic 
counties; District 3 is a Democratic stronghold; District 4 combines 
four Republican emd six Democratic counties; District $ comprises one 
Republicem emd three Democratic counties, as well as populous Oklahoma 
county, a crucial swing county as to the major races but a Democratic- 
oriented county as to the congressional contests and those involving 
lesser state offices; District 6 combines six Republicem emd seventeen 
Democratic counties.
^^Ifaiversity of Oklahoma Bureau, op. cit., pp. l4-l6.
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CHAPTER VIII
DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADERSHIP 
AND ORGANIZATION
In contrast to the Republican party, where leadership has been 
relatively concentrated and reasonably identifiable, the Democratic 
party is much more fragmented and its leadership more diffused. Be­
cause the Democrats have controlled the executive and legislative 
branches of Oklahoma government throughout nearly all of Oklahoma history 
and have supplied the great bulk of the congressional delegation, the 
Democratic party has seldom spoken with one voice. Its record is made 
by its governors, other elected state officials, its state legislators, 
its congressional delegation, and in lesser degree its party organization 
officials. To attempt to answer the questions. Who runs the Democratic 
party in Oklahoma? or What does the Democratic party in Oklahoma stand 
for? is a very difficult task.
Political bosses comparable to those in various other states 
have been unknown in Oklahoma. For one thing, the law which prohibits 
a governor from succeeding himself makes it virtually impossible for a 
leader or group of leaders to build up any sort of continuing organization 
that is committed to a given set of goals or principles. If there is a 
fault in the Oklahoma political system, it lies in the other direction;
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political leadership has been so diffused that the electorate has found 
it virtually impossible to know where to give credit or place blame. 
Confronted with a largely new set of faces in the gubernatorial contests 
every four years and not knowing who is running things, the principal 
aim of Oklahoma voters apparently has been to find the "fresh new face," 
the g-an unscarred by past political connections, the nan who will give 
them their money's worth in the operation of state government. Such an 
attitude exalts personality above principle, favors the honest amateur 
over the man vith experience, and implies that one man can clean up state 
government almost unaided.
It has been just as difficult to ascertain what the Democratic 
party stands for as to learn who is running things in the party. The 
Democratic party has not drafted a state platform for approximately 
twenty-five years. In actuality, the Democratic state platform is the 
platform of the nominee who wins the Democratic gubernatorial primary, 
a program which the Democratic majority in the state legislature some­
times will enact into law and sometimes will not. And since Democratic 
gubernatorial candidates axe largely self-nominated, this can lead to a 
wholesale revision of the "party platform" every four years, as occurred 
in 193k and 1938. In 193k Democratic candidate E.W. Mar land campaigned 
on a platform of "Bring the New Deal to Oklahoma" and of building 100,000 
subsistence homes for needy families, but the Democratic members of the 
state legislature took over and adopted their own program in large part. 
In 1938 Democratic candidate Leon Phillips ceunpaigned on a program of 
severe retrenchment, and this time the Democratic members of the state 
legislature concurred.
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Therefore^ In discussing the Democratic party and its leader­
ship^ it is necessary to break down the party into its cozqionent parts 
and discuss each separately. Fbr^ in addition to the party in the 
electorate, the term political party also includes the party in the 
legislature and the party in the executive branch, as well as the 
official party machinery.^ And the various elements of the party are 
not always tied together into a coherent whole under united leadership.
The Party in the Executive Branch
James Arrington, the current Democratic national committeeman
from Oklahoma, explained that the Democratic party in Oklahoma is built
2
around the governor. This is so because the governor has a bundle of 
powers which, if wisely and energetically used, give him a big advantage 
over any other person or party element in providing unified leadership 
for all party elements. Among his more iaqportant powers are these:
l) His patronage powers. Though the heads of many of the most important 
executive departments are elected by the people, the governor's patronage 
powers still are considerable. He names five department or bureau heads 
and the members of approximately forty boards, commission^ authorities, 
and committees vith senate confirmation, plus four department or bureau 
heads and the members of thirty-five agencies without senate confirmation. 
Among the more important executive officials appointed by the governor 
are the members of the highway commission, the budget officer, tax
^Key, Politics, Parties, And Pressure Groups, Introduction to 
Part Two.
^Interview with James Arrington, July 19, 19^3'
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coBolssloner, welfare commissioner, president of the board of agriculture, 
and conservation commissioner.
2) The governor's control of the eight-member highway commission is worthy 
of special mention because there are many persons with vested interests
in the state's highway building program, emd out of this web of relation­
ships can develop a sizeable organization. Many civic leaders such as 
bankers, doctors, lawyers, and insurance men are willing to serve as 
county campaign managers for gubernatorial candidates almost solely to 
have access to the governor to obtain needed highways or highway improve­
ments for their communities. There are approximately three hundred 
fairly large road contractors in Oklahoma, and they have been a good 
source of campaign funds for many gubernatorial candidates. The sale 
of performance bonds to highway contractors who receive state contracts 
is a highly profitable business for certain insurance men. In sum, the 
eight highway commissioners can become the political eyes and ears for 
the governor over the state and the nucleus of his political organization 
during his four years in office.
3) A strong governor can exert considerable control over the state legis­
lature because, by custom, he usually designates the speaker of the house, 
the president pro tempore of the senate, and the floor leaders. The 
speaker and president pro tempore in turn generally control the make-up 
of the legislative committees and assign the bills to the committees. 
However, Oklahoma's governors have by no means been uniformaly successful 
in controlling the legislature, as already indicated.
4) A strong governor usually has considerable control over the Democratic 
party's official machinery from the fact that his choices for national
l6l
committeeman and state chairman generally are accepted by the party's 
central committee members, who actually elect the state chairmsm, and by 
the delegates to the Democratic national convention, vho nominate the 
national committeeman and committeevoman. But here again Oklahoma's 
governors have exerted varying degrees of control. The reasons why 
Governor J. Howard Edmondson lost almost all control over the party 
machinery In I96O will be discussed later.
To provide the unified leadership of all the elements of the 
Democratic party that is expected of him, Oklahoma's governor must have 
a good program, the political know-how to maneuver it througpi the legis­
lature, considerable public backing for his program, good rapport with 
the members of the legislature, and the capacity and tes^erament to use 
the powers of the office energetically and wisely. When a governor stubs 
his' toe, leaders of one or more of the other elements of the party always 
are ready to step in and take over.
A capsule summary of how well Oklahoma's last four Democratic 
governors have succeeded in leading the party is provided by Otis 
Sullivant of the Daily Oklahoman, who has observed the workings of Okla­
homa state government for more than thirty years.
Roy Turner, 19^6-1950: He lacked the drive of Leon Phillips
(1938-19^2) in pushing difficult legislation through the legislature and 
the salesmanship of Robert S. Kerr (19^2-19^6) in dealing with legis­
lators and party officials. But he exhibited a quiet tenacity and strong 
determination to be an effective governor, and he left office with more 
popularity than almost any other outgoing governor. 3
3paily Oklahoman, January 12, 1950.
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Johnston Murray, 1950-195 :^ Though elected on an economy and
reform program, he did not display the firmness or leadership required 
to drive much of his program through the legislature. There vas much 
"vacillation" and "indecision." He designated the party state chairman 
but lost control of the delegation to the 1952 Democratic national con­
vention to Senator Robert Kerr.^
Raymond Gary, 19$4-19$8 : As a veteran legislator, Gary had
excellent rapport vith the state legislaturej the question is whether 
he allowed the legislators too free a rein.
[His administration] could have been much better if Gary had 
held to a minimum the use of patronage, favors and promises 
of roads. On the other hand, without the free use of the 
power and influence of the office, the governor might not have 
been in full control. . . .
He designated the state chairman and controlled the delegation to the
1956 Democratic national convention.^
J. Howard Edmondson, 1958-1962: His troubles with other elements
of the Democratic party leadership began in 1958, shortly after the close
of the first legislative session of his tern, when he decided to initiate
three reform proposals, two of which were especially bitterly opposed by
rural elements of the party. Two of his initiative petitions called for
legislative reapportionment and for curbing the powers of the county
commissioners with respect to road building and maintenance; the third
called for a constitutional highway commission to take road building out
of politics. When the Democratic state chairman resigned in September,
1959, the rural-dominated Democratic executive committee chose an avowed
^Ibid., January 9, 1955*
^Ibid., January 4-, 1959> Magazine Section.
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opponent of the governor's reform petitions for state chairman. After 
the three petitions were defeated overwhelmingly by vote of the people ^ 
in September, i960, Edmondson "had less influence and control in the 
Democratic party . . . than any governor since the 1920's . H e  did 
not control the Oklahoma delegation to the Democratic national con­
vention in i960 and the only legislative leader he was allowed to 
designate for the 1961 legislative session was the Democratic floor 
leader.
Without a strong and popular governor to lead it, the Demo­
cratic party can easily become fragmented, for there are numerous com­
petitors for party leadership.
The Party in the Legislature
The most formidable contestants of the governor for Democratic 
party leadership are the legislative leaders, including the leaders of 
the various blocs within the legislature. The governor sometimes meets 
especially strong opposition from members of the state senate, who some­
times act in concert with the county commissioners and sometimes with 
leaders of private pressure groups.
Because the Oklahoma legislature has been O'verwhelmlngly Demo­
cratic in all but two sessions since I907, several strong blocs have 
developed within the Democratic majority. There has not been sufficient 
Republican membership to instill a strong spirit of unity emd discipline 
in the Democratic members. One former influential legislator identified 
the three major blocs as the school, welfare, and road users-county
^Ibid., December I6, I962.
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commissioners blocs. There are also public utility and retail merchants 
partisans^ but they are not numerous enough to be considered as major 
blocs.
The school bloc includes the higher education bloc, made up of 
legislators representing districts that contain one of the state's 
eighteen institutions of higher learning, and the common school bloc, 
which works in close cooperation with the Oklahoma Education Association, 
widely regarded as the most influential lobby in the state. The welfhre 
bloc coB^rises the legislators from counties or districts in which there 
are large numbers of public assistemce recipients, particularly the 
counties in southeastern Oklahoma. The road users-county commissioners 
bloc is made up of legislators who sell highway building equipment and 
supplies to the county commissioners or who have other vested interests 
in the way in which the state road users' tax revenues are being spent.
A collision often develops between two or more of these blocs over 
division of the state's funds when the appropriation bill is being en­
acted.
In the lower house, veteran legislators have estimated that about 
thirty to thirty-five members usually can be counted upon to respond to 
the wishes of the governor. Total membership is about one hundred twenty, 
but it varies because of the existence of flotorlal districts. The house 
speaker also can control a substantial number of votes through his ability 
to grant such favors as placing members on desired committees. The 
governor customeurily makes trades with a sufficient number of legislators 
to get his important bills enacted.
In the state senate, each senator is virtually a power in his
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own right, for the senators have these patronage powers that enable them 
to build up strong individual political organizations;
1) The county tag agents, who receive a fifty-cent notary fee for each 
automobile license tag sold in their counties, are designated by the 
state senators. By custom, the State Tax Commission follows the wishes 
of the state seiMitors in appointing the tag agents. These are prized 
Jobs, and the tag agents become the political lieutenants of the state 
senators. In 19^0 the Tulsa county tag agent was reported to be clearing 
$30,000 a year.7
2) County Election Board personnel also are designated by the state 
senators. The State Election Board actually makes the appointments, 
but the Democratic majority on the board usually follows the wishes of 
the senators. The secretary of the state senate is the secretary of the 
State Election Board; the other two board members are one Democrat and 
one Republicem appointed by the governor from names submitted by the 
party central committees. The Democratic member customarily votes with 
the secretary of the senate.
3) Many applicants for Jobs at the state institutions are "cleared" for 
employment with the state senator from that district.
Thus are individual political machines built up by the state 
senators, vho also enjoy close ties with the county commissioners through 
a mutual interest in county road building and maintenance. Nearly all 
the state senators are important political influences in their home 
districts. Memy are isqoortant figures in the affairs of the state
ÎH.O. Waldby, The Patronage System in Oklahoma (Norman, Okla.:
The Transcript Company, 1950), p. 47.
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Democratic party.
The Democratic legislators constitute one voice of the Demo­
cratic party in Oklahoma, and the records they make in the various 
legislative sessions contribute heavily to the party's public image.
The Oklahoma City Times intimated editorially in 1963 that the recent 
record of the Democratic-controlled legislature may have had much to do 
with the election of a Republican governor in 1962. The editorial was 
prompted by the efforts of some Democratic legislators in the I963 
session to kill the merit system law that had been enacted in the early 
days of the Edmondson administration. Edmondson had been elected on a 
reform platform and the promise to "clean out the Old Guard" of Oklahoma 
politics. The editorial said:®
Intra-party bickering and a concern for patronage, often at the 
expense of responsible and effective administration, both helped 
to spark the prairie fire that put J. Howard Edmondson in the 
governor's chair. His election was, in effect, a warning by the 
state's voters.
When it went largely unheeded, the voters decided last November 
to try a Republican governor.
The 1961 legislative session, just ahead of the 1962 election, was the
longest, costliest, and one of the most wrangling sessions in the state's
history.
The Official Party Machinery 
Though officials of the Republican party organization generally 
have constituted the principal voice of that party in Oklahoma, until 
very recent years those holding posts in the Democratic party organization
®Oklahoma City Times. April I8, 1963.
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have constituted a relatively minor voice of the Democratic party. Such 
organization leaders as the state chairman emd national committeeman have 
been overshadowed by elected Democratic public officials, especially the 
governor. Most of the top party officials have owed their positions to 
the governors who supported them.
The national committeeman with the longest tenure was Scott 
Perris, of Lawton, Pauls Valley, and later Oklahoma City, who served 
ftrom 192k until 19^0. His term began four years after he defeated in­
cumbent Senator Tom P. Gore in the bitter I92O Democratic senatorial 
primary, then lost to Republican J.W. Harreld in the general election.
He was personable emd well liked, but at no time during his sixteen-year 
tenure did he dominate the party. Robert S. Kerr had the next longest 
tenure, from l^ l^ O until 1948, but he came to exert more influence upon 
the party after he left the post than while he held it. However, he 
gained much recognition outside the state in those eight years. He was 
keynote speaker at the Democratic national convention in 1944 and was 
rumored as a possible successor to both Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Ickes and National Democratic Chairman Robert E. Hannegan in 1946.
Former State Chairman Sam Battles summarized the usual importance 
of the post of state chairman in this way: "The state chairman can
recommend that a party worker be given a job, but if the state senator 
or representative doesn't want him he doesn't get it."^ Such state 
chairmen as Judge Samuel W. Hayes, who served from 1930 until 1932, and 
R.M. Me Cool, who served from 1932 until 1934, were men of very high
^Interview with Sam Battles, July 23, I963.
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caliber, but neither dominated the party. Governor W.J. HoUovay per­
suaded Judge B&yea to take the post to help give the party a better 
image following the impeachment and removal of Governor Henry Johnston 
and the 1928 Hoover landslide.Judge Hayes had been chief Justice of 
the Oklahoma suprsms court. McCool vas president of Murray State Agri­
cultural College at Tishomingo when Governor W.H. Murray chose him for 
the post.
The post of state chairman assumed somewhat more iiqportance be­
ginning in i960, for Governor Edmondson lost control of the party in 
that year; with the Bepubliceua gubernatorial victory in I962, the Demo­
crats were without a governor for the first time in history. However, 
it appears that the party has been run by a coalition of party organ­
ization leaders headed by State Chairman Gene McGill, members of the 
congressional delegation headed by Senator Kerr prior to his death and 
later by Senator Mike Monroney, state legislative leaders, plus some 
large-scale financial contributors and leading political figures. The 
decision making apparently has shifted from one person or group to others 
on given matters; as to the state legislative program, for example, in­
dications are that this has been and will continue to be shaped by Demo­
cratic legislative leaders, with little or no outside help.
The Congressional Delegation 
Each of the state's United States senators and representatives 
has his own campaign organization, varying greatly in size and izqxartance. 
Each also controls a certain amount of federal patronage in Oklahoma,
Interview with Otis Sullivant, Daily Oklahoman political 
writer, August 2, I963.
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with the patronage of the senators being especially important. However, 
the influence of the congressmen upon Oklahoma politics has varied 
greatly^ depending in part upon the inclinations and temperaments of 
each.
Senator Robert S. Kerr's organization was especially important 
in recent Oklahoma politics and is thought by many to have played an 
inqportant role in helping W.P. Bill Atkinson defeat Raymond Gary in the 
1962 Democratic runoff primary. The Kerr organization conqprised nuclei 
of from ten to fifty active Kerr supporters in nearly all the state's 
seventy-seven counties,plus the support of many members of the Southern 
Baptist faith, the Farmers Iftiion, and the oil Interests; late in Senator 
Kerr's career he acquired the support of chamber of commerce and business 
interests, particularly in eastern Oklahoma, as a result of his promotion 
of the Arkansas River navigation project.
According to Aubrey Kerr, the senator's brother and former campaign 
aide, the organization had its genesis on the University of Oklahoma campus 
in the 1925-1926 school year, when Aubrey was a law student there. Aubrey 
took a hand in the Independent group's campaign to elect a member of the 
student council against the fraternity combine candidate. Aubrey became 
president of the Independent group the next year and helped bring about 
Independent victories in that year and the following year. In so doing 
he made contacts with students from throughout the state, emd these 
friends later became the nucleus of the original Kerr organization.
By 1936 Robert Kerr had become president of the Ksinsas-Oklahoma
l^Interview with Aubrey Kerr, September I8, 1963.
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division of the Mid-Continental Oil and Gas Association, and a number 
of Oklahoma state senators were seeking to raise the gross production 
tax on gas emd oil. Aubrey said that he and Bobert decided to back 
about twenty-five to thirty candidates for the state legislature who 
would oppose the tax increase. Aubrey called upon his former friends 
from the University of Oklahoma to help recruit candidates and raise 
cajsQ>aign funds. Two years later the organization supported Leon Phillips 
for governor, and in 1S^ 2 its members helped to elect Robert Kerr him­
self as governor.
The organization expanded as time went on. As Robert Kerr be­
came more and more prominent in Baptist lay work, he acquired a larger 
following among the Southern Baptists. The patronage appointments he 
made as governor, and later as United States senator, added more active 
supporters. As Senator Kerr acquired increasing stature in the United 
States senate the oil and gas interests looked to him for help, as did 
members of other political interest groups. Lobbyists of several 
political interest groups said that Senator Kerr kept in much closer 
touch with Oklahoma interests than did Senator Monroney.
Though there were ten to fifty active Kerr supporters in nearly 
all Oklahoma counties, generally it devolved upon the one or two most 
active workers to perform such tasks as bringing together fifteen to 
twenty key men in each county to meet with Senator Kerr when the senator 
toured the state in campaign years. Aubrey coordinated the work of 
bringing together these representatives of labor, farm groups, merchants, 
and other key groups in the various counties. He also briefed Senator 
Kerr on the way to each meeting as to who would be there and what they
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favored.
The extent to which the Kerr organization Intervened In political 
contests other than those In which Robert Kerr was a candidate becomes a 
problem In semantics. Aubrey said the organization never actively Inter­
vened In any other contests except the 193® gubernatorial contest. How­
ever, in reply to a question, Aubrey said that frequently many members 
of the Kerr organization followed the lead of the Iferrs when they knew 
whom the Kerrs were supporting.
The extent of Senator Kerr's Influence upon Oklahoma politics is 
difficult to pinpoint precisely, but several top-level Democrats agreed 
that If he had not established himself as the Mr. Democrat of Oklahoma 
to quite the same extent that Sam Rayburn earlier had become the Mr. 
Democrat of Texas, he certainly was on the way toward becoming Oklahoma's 
Mr. Democrat at the time of his death on New Year's Day, I963. A head- 
on clash with former Governor Gary In the 1964 Democratic senatorial 
primary appeared to be shaping up following Gary's defeat In the 1962 
gubernatorial runoff primary, and It Is probable that a Kerr victory In 
that contest would have established Kerr as Oklahoma's Mr. Democrat.
It has been the policy of Senator Mike Monroney, on the other 
hand, to avoid becoming too entangled In state party matters. Senator 
Monroney said In 1955> "I've always taken the position that the governor 
Is the leader of the party and pretty well entitled to have his choice 
for national commltteemein and state c h a i r m a n . B u t  In January, 1964, 
when the Democrats had no governor, Monroney openly objected to two
^^ The Dally Oklahoman, September I3, 1955-
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candidacies for national committeeman and state chairman emd called for 
nev leadership In the party. ^3 in his nev role as leader of the Oklahoma 
congressional delegation following Senator Kerr's death, emd with Okla­
homa having no Democratic governor, Monroney may deem It necessary to 
take a stronger hemd In state party affairs than formerly. But It seemed 
certain that he never would attempt to achieve the Influence in otate 
party affairs that Senator Kerr sought.
Summary
Bepubllcem party organizational resurgence under State Chairman 
Henry Bellmon* and his Operation Countdown program begem at Just about the 
same time that Democratic Governor Edmondson precipitated a serious urban- 
rural split In the Democratic party with his three Initiative petitions.
The record of the Republican party since the early 1950's has been 
one of tremsformatIon from one-mem domlnemce, lack of Interest In grass 
roots growth, and em Image as a "party of millionaires" to somewhat less 
concentrated leadership. Infusion of new life Into the party organization, 
and the Image of a party whose 1962 ticket was headed by "Just a country 
boy from Hoble county."
The record of the Democratic party since the early 1950's has 
been one of a series of party splits growing out of the bitter William 0. 
Coe-Johnston Murray fight In the 1950 Democratic primaries, the Coe-Gaiy 
battle In the 195^ primaries, and the urban-rural split precipitated by 
the Edmondson petitions In 1959-1960.
Going Into the I962 caiq>algn. Republican party morale was high 
and Democratic party morale was not.
^^ibid., January 29, 196^ *
CHAPTER DC
SUMMARY OF LONG-TERM INFLUENCES 
UPON THE 1962 ELECTION
A look at the entire span of Oklahoma political history shows 
that there have been two cycles of definite Democratic dominance, 1907 
to 1920 and 1930 to 19^2, and two cycles of more competitive politics, 
1920 to 1932 and 19^2 through I962. These cycles are pointed up in 
Table 4l, which gives the Desu>cratie percentage of the two-party vote^ 
for governor and President for these periods.
TABLE 4l.— Democratic percentage of the two-party vote for governor
and President by historical periods^
1907- 1922- 1930- 1942- 1942-1954,
1918 1926 1938 1962 1962
For Governor 54.2 52.0 63.2 56.4 51.9 (omits 1958)
For President- 56.5 45.3 66.0 49.9 43.7 (since 1952)
Since the Socialist candidates undoubtedly took more votes away from the 
Democratic candidates than the Republicans in the I907-I9IÔ period, as
^Because of heavy third-party voting in I907-I918, figures giving 
the percentage of the total vote, rather than the two-party vote, do not 
picture properly the relative Demacratic-Republican strength in this 
early period.
^ttaiversity of Oklahoma Bureau, op. cit., pp. 62-106.
%hc periods of presidential voting are I908-I916, I920-I928, 1932- 
19^, 19*^-1960, and 1952-1960, the periods that correspond most closely 
to the gubernatorial periods.
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the Populist candidates did in the 1890's, it is probable that the ^k.2 
per cent average vote for the Democratic gubernatorial candidates under­
represents Democratic strength somewhat in that early period. Likewise, 
the 76-7 per cent of the two-party vote received by Edmondson in 1958 
raises the Democratic average for the 19^2-1962 period to a point where 
it obscures the fact that Democratic candidates received less than $4 
per cent of the vote in all but two elections in that period.
Manifestations of Liberalism 
and Conservatism
Manifestations of liberalism in Oklahoma.— When the delegates 
to the 1906 state constitutional convention inserted a number of pro­
visions into the state constitution providing for regulation of rail­
roads emd public utilities emd others protecting labor, they were ex­
pressing a willingness to increase the regulatory powers of government 
in the interest of the less privileged. In their voting for Socialist 
candidates soon thereafter, Oklahomans were expressing the sentient 
that the government should exercise its powers in the interests of what 
they viewed as economic Justice. In the 1919-1921 period the Earmer- 
Labor Reconstruction League members were seeking an increase in the 
service (welfare) functions of government, such as having the state 
government take over the grain elevators and farm credit facilities, and 
they were expressing a willingness to have the government spend the money 
required to accomplish these ends. These latter sentiments were ex­
pressed again in the Hew Deal period, when Franklin D. Roosevelt polled 
73.2 per cent of the vote in 1932 and 66.8 per cent in I936.
The most prominent correlation that suggests itself with respect
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to the cycles of definite Democratic dominance and of more competitive 
politics is that the former correspond generally with periods of 
economic distress emd the latter vith periods of better economic times. 
However, this explamation would oversimplify what lies behind these 
cycles, for other factors contributed.
Memifestations of conservatism.— A sort of moralistic-patriotic- 
nationalistic type of conservatism appeared to manifest itself in the 
1920's with the rejection of Senator Gore because he did not support 
Woodrow Wilson's request for a declaration of war against Germany, with 
opposition to the League of Ifeitions, and with the thumping rejection of 
Catholic, anti-prohibitionist A1 Smith. This seems to be pointed up by 
the fact that 1924 Democratic presidential nominee John W. Davis, whose 
cemdidaoy was sandwiched between that of League of Rations proponent 
James Cox and that of A1 Smith, received a 48.4 per cent plurality in 
Oklahoma as against only 29 per cent of the vote in the nation as a 
whole. Apparently there were no moralistic-nationalistic grounds upon 
which to reject the Democratic corporation lawyer, emd so the normal 
Democratic majority in Oklahoma asserted itself. This type of con­
servatism, given voice through such movesients as that of the Ku Klux 
Klsm, appeems to develop rather commonly in almost wholly Anglo-Saxon, 
religiously fundamentalist environments. It must be recalled too 
that the 1920's was a period of serious Democratic party splits, which 
also contributed to the Republican successes in this period. However, 
the Democrats were by no means united when Davis won in 1924 and the 
Klan contributed to the Democratic split in 1928.
Since the early 1940's memifestations of conservative sentiment
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again outweigh nanifestations of sentiment that would be regarded as 
liberal. On domestic issues, the most likely bases for increased 
Republican voting in this period appear to be protests against heavier 
tax burdens, inflation and rising prices; on foreign issues, the pro­
tests appear to have been against the Democrats' handling of the Korean 
war in particular and the cold war in general. In assessing the mood 
of the voters in 1962 Democratic State Chairman Gene McGill said,
"Many are in debt and making installment payments, and they've got to 
blame someone. . . . There's been a realization since the Russians 
launched their Sputnik that we're not the sole big power we used to 
be. . . . The time was when no one would put a Yank in jail because they 
were afraid to do so. . . ."^  Here again some strains of moralistic- 
nationalistic conservatism appear to be interwoven with a measure of 
economic discontent.
Samuel Lubell expressed the view that the location of support 
for the Henry Wallace Progressive movement in 19(48 proved that today's 
radicals or liberals are those elements of the population most sensitive 
to civil rights issues rather than those motivated by economic discon­
tent. 5 In this respect, overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon Oklahoma, vith the 
size of its ethnic minorities at a bare minimum, is on the side of con­
servatism.
Further manifestations of conservatism in Oklahoma in recent 
years include these: (l) the I963 Oklahoma legislature endorsed two of
^Interview with Gene McGill, state chairman of the Democratic 
party, November 23, I962.
^Lubell, The Future of American Politics, pp. 218-219.
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the so-called states' rights amendments : one to prohibit any federal
court from exercising Jurisdiction in legislative apportionment cases, 
the other to permit two-thirds of the states to propose constitutional 
amendments without a constitutional convention or the approval of 
Congress. The lower house also rejected the proposed anti-poll tax 
amendment on the ground that it would constitute interference in the 
business of other states.^  (2) In May, I963, Oklahoma wheat farmers
rejected the Kennedy administration program of high wheat support 
prices with accompanying stricter governmental controls by about a 
61-39 ratio.
Some of the foregoing exsunples of expressions of conservatism 
are not entirely adequate. Some are derivative rather than direct; for 
exanple, there is little way of knowing whether the Oklahoma legislature's 
endorsement of the states' rights amendments reflects the:sehtiment of1 the 
majority of Oklahomans, though there is reason to suspect that it might. 
The vote of the Oklahoma wheat farmers came from the predominantly 
Republican areas of the state. Some of the examples are drawn primarily 
from the national experience rather than from Oklahoma in particular; 
however, it seems probable that frustration over the unpopular Iforean 
war and resistance to inflation constitute sentiments that sure shared 
quite generally throughout the nation.
The best indication of a conservative trend in Oklahoma would be 
a record of voting for political candidates who espoused obviously con­
servative viewpoints. On the national level, there seems to be rather
^Oklahoma City Times, May 23, I963.
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general agreement that the political positions of the Republicans and 
Democrats have been closer together In recent years than for some time.
In Oklahoaa, political contestants almost never couch their campaigns 
In liberal-conservative terms or present the electorate with any sort 
of clear-cut choice between a liberal or conservative approach to 
governmental problems. Border state politicians traditionally have been 
adept at striking compromises between northern and southern and other 
political viewpoints. Nor are there any continuing political factions 
or associations that assume the task of espousing liberal or conservative 
principles or recruiting liberal or conservative ceuidldates.
The 1962 Uhlted States senate race between Republican B. Hayden 
Crawford and Incumbent Democrat Monroney has been one of the very few 
political contests--possibly the only one In recent yesors— In which a 
fairly clear choice was presented between a liberal and conservative 
approach to governmental problems. The choice was not as clear-cut as 
It might have been: Crawford was mllltantly conservative, but Monroney
was not mllltantly liberal. Crawford adopted the slogem "Turn Right" as 
his campaign theme and stressed antl-soclallsm, antl-communlsm, and 
opposition to medicare emd federal aid to education In his campaign 
speeches. Monroney's liberalism was deduced as much or more from his 
voting record In Congress as from his canqpalgn speeches. One conserv­
ative and two liberal organizations rated Monroney as being more liberal 
than conservative In his voting,^ but some political observers have 
expressed the view that his voting record has been less liberal In recent
^"Non-Party Groups Rate Each Senator, Representative," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 26, I962, pp. 2019-2024.
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years than It formerly was.
The result of the contest was that Monroney received per 
cent of the vote and defeated Crawford. However^ the result of one 
such contest could hardly be offered as a measure of liberal-conservative 
sentiment in Oklahoma. The issues were not that clearly drawn, the 
electorate is not accustomed to thinking in liberal-consezvative terms, 
Crawford was a once-defeated candidate (1960), and there is a tendency 
to return incumbent congressmen to office in Oklahoma. Moreover, Monroney 
was highly popular personally, and it seems highly probable that many 
Oklahomans voted on the basis of personality rather them issues.
Summary
The best available evidence indicates that a conservative trend 
has been operative in Oklahoma since about 19^2, when the Republican per­
centage of the vote began to rise markedly. The fact that Oklahomans 
gave Harry S. Truman 62.7 per cent of the vote and that a number of 
strongly Republican counties returned majorities for him provides some 
indication that the conservative trend might not be solidly based.
Further indication of this might be seen in the 19$8 congressional 
elections, following the 1957 recession under Eisenhower, when the Demo­
cratic congressional camdidates received a higher percentage of the 
total vote than in any congressional election in history except that of
g
1932. To the extent that Œüahomans vote more heavily Democratic when 
an econrad.c downturn looms and more heavily Republican when the economic 
spiral is upward, this seems to lend support to the Lubell thesis that
O
Qhiversity of Okleüicma Bureau, op. cit., pp. Ih3-lh$.
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the voters may be trying to steer a middle course between the threats 
of depression and inflation.^
Despite the conservative trend, the partisan division of the 
vote since 19^2 still favored the Democrats, though by a reduced 
margin. This and the other long-term political influences favored the 
Doaocrats as the 1962 election approached. Depublican voter registrations 
and participation in Republican primaries continued low; Democrats con­
tinued to elect the great majority of county, district, legislative, and 
statewide officials.
The extent to which the long-term political influences favored 
the Democrats perhaps cam be set forth best by ascertaining the vote 
which the 1962 Democratic gubernatorial nominee normally could have ex­
pected to receive in I962, provided that the short-term political in­
fluences in that year did not favor either the Democratic or Republican 
candidate to any significant degree.
The Normally Expected Vote for the I962 
Democratic Gubernatorial Nominee
On the basis of Oklahoma voting and turnout performances since 
19^2, the Democratic nominee for governor should normally have expected 
to receive 53*38 per cent of the vote in I962.
The normally expected vote was calculated on the basis of two 
factors: (l) the average Democratic percentage of the gubernatorial
vote in each county from 19^2 through 195^ and (2) the average percentage 
of voter turnout for each county based upon em average for the years 1950
^Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates, p. II8.
I6l
and 195^*
The 19^2-193^ period vas selected as the base period from vhlch 
to compute the average Democratic vote percentage for reasons already 
giveni fairly common political influences seem to have been operative 
through most of this period; the 19$8 vote vas omitted because it vas 
an abnormally h i ^  Democratic vote.
The voter turnout figures vere computed from a more recent span 
of time in an effort to take account of the most recent influences in 
this respect. The year 1950 vas the best Republican year of the decade 
and 195b vas the best Democratic year except for 1958; an average for 
these tvo years should not give undue stress to the highest voter 
motivations of either Democrats or Republicans. Estimated populations 
for each county as of April, 1962, supplied by the Bureau of Business 
Research of the University of Oklahoma, vere used to take account of 
population changes in each county betveen I96O and 1962.
In short, the effort vas to capture the most recent possible 
trends vith respect to voter turnout and to average out the trend vith 
respect to Democratic-Republican voting over the longest possible period 
of time in vhich common political influences have been operative. The 
latter vas deemed desirable to minimize local or regional influences that 
might distort the vote in particular elections.
The fact that the Democratic nominee received only 44.4^ per cent 
of the vote signifies that the short-term influences bearing upon the 
1962 gubernatorial election vere favorable to the Republican candidate. 
What those short-term influences vere and hov they favored the Republicem 
candidate vi.ll be discussed in Part III.
PART III
SHORT-TERM INFLUENCES UPON THE I962 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
CmPTER X
THE 1950-1960 DECADE; GRIEVAMCES ACCWTOLATE 
AGAINST THE DEMOCRATS AND THE DEMOCRATS 
SUFFER A SERIES OF PARTY SPLITS
There vas some change of political sentiment nationally In 
ftivor of the Republican party at the outset of the I95O-I96O decade.
It resulted In part from frustration over the unpopular Korean var, 
from charges of corruption In the Truman administration, and from re­
sistance to continued Inflation.
In Oklahoma, the Republican party vas undergoing a transfor­
mation that vas to result In Its being strengthened considerably In 
the early 1960's. The virtual one-man control by national committee­
men vho displayed little Interest In building the party at the grass 
roots vas being broken. The state chairmen began to assume more pover 
and party leadership vas democratized to some extent. This process, 
vhlch began after the Elsenhower victory In 1952, vas momentarily pain­
ful for the peurty because It vas resisted by the Tulsa group that had 
been supplying much of the party's finances, and the party fared poorly 
throughout most of the 1950's. It vas not until State Chairman Bellmon 
assumed party leadership In 1960 that the party began to capitalize upon 
the series of presidential successes vhlch Republicans had In Oklahoma
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in this decade. The self-styled "country boy trcm Noble county" vas 
determined to transform the "party of millionaires" image which the 
Republicans had acquired and to infuse nev life into the party organ­
ization at the grass roots.
For the Democrats in Oklahoma, the 19^0-19^0 decade was one 
marked by a series of party splits that culminated in the serious split 
between the urbem and rural segments of the party in 1959 emd i960. 
Furthermore, it vas a period in vhich a series of grievances accumulated 
against Democratic management of state affairs. Except for the I921 
legislative session, the Democrats had been in control of all branches 
of state government since I907. And vhile party control is sufficiently 
fragmented as to make it difficult for the electorate to know precisely 
where to place the blame for particuleur grievances, there comes a time 
in most predominantly one-party states when the electorate begins to 
get the broad impression that "it's time for a change."
That "time for a change" sentiment was strong in Oklahoma by the 
late 1950's is shown by the fact that two unusual gubernatorial elections 
occurred in succession in 1956 and 1962.
1) In 1956, despite two successive Republican presidential victories in 
1952 and 1956, Democratic candidate Edmondson carried every county in the 
state on the basis of his promises to "clean out the Old Guard" of Okla­
homa politics emd to bring about a speedy vote on the question of repeal 
of prohibition. Though he was almost a political unknown outside his 
heme area at the outset of the 1958 primary ceu^ paigns, Edmondson re­
ceived the biggest vote ever accorded a gubernatorial cemdidate in 
Okledioma, 74.1 per cent.
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2) In 1962,Just four years later, Bellmon became the first elected 
Republican governor in Oklahoma history on the basis of his promises 
to eliminate "vaste, graft, and corruption" from state government and 
to operate Oklahoma government efficiently without the tax increase 
vhich Democratic nominee W.P. Bill Atkinson said vas necessary.
The most plausible explanation as to vhy the first Republican 
gubernatorial victory followed upon the heels of a Democratic landslide 
is that many voters felt they vere voting for the same thing in both 
elections: they vere deeply dissatisfied vith many aspects of the manage­
ment of state affairs, they thought it vas time for a change, and they 
wanted reform of state governmental practices. It seems probable that 
the time vas ripe for a Republican gubernatorial victory in 1958— if the 
Republicans had nominated a popular and aggressive candidate vho vould 
have advanced a strong reform program and if the Republican party trans­
formation had been completed by then. Instead, as had happened before, 
the candidate with the strong reform program in I958 appeared from vlth­
in the Democratic party. The Republicans nominated a former Democratic 
congressman— a situation displeasing to many long-time Republican party 
workers— vho conducted an ineffective campaign. When Edmondson pre­
cipitated the urban-rural split within the Democratic party in September, 
i960, by submitting to the people three reform petitions that antagonized 
rural Gklahosans, the rural segment of the electorate especially thought 
it was time for a change again, and this time they joined with the urban 
"good government" forces who had supported Edmondson in 1958 lu turning 
to the Republican candidate. Bellmon took up where Edmondson left off 
in 1958 in promising to deem up state government, but he went one step
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further: he charged that Edmondson had been unable to control the Old
Guard elements of the Democratic party and argued that the only real 
solution to Oklahoma's problems was to elect a Republican governor and 
to begin enjoying the advantages of two-party politics.
Republican gubernatorial nominee Jo 0. Ferguson came within 
l6jl04 votes of becoming the first elected Republican governor In 19$0, 
on the basis of national trends and developments and a Democratic party 
split that grew out of the bitter Democratic primary of that year. In 
1962, the Democratic party split was much more serious, reaching deep 
Into the Democratic rural strongholds; a series of political scandals 
occurred between 1950 and 1962; and the Republican party organization 
was stronger In 1962 than It was In 1950.
This chapter will be devoted to an elaboration of the political 
scandals and other grievances that lay behind the "time for a change" 
sentiment In 1953 and I962 and to the reasons for the series of Demo­
cratic party splits. In doing so It has seemed convenient to treat 
these developments under the following headings: the Johnston Murray
administration of 1950-195 ;^ the Raymond Gary administration of 1954- 
1953; the 1953 Democratic primary, In which the 1962 Democratic nominee 
figured strongly; and the Edmondson administration of 1953-1962. By 
dividing the decade Into periods of gubernatorial adstlnlstratlons. It 
Is not Intended to link the governors themselves with all the scandals 
and grievances that occurred during their respective tenures; rather, 
the division Is one of convenience.
The Johnston Murray Administration 
Murray, son of former Governor W.H. (Alfalfa Bill) Murray,
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campaigned in 19$0 on a platform of economy and no tax increases. He 
got his principal support, especially in the runoff primary, from western 
Oklahoma, which is less public assistance-oriented than eastern Oklahoma. 
Murray's chief opponent, William 0. Coe, appealed to the public assistance 
recipients and war veterans. Of the thirty-two counties which he carried 
in the runoff, twenty-seven were in eastern Oklahoma. The primary battles 
were bitter. Coe charged that Murray deserted his wife and child and 
that he had resigned from the Rational Guard Just prior to World War II. 
The first charge was denied by Murray's former vife^ and the second by 
Murray,^ but the fact that Coe trailed Murray by eighty-eight thousand 
votes in the first primary and by only 962 votes in the runoff primary 
would seem to indicate that Coe's allegations had influenced thousands 
of Oklahoma voters. The primaries produced a Democratic split, and a 
number of Coe's aides actively supported the Republican nmsinee in the 
general election. 3 In his contest with Republican Jo Ferguson, Murray 
received a bare 51.I per cent of the vote, the closest gubernatorial 
race in the state's history up to that time.
Murray's has been characterized as a status quo administration.
He "didn't rock the boat." In fact, he was so conservative that many 
Democrats charged that he was a Republican in Democratic clothing. But 
neither did he exhibit the leadership required to effect the economy and 
reform which he said were needed.^ His relations with the state legis­
lature were not cordial. In his final address to the legislature just
^Daily Oklahoman, July 17, 1950. ^Ibid., July 19, 1950.
3Ibid., July 12, 1954. ^Ibid., January 9, 1955»
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before leaving office, he lambasted the legislators for permitting In­
creases In utility rates, for failure to reduce school administration 
costs, and for vhat he called reckless spending. 5
After leaving office Murray gave an Interview to a Saturday 
Evening Post writer that resulted In an article entitled "Oklahoma Is In 
a Mess."^ Murray was quoted as saying that a "maze of unsolved problems 
shame my state and hold It In the category of the retarded.” He said 
earmarking of tax revenues was too prevalent, that the practice had Its 
roots In a general public mistrust of the legislature and was perpetuated 
by mighty pressure groups. Murray was quoted further as saying that In­
vestigations showed that Oklahomans may be getting as little as fifty 
cents worth of roads for their county road dollars because county com­
missioners were paying up to double the price for road materials. He said 
the legislature would not correct such practices because some legislators 
are former county commissioners, some sell road materials to the county 
commissioners between legislative sessions, and because the County Com­
missioners Association ”ls perhaps the most politically powerful organ­
ization In Oklahoma" and can make or break a political candidate.
One of the major political scandals of the decade broke Just 
before Murray took office and dragged through the legislative halls and. 
state and federal courts for nine years. The Selected Investments 
Corporation scandal began In April, 1950, when State Bank Commissioner 
O.B. Mothershead revoked the corporation's right to sell securities In 
the state. In the 19^1 legislative session the state senate refused to
^Ibld.. January 4, 1955*
^Saturday Evening Post, CCXXVII (April 20, 1955), 20.
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confirm Mothershead as bank commissioner. Further, Assistant Bank 
Commissioner M B. Cope, under whose direction the study of Selected's 
affairs was made, was legislated out of his position under terms of a 
highly controversial bill passed In the closing hours of the 1951 
legislative session.? Cope was serving as securities commissioner In 
the State Banking Coimlsslon. The bill provided for separating the 
Securities Commission from the State Banking Commission and for the 
creation of a new three-member body to head the Securities Commission.
Selected Investments apparently had many fflends In high places 
In the state government. The authors of the controversial bill were two 
state senators who were Selected attorneys. William C. (Bill) Doenges, 
Democratic national committeeman and chief financial backer of Murray's 
gubernatorial campaign, was charged with supporting the bill by the 
Democratic floor leader of the state senate. The floor leader also 
charged that Arlday Fitzgerald, Murray's patronage asslstamt, was putting 
pressure upon the more reluctant members of the lower house to get the
o
bill passed. The bill delayed a scheduled Thursday adjournment of the
legislature eind was passed In a stormy Friday night session. Discussing
passage of the bill some yeairs later, a Tulsa World reporter wrote
. . .  It was openly known what some lobbyists would pay or give 
for a vote for the bill and In some Instances legislators had 
their own lists of what they wanted.
Selected President Hugh A. CairoU was reported to have been In Governor
Tpally Oklahoman, May 19, 25, 1951*
®Ibld.. May I6, I95I.
% u l s a  World, January 27, 1963.
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Murray's office, along with Doenges, on the night the bill passed.
In February, 1958, just as the 1958 gubernatorial campaign vas 
getting under vay, an auditing firm reported that the $39,000,000 in­
vested in Selected by nearly ten thousand Oklahomans had shrunk by more 
than $11,000,000, and the following month the corporation was declared 
bankrupt. Testimony about Selected's affairs and the dealings of its 
officials with various state officials was being taken in federal court 
as the 1958 gubernatorial campaign progressed. All this occurred as 
Edmondson was promising that he would "clean out the Old Guard" of Okla­
homa politics.
In October, 1958, a United States district judge ruled that the 
securities commissioner appointed in September, 1951, to head the newly 
created Securities Commission was guilty of neglect of duty in his 
handling of the Selected Investments case. Later that month five Selected 
officials were indicated by a federal grand Jury. Four were convicted of 
various charges in March, 1959»
The Raymond Gary Administration
Gary was a veteran of fourteen yeairs in the state senate, where 
he served as chairman of the appropriations committee for six years eind 
as president pro tempore for two yeairs, when he announced for governor 
in 195 *^ Again the principal contender in the Democratic primaries was 
Coe, 1A0 led Geucy by 2,746 votes in the first primary but lost in the 
runoff primary by 10,84l votes. It was another pair of bitter Democratic 
primaries, and again a paurty split developed. In 1950 some of Coe's
^Qpaily Oklahoman, May 19, 1951.
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principal aides supported the Republican nominee In the general election; 
In 19^^ Coe himself declared his support for Republican nominee Reuben 
Sparks. But, despite this, Gary received $8 .6 per cent of the vote In 
the general election to score a decisive victory.
Another mild party split developed shortly after Gary's election 
when he sought to replace National Committeeman Doenges with an appointee 
of his own choice. Gary claimed that Doenges had resigned when he an­
nounced his candidacy for governor In 195 .^ The claim was based upon a 
letter written by Doenges to the Democratic state chairman In which, 
according to Gary, Doenges expressed his willingness to resign; Gary 
said Doenges made similar statements to newspaper men. In April, 1955, 
the Democratic party executive committee voted not to oust Doenges, but 
the committee reversed Its decision In August. The fight was then carried 
to the Democratic national committee, which Is the Judge of Its own 
membership, emd the credentials committee of that body voted nine to six 
to uphold Doenges. A fflend of Senator Robert Kerr, Nebraska National 
Committeeman Bernard J. Boyle, represented Doenges before the committee.^ 
Upon hearing the national committee's decision, Gary commented that this 
would make It more difficult for the Democrats to carry Oklahoma In 1956. ^  
Gary Is credited by many with having a closer knowledge of Okla­
homa government and Its problems than any other single Oklahoman. In 
addition, he was one of Oklahoma's hardest working governors, and he 
enjoyed excellent relations with the state legislature. As a result, most
^^Ibld., November I3, 1955*
^^Ibld., November 18, 1955.
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of his program vas adopted, and among his accomplishments vas that more 
highways were built or modernized during his administration than In any 
previous term, and without any Increase In taxes.
However, numerous allegations of "playing politics" were made 
during Gary's term. The role of Highway Commissioner A.B. Green, for 
exemple, was the subject of frequent criticism. In November, 1955>
Green denied rumors that he donated $$0,000 to Gary's campaign, that 
he and Gary were associated In the gasoline business, or that he had 
tried to pressure the Highway Patrol Into buying gasoline from his 
chain of service stations.He said that Joe Gary, the governor's 
brother, was vice president of the oil company of which Green was 
president, but that the governor was neither an official nor stock­
holder. In April, 1956, Green announced that he had sold a lot In 
Clinton which he had bought as a filling station site on a new U.S. 
Highway 66 routing; he said Gary asked him to sell It.^^ In October, 
1957» H.E. Bailey, supervising engineer for the Oklahoma Toll Road 
Authority, alleged that Gary was building a "crony road" to a filling 
station owned by Green In Purcell.Highway Director C.A. Stoldt re­
plied that the four-lane street was programmed before Gary became 
governor.
Officials of the Oklahoma Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
reacted violently to what they termed a Gary-engineered contract signed
13lbld., September 27, 1955'
^^Oklahoma City Times, April 26, 1956. 
^^Ibld., October 2$, 1957.
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between the state's Grand. Elver Dam Authority and Public Service Company 
of Tulsa. Under the contract, signed In the summer of 19$?, electric 
power from the state-owned facility was to be supplied to seven Qklahcnoa 
EEA cooperatives and others under terms which EEA leaders said were 
favorable to the Tulsa utility and unfavorable to REA. Floyd Gibson,
RE.A. general manager, alleged that Gary pushed through the contract "to 
pay a political debt."^^ Farmers Union leaders joined with EEA leaders 
In criticizing the contract. Jack Rorschach, EEA attorney In Vlnlta, 
said the contract had the effect of turning the state facility over to
the Tulsa utility from an operational standpoint, eliminating conpetltlon
and giving the utility a monopoly over electric power In the area.^?
Gary replied that EEA Is required to pay only two per cent Interest on
Its Investment to the government and that this Is not fair to private
enterprise. He added that EEA was trying to build a political empire, 
not only In Oklahoma but throughout the nation. Gary said further that
the contract was essential to the sale of bonds required to finance the
iflMarkham Ferry power project for GEDA.""^  A Tulsa newspaper supported 
Gary's stand, saying there Is room for public power but not as a glsuat 
squeezing out private utilities. ^9 But EEA and the farmers Union 
mllltantly opposed the contract, and If there was any chink In Gary's
^^Ibld.. July 2k, 1957.
17Interview with Jack Rorschach, REA attorney In Vlnlta, August
18, 1962.
^Oklahoma City Times, August 5, 1957*
% l d . . July 30, 1957.
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otherwise rather solid rural support in the I962 Democratic gubernatorial 
primaries j it came froai this source.
The Wagoner county scamdal.--The most explosive political scandal 
of the decade, the Wagoner county relief check case, occurred midway 
through Gary's term. It was coupled with an inquiry into the issuance 
of an unusually large number of absentee ballots in Wagoner county in 
connection with a hotly contested state senate race. Incumbent State 
Senator John Russell was opposed by Tom Payne in the Okmulgee-Wagoner 
county state senate district. Gary said later that he "favored Russell"
PQ
but could not condone the methods used to try to reelect him.
More than eleven hundred requests were made for absentee ballots 
in the relatively small county of Wagoner in the 19$6 runoff primary and 
a court hearing developed over the question of invalidating the absentee 
ballots. Payne led in the tabulation of the regular ballots but his lead 
was overcome by Russell's big margin in the absentee ballots. During the 
hearing one witness testified, "Somebody has forged my ballot. That's
pi
not my X. I put a tail on my X."
In the midst of the hearing on the absentee ballots, it was 
disclosed that Russell aides had paid approximately forty caaq>aign workers 
with twenty-dollar Oklahoma emergency relief checks in July, during the 
i"unoff campaign. Bob JefArey, Wagoner farm implement dealer, was Russell's 
Wagoner county campaign manager. It was testified that the cas^ign workers 
went to Jeffrey's store and signed the relief checks, which were face down
^Qpaily Oklahoman, November 29, 1956.
1962.
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Interview with Noel Bulloch, Tulsa Tribune reporter, August 29,
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on the store counter. The checks vere cashed by Jeffrey and the proceeds 
paid in cash to the workers, with nearly all not knowing that they were 
signing relief checks. The case came to the attention of authorities 
after one woman worker turned a check over while Jeffrey was answering
the telephone and saw that It was a relief check. She put the check In
op
her purse and contacted the Tulsa Tribune.
The Oklahoma Emergency Relief Board was then separate from the 
Oklahoma Welfare Department. A field representative for the board could 
certify a person or family for emergency relief. The state office 
customarily sent one check for twenty dolleirs \Q>on such certification, 
then had the need for relief Investigated. Generally, such recipients 
could receive only three emergency relief checks, for by that time the 
Welfare Department was presumed to have had time to determine whether the 
recipient was qualified to receive another form of relief. ^3
The governor was chairman of the Emergency Relief Board. The 
administrator was Frank Easley, a fellow townsman of Gary's from Madlll. 
Easley had been a field representative prior to Gary's election and Gary 
appointed him administrator. Earl Johnston, the field representative 
for Okmulgee and Wagoner counties In 1956, was a patronage appointee of 
Senator Russell.The Emergency Relief Board was reported to be 
"highly political," with legislators considering Its employees their
I^bld.
^^Qklahoma City Times, August 8, 1956.
^^Ibld., August 9, 1956.
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patronage and exercising influence over the distribution of relief 
checks.25 However, in this case Jeffrey testified in court that "to 
my knowledge Russell knew nothing of the use of emergency relief funds 
in the caiqpaign; I never talked to Russell about the use of relief 
c h e c k s . A n d  Russell was cleared of any implication in the matter.
Grand jury indictments were returned first against Jeffrey, 
Easley, Johnston, emd Jeffrey's secretary. A month later indictments 
were returned against Jenks Craig, administrative assistant to Gary in 
the capacity of patronage adviser, and Senator Russell.
Jeffrey testified that he met with Gary, Craig, Russell, and 
others at a filling station cafe outside Wagoner on July 6, nearly three 
weeks before the July 2k primary. Jeffrey said he told Gary, "We are 
having a rough time." He said Gary replied, "We'll see if we can't help 
you."2? Gary agreed that such a meeting occurred, but said it was only 
a chance meeting that took place while he emd his party were on the way 
from Muskogee to another city, and he branded Jeffrey's testimony as 
the "rankest perjury.
Field representative Johnston testified at his preliminary 
hearing that he was told by relief administrator Easley in July that 
his relief rolls were low in Wagoner county and that there was leeway 
to increase them. He said he was told to contact Jeffrey. He added 
that he talked later with Jeffrey and two other men in Wagoner and
^^Ibid., August 10, 1956. ^^Ibid., January 17, 1957*
^7Ibid.. November 21, 1956.
^Qpaily Gklahomsin, January I8, 1957.
197
that he gave Jeffrey a large number of relief applications^ which he 
picked up on three occasions. ^9
Gary said that as soon as he knew of the charges he contacted 
three state agencies to ask each to make an investigation and turn over 
whatever evidence was found to the Wagoner county grand Jury. He issued 
an executive order placing the Emergency Belief Board under the Welfare 
Depairtment in September, 1956, and ordered that no more emergency relief 
checks be issued until after the investigation was completed. He sus­
pended Easley after the latter was Indicted and gave his administrative 
assistant, Craig, a leave of absence so that Craig could clear himself. 
Later he asked the legislature to organize the relief agency along the 
lines set forth in his executive order and to tighten tqp the laws as to 
absentee ballots; these steps were taken.
The trial of Senator Bussell resulted in a hung jury. Jeffrey 
and Easley pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to defraud the state 
and were fined.Charges against the others were dismissed.
Gary ordered a special primary held December 11 and a special 
general election December 22 to fill the state senate seat. It was won 
by Payne, who was the only state senator to support Edmondson in the 1958 
Democratic primary. District Judge Andrew Wilcoxen, who presided at the 
absentee ballot hesoring, became a gubernatorial candidate in 1958.
This case extended into the summer of 1957, about six months 
prior to the start of the 1958 gubernatorial primary campaigns, and lent
^^Ibld., November 21, 1956.
30lbid.. July 9, 1957, and July 10, 1957-
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further subotance to Edmondson's good government appeal. The Wagoner 
county scandal undoubtedly was more politically explosive than the 
Selected Investments case because no knowledge of the intricacies of 
high finance was required to understand what it meant to pay political 
campaign workers with state relief funds.
The Tulsa bypass.— The next major political scandal^ that of the 
Tulsa bypass, did not come to light until late 1959, but it developed 
out of a road built in the last half of Gary's term. The twenty-three- 
mile, ten million dollar Tulsa bypass, built around Tulsa to link the 
Turner and Will Rogers turnpikes, was opened to traffic November 21,
1958. Portions of the bypass deteriorated rapidly, and less than a year 
after it was opened the Tulsa county attorney opened an investigation in­
to charges that inferior materials were used in the construction of the 
bypass.
Additional investigations soon were under way by a United States 
House of Representatives public works subcommittee, the United States 
Bureau of Public Roads, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a special 
task force of the Oklahoma Highway Department, and a special subcommittee 
of the Oklahoma Legislative Council's roads and highways committee.
In March, I96O, the Tulsa county grand Jury indicted three 
partners in the road construction firm on charges of defrauding the state 
of $146,289.35 through the use of faulty or inferior materials. Former 
Governor Gary charged that the Tulsa county attorney was an "Edmondson 
lieutenant" and added, "They irould like to find something wrong with the 
Highway Commission under my administration."^^
3^Ibid.. March 17, I960.
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Among the charges aired in the investigations vere that the 
roadbed vas to contain sand and gravel at least eight inches thick and 
that actually it varied from nothing to ten i n c h e s t h a t  an Qklahcna 
Highway Department inspector had been transferred to another job after 
reporting ease road building deficiencies to a superior;33 and that 
another Highway Department employee in charge of a field materials 
laboratory doctored some materials samples to cause them to meet 
specifications.
Some political overtones crept into the investigations, vith 
Republican members of the congressional subcommittee stressing that it 
vas the state inspectors vho failed to detect emy irregularities; Demo­
cratic members of the subcommittee felt that it vas more the fault of 
the inspectors of the Republican-controlled Bureau of Public Roads.
As a result, the reports issued by the five agencies investigating the 
bypass could be used to support either the notion that the bypass vas 
properly built or not properly built.
The investigation took a nev turn in May, I96O, vhen one of 
four partners in the D & G Construction Company told the subcommittee 
that H. Tom Kig^t, Jr., vho was a member of the Oklahoma Highway Com­
mission until January, 196O, was a silent poortner in the D & G Company 
vhen it obtained a $10,681 subcontract to sod the bypass. The witness 
added that sod contractors had held a number of meetings at an Oklahoma
^Oklahoma City Times, April 15, 196O.
^^Ibid.. May 2, I96O.
-ak
Daily Oklahoman, May 4, i960.
^^Ibid.. May 3, 196O.
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City hotel over a period of years to "diwy up" state contracts. He 
said state estimates of the cost of performing each contract vere 
furnished to the contractors before the contractors submitted their 
bids. He added, "The state estimates were generally high; you could 
bid under them and make a reasonable profit.
However, all charges against Kight and the partners in the 
road construction firm were dismissed by the Tulsa court on the ground 
that the charges, if any, should have been brought in Oklahoma county 
instead of Tulsa county. No further legal action was taken, but the 
Bureau of Public Roads temporarily suspended all federal payments on 
Oklahoma highway projects employing anyone who worked on the Tulsa by­
pass.
Thus a mixed record emerges from the 195^-1958 period. On the 
one hand the potentially troublesome question of racial integration of 
schools had been handled skillfully, a major highway building and im­
provement program was carried out, school teacher salaries were raised 
by an average of $1,076 a year, more funds were provided for higher 
education emd mental health, the Department of Commerce and Industry 
was created to attract industry, and such reforms were accomplished as 
a tightening up of the absentee ballot law and a welfare agency re­
organization. All this was accomplished vith no increase in taxes except 
for a temporary one-cent gasoline tax to meet emergencies caused by the 
1957 floods. On the other hand, there were the Wagoner county and 
Tulsa bypass allegations and the various allegations of "playing politics."
3^0klahoma City Times, May 5, i960.
^^Daily Oklahoman, May 8, I962.
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The 1958 Gubernatorial Campaign 
Edmondaon, then a thirty-two-year-old Tulsa county attorney, 
came out of nowhere In 1958 to poll 21 per cent of the vote In a field 
of eleven candidates In the Democratic first primary and to get Into 
the runoff primary with V.P. Bill Atkinson, millionaire Midwest City 
home builder who had been regarded as the "man to beat" from the be­
ginning of the campaign. Other strong contenders In 1958 were three- 
time candidate William 0. Coe, State Senators fkorge Mlskovsky and Jim 
A. Blnehart, Doenges, and former House Speaker B.E. (Bill) Earkey* 
Edmondson was so much of a darkhorse at the outset of the campaign that 
one veteran political writer speculated as late as April that Edmondson 
might not remain In the race.
Atkinson was regarded generally as the man to beat because he 
had the support of more Gary administration employees and more state 
senators than any other candidate, the support of the largest number of 
voting blocs and Interest groups, and at least the quiet support of Gary. 
He received statewide recognition when Geory appointed him to the Economic 
Development Commission, which operates the Department of Commerce and 
Industry. And he had been laying the groundwork for his 1958 campaign 
for at least eighteen months, during which time he gave speeches In more 
than four hundred Œüahoma towns and cities.
But, as the candidate believed to be out In front, Atkinson's 
opponents levelled a number of charges at him In an effort to cut him 
down. Attong these were:
1) That he would not take a stand on the Issues. On repeal of pro­
hibition, Atkinson said he was a personal dry, but he added that he 
would submit the repeal question to the people for a vote If a proper
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petition were presented to him; however, his opponents said It was not 
clear whether Atkinson would submit the question at a special election, 
where the silent vote would not count against It, or at a general 
election, where the silent vote would count against It.^® On right to 
work, Atkinson told an Oklahoma Press Association meeting that he did 
not know how he stood on that question, that he would do some research 
on the subject before taking a stand. 39 Such positions as these led 
Mlskovsky to have some cards printed saying of Atkinson, "Have Fence—  
Will Straddle." Other candidates charged that Atkinson lacked knowl­
edge of state government and state problems.
2) That he was a "rich man trying to buy the office." Atkinson's 
campaign was the best financed of all the candidates. One of his op­
ponents, Andrew Wilcoxen, filed suit In Oklahoma county district court 
In April, 1958, seeking to enjoin Atkinson from filing In the governor's 
race on the ground that Atkinson's expenditures had exceeded the slxty- 
thousand-dollar campaign limit before the filing period opened. ^
3) That he was linked to Gary and that both were part of the Old Guard 
of Oklahoma politics.
Atkinson's platform was geared primarily to maintenance of the 
status quo: he would allow the state legislature to handle the legis­
lative apportionment question; he saw no need for change In the operation 
of the Highway Commission or for shortening the ballot, as advocated by 
Edmondson; emd he did not favor a tax Increase.
^ I b l d .. July 11, 1958.
^^Ibld.. April 15, 1957.
 City Times, April 30, 1958.
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Edmondson's ceunpalgn vas almost the antithesis of the Atkinson 
campaign. He vas a definite darkhorse at the outset because he vas 
virtually unknovn outside his home area and because he had no voting 
bloc or Interest group support. He vas forced to conduct a "cheese 
and cracker" campaign because of limited funds. And he offered a 
positive reform program: (l) he advocated a new constitutional formula
for legislative apportionment that vould guarantee each county at least 
one representative In the lover house of the state legislature but vould 
remove the existing celling on the number of representatives allowed to 
the larger counties; (2) he proposed that a constitutional Highway Com­
mission be created so as to tsike highway building out of politics, since 
commission members could not be removed at will by the governor; (3) a 
shorter ballot; (h) a merit system for state employees; and (5) central 
purchasing of state supplies. As to repeal of prohibition, hé promised 
a special election on the question within ninety days after the general 
election. And one of his major promises was that he would "clean out 
the Old Guard" of Oklahoma politics.
The other two principal contenders were Coe and Mlskovsky, with 
Coe coBçetlng primarily vith Atkinson for the rural and velfare bloc 
vote and Mlskovsky ccxnpetlng primarily vith Edmondson for the urban- 
progressive vote. Coe adopted much more conservative positions In 195® 
than he had In his previous campaigns, even supporting the right to vork 
proposal; however, the election results Indicate that he got most of his 
votes as a result of the residue of support which he enjoyed from his 
previous canpalgns, for he ran strongest In the rural, low Income counties. 
Mlskovsky was the most openly avowed advocate of repeal of prohibition
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among all the candidates, and this stand gave him strong support in the 
urban areas.
As the csopaign vas nearing its close, Edmondson's aides sav 
that a contest might be shaping up between Edmondson and Mlskovsky for 
a place in the runoff vith the favored Atkinson. Taking note of the 
strong si^port Mlskovsky vas receiving in the urban areas on the basis 
of his strong stand for repeal, it vas decided that Edmondson should 
start stressing repeal more, for it vas in the urban areas that 
Edmondson also vas strong. This decision vas made less than tvo weeks 
before the end of the campaign.With the repeal issue added more 
forcibly to his reform program, Edmondson not only overtook Mlskovsky 
but Atkinson as veil. The results of the voting for the four leading 
candidates vere*
Edmondson . . . 108,358
Atkinson . . . 107,6l6
Mlskovsky . . . 87,766 -
C o e .........72,763
Atkinson carried thirty-eight counties, twenty-four of which 
had populations of less than fifteen thousand; but, though his support 
was predominantly rural, he finished second in seven of the twelve most 
populous counties. Coe carried fourteen counties, seven of which had 
populations of less than ten thousand and eight of which vere in the 
Little Dixie section of southeastern Oklahona.
Mlskovsky and Edmondson together carried eleven of the state's 
twelve most populous counties; Washington county voters returned a 
majority for the home area favorite, Doenges. Mlskovsky carried ten
^^Interviev vith Whit Pate, op. cit.
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counties, which included six of the twelve most populous ones. Edmondson 
carried eleven counties, five of which were among the twelve most populous.
Map XXIV shows the counties which Edmondson carried and those in 
which he ran second. The boundaries of the second congressional district 
in northeastern Oklahoma also are outlined. Edmondson enjoyed an ad­
vantage in that district because his brother, Ed Edmondson, had repre­
sented it in Congress since 1952.
Among the more notable features of Edmondson's 1958 first 
primary canqpaign are these; (l) he probably brought more middle class 
persons, including women, into active politics than any previous political 
c a n d i d a t e (2) he was the first political candidate to demonstrate—  
possibly more by necessity than design— that it was possible to win a 
Democratic primary with a oangpaign concentrated largely in a relatively 
few of the more populous counties, and in so doing his candidacy drama­
tized Oklahoma's increasing urbanization; (3) he demonstrated that, in 
1958 at least, the electorate was highly receptive to a reform platform 
and good government appeal; and (4) he made the most effective use of 
television that had been made up to that time.
As to the 1958 runoff primary, Edmondson's reform-repeal program 
swept the state like the prairie fire proclaimed by the Edmondson bill­
boards. In contrast to the "cheese and crackers" first primary campaign, 
offers of financial, and orgsmizational support came in substantial amounts 
to the primary front-runner. Edmondson carried seventy counties and re­
ceived 69.6 per cent of the vote in his contest with Atkinson, 1^0 carried
lip
Interview with Phil Dessauer, associate editor of The Tulsa
Daily World, August 29, I962.
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only 8even rural counties. Youth and new faces triumphed in other run­
off contests: thirty-one-year-old George High defeated sixty-six-year-
old incumbent Cowboy Pink Williams in the lieutenant governor contest 
and thirty-three-year-old William A. Burkhart defeated seventy-eight- 
year-old veteran office holder A.3.J. Shaw in the state treasurer race.
The Edmondson prairie fire swept on in the 19$8 general election 
as the youthful Democratic nominee swamped his Republican opponent^ Phil 
Ferguson, by a margin of nearly four to one. Edmondson carried every 
county in the state and received 7^.1 per cent of the total vote to 
register the most lopsised gubernatorial victory in Okleihcma history. 
Ferguson's stand against h<naestead exemption alienated many voters, sind 
in general he staged an ineffective campaign. The Republican organization 
still was relatively ineffective, and many Republican party workers were 
not enthusiastic about supporting a former Democrat; Ferguson was a 
former Democratic congressman who had been elected from the normally 
Republican eighth congressional district in the New Deal yeairs of 193 ,^ 
1936, and 1938. But, more inportantly, Edmondson had seized the 
initiative with respect to cleaning up state government by coming out 
with a strong reform program in the Democratic primaries— a prograua 
that should have been exploited by the Republicans in 1958.
The J. Howard Edmondson Administration 
The new governor enjoyed soom important successes eaurly in his 
administration. Prohibition was repeaLled by a vote of the people at a 
speciaü. election in April, 1959» And his proposals for a merit system 
for state employees and for central purchasing of state supplies were
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adopted In the 1959 legislative session.
However, before the first half of his term was conqpleted 
Edmondson had lost complete control of the Oklahoma Democratic party 
and his actions had contributed to an urban-rural split within the 
Democratic party that was one of the most severe splits in the party's 
history.
Edmondson's troubles began when he decided, shortly after the 
close of the 1959 legislative session, to initiate three initiative 
petitions, all of which were opposed by rural legislators and rural 
residents. One proposal would have put the spending of county road 
funds in the hands of the State Highway Department rather than the 
county cmnmissioners, on a county option basis. Another vould have 
changed the existing legislative apportionment formula to one of 
electing both the old and new state senators on a population basis; 
state representatives also would have been elected on a population 
basis, but each county would have been guaramteed at least one repre­
sentative. The third vould have created a constitutional highway com­
mission whose members could not be removed at will by the governor.
An urban-rural cleavage began to take form when the governor's plans 
vere made known.
The seriousness of the split became known in September, 1959, 
vhen the Democratic state executive committee ignored the governor's 
wishes in selecting a new Democratic state chairman following Loyd 
Benefield's resignation. Edmondson let it be known that his choice 
for state chairman was Pat Malloy of Tulsa. However, the committee 
chose an avowed opponent of the governor's three initiative petitions,
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Gene McGill of A l v a . S o m e  committee members said after the meeting 
that they resented the fact that they vere not called by the governor
and retiring chairman Benefield and asked to vote for Malloy; they said
w,
they vere contacted instead by the chairman of the third district. 
Hovever, it is probable that the rural orientations of the majority of 
the executive committee vere more significant.
Edmondson had virtually no control over the Democratic party 
organization from then on. He did not control the Democratic state 
convention vhich selected delegates to the Democratic national convention 
in i960. State Chairman McGill headed the delegation; Edmondson vas 
placed on the delegation and given a one-half vote because of his 
position. He vas unable to control the organization of the state legis­
lature for the 1961 session, though under terms of a compromise he vas 
alloved to designate the majority floor leader of the house of repre­
sentatives.
The three initiative measures vere voted upon in September, 
i960, and all three vere defeated by heavy margins. It appears to have 
been a tactical error to submit three such controversial measures on 
the same ballot, for this apparently had the effect of solidifying all 
possible elements of rural opposition to the measures. Rural leaders 
formed a statevide organization, Oklahomans for Local Government, to 
fight them and this organization had the active support of the rural 
legislators and county commissioners. Chairman McGill sent a letter to
^^Oklahoma City Times. January 19, i960.
Ml
Daily Oklahoman, September 20, 1959-
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Democratic county officials asking them to get out the vote to defeat 
the measures.The result vas that only three urban counties, Oklahoma, 
Tulsa, and Washington, returned majorities for the three proposals. The 
measure to permit changing the system of spending county road funds vas 
defeated 353,^46 to 183,173; the results as to the other two proposals 
v e re  comparable.
The i960 presidential election occurred just six weeks after the 
voting on the Initiative measures, when the Democratic party split was 
at Its deepest. Though the religious factor alone probably was sufficient 
to bring about President Kennedy's defeat In Oklahoma, the party split 
and the unpopularity of the governor and his program undoubtedly contri­
buted to the size of the Nixon victory.
The election of a Catholic President was displeasing to many 
Oklahomans, and this contributed further to a sense of dissatisfaction 
with the Democratic party.
The state Democratic party's Image was shaken still further by 
the lengthy, wrangling I96I legislative session, described as "the 
longest, costliest, most wearisome and frustrating session In the history 
of the state. Organized and operating almost Independently of the 
governor, the session was marked by repeated grabs for patronage, by 
efforts to scuttle the merit system and central purchasing lavs, and 
by approval of the biggest spending program In the state's history.
Overall, It was not the dignified, businesslike type of session that
Ibid., September 8, i960.
^^Ibld.. July 30, 1961.
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Inspires confidence In Its actions among the electorate, a fact which 
many Oklahomans undoubtedly took Into account when the Democratic guber­
natorial nominee recommended In I962 that the sales tax be Increased to 
provide more money for the operation of state affairs.
As the 1962 elections approached, relations were sorely strained 
between the urban and rural wings of the Democratic party, as well as 
between the legislative and executive elements of Its leadership and 
between the governor and the official party organization. The ac­
cumulation of grievances against Democratic management of state affairs 
and dissatisfaction with the national administration were sufficient to 
cause many to think It was "time for a change."
CEAPTER XI
THE D0 COCHATIC FIRST PRIMARY
Twelve candidates entered the 1962 Democratic gubernatorial 
primary. This compares with an average of nine in all such primaries 
since 1910 and with an average of ten since 19^2. The large number of 
primary candidates is one indication of a multifactional political 
system and of fragmented party control.
The filing period opened February 26 and the election vas held 
May 1. The I962 primary was the first to be held in May; previously 
the voting had been held in July.
The legal limit for expenditures in a gubernatorial contest is 
$60,000 in the first primary and $30,000 in the runoff primary. When 
the limit was raised to $60,000 for the first primary, the lav made 
the candidates responsible for money raised by local organizations as 
veil as by state campaign headquarters. The limit is unrealistically 
low and invariably is exceeded by the major candidates. Uhofficial 
estimates of the range of spending by the major candidates in the I962 
first primary are frtm $100,000 to $300,000.
Generally, it has been necessary to poll one hundred thousand 
or more votes in the first prisary to win a place in the runoff. In 
the six election years through 1958 in which the runoff primary has 
been employed, only twice did the second-place candidate receive less
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than one hundred thousand votes, the last such occasion being in 19^ 6.
And only once in those years did the candidate who finished second in 
the first primary go on to defeat the front-runner in the runoff; that 
was in the 195^ Gary-Coe contest. In 193%, Tom Anglin withdrew ftom 
the runoff against E.W. Marland after trailing 156,885 to 101,698 in 
the first primary. In I962 second-place candidate Atkinson not.only 
received less than one hundred thousand votes in the first primary, but 
he also went on to overcome Gary's staggering lead of more than eighty- 
five thousand votes and to defeat Gary in the runoff.
The candidates and the votes they received in the first primary
were :
Raymond Gary 176,525 William A. Burkhart %,055
V.P. Bill Atkinson 91,182 Max B. Martin 1,199
Preston J. Moore 85,2%8 Thomas Dee Frasier 1,123
George Nigh 8%,%0% Barry R. Moss 1,101
Fred R. Harris T8,%76 Paul J. Summers 90?
George Miskovsky 9,%3% Ben Elmo Newcomer 56%
Three of the candidates withdrew from the contest, but their withdrawals
were made too late to have their names teOcen off the ballot. Frasier
withdrew and announced his support of Harris. Summers and Moss gave
their support to Moore.
At the outset of the campaign there was speculation that Gary and
Atkinson would be competing for the anti-Edmondson, largely rural,
generally status quo vote and that Moore, Nigh, and Harris would seek to
establish themselves as the "fresh political face" in an effort to
capture the vote that went to Edmondson in 1950" Gary and Atkinson were
expected to project the image of stability, whereas the younger trio
would appeal to the urban-progressive elements of the electorate. Though
this occurred to some extent, Atkinson changed his appeal markedly from
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that of 1958^ took a forthright stand on the issues, appealed to the 
urban-progresBive elements of the electorate vhile retaining his image 
as a sound businessman, emd dissociated himself more and more from Gary. 
This gave Atkinson a somevhat separate image in the field of candidates, 
and the fact that he vas the only candidate advocating a sales tax in­
crease to solve the state’s financial problems contributed to his 
fairly distinctive ;position. Gary's position vas the most distinctive 
of all; vith a platform that vas even more rural-oriented than his 19^4 
platform, he emerged as the champion of the rural, anti-Edmondson elements 
of the electorate. There vas a substantial overlapping of support for . 
Moore, Nigh, and Barris, and this hurt the candidacy of each. Moore end 
Harris especially sought to find a position on one of the major issues 
that could be dramatized and vhich vould give them a distinctive position, 
for they suffered the disadvantage of being least the videly knovn of the 
major candidates.
It seemed appeurent almost from the outset that Gary vas the only 
candidate certain to vin in the first primary, and the question soon be­
came: Which of the Anybody But Gary candidates has the best chance of
getting into the runoff vith Gary and of defeating him in the runoff?
For virtually no one vas neutral tovard Gary; most voters vere either 
strongly for him or strongly against him, and this feeling vas enhanced 
by the urban-rural split vithin the party. Gary's popularity began to 
rise in the state in 1959 and 196O as Edmondson's popularity fell, and 
one primary candidate alleged that Gary vas the real pover behind the 
Oklahomans for locaü. Govemsient organization that vas formed to fight 
Edmondson's initiative petitions.
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The eeeiruh for the Anybody But Gary candidate introduced a 
strong irrational factor into the I962 first primary. Instead of 
voting their own preferences, many voters vere trying to guess who bad 
the best chance to defeat Gary. There was much fear of "wasting my 
vote" on one of the lesser known and less well financed candidates.
Atkinson enorged as the successful Anybody But Gary candidate 
vith only I7.I per cent of the total primary vote, and among the reasons 
for his second-place finish in the first primary were these:
1} Only Atkinson could match Gary vith respect to campaign finances 
and strength of C8uq>aign organization. These factors created same 
"bandwagon effect" in his favor.
2) The fact that Atkinson and Nigh were the best known of the four 
major Anybody But Gary candidates gave them a big advantage over Moore 
and Barris. Nigh became established early in the campaign as the front- 
runner among the four, partly because he was well known as a result of 
having served four years as lieutenant governor and partly because 
Atkinson delayed the opening of his ceumpaign until two months after the 
other candidates began stumping the state. The front-runner position 
was as disadvantageous to Nigh in I962 as it was to Atkinson in 1953, 
for it promoted his opponents to center their fire upon him; his 
opponents' charges that he had no carefully considered program were 
especially damaging to Nigh. As Nigh's canq>aign began to fade, Atkinson's 
began to rise because his finances and organization were superior to those 
of Moore and Harris.
3) Atkinson had an important residue of support from his 1953 campaign. 
Though he was soundly defeated by Edmondson in the 1953 lunoff, he still
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polled 158,780 votes. Some of his 1958 support remained vith him In 1962; 
for example, many Rural Electric Cooperative Association leaders siqiported 
him In 1958 because he opposed the Gary-sponsored contract betveen Grand 
River Dam Authority and Public Service Company of Tulsa, and a number of 
them continued to support him In 1962. Such rural support vas Important 
to Atkinson, for ho vas coapotlng vith Moore, and Harris for the
urban vote.
4) Atkinson* s advocacy of a sales tax Increase not only gave him a 
distinctive position In the crovded field of cemdldates and a base from 
vhlch to deal forthrightly vith the major Issue of the campaign, but It 
also drev some Important organizational support to him. The school bloc 
vas seeking higher teacher salaries and the Oklahoma Municipal League 
vas seeking additional revenue for the tovns and cities. Atkinson had 
something positive to offer to such groups as these.
Table 42 shovs hov broadly based the support of each of the 
candidates vas.
TABLE 42.— Ikusber of first, second, third, fourth, and fifth place 
finishes by the candidates In the seventy-seven counties
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Gary 60 11 3 1 2
Atkinson 1 25 32 13 6
Moore 7 16 18 22 14
Nigh 3 16 21 33 4
Harris 6 9 3 8 51
That Gary had by far the broadest base of support, vhlch cut across 
neau-ly all segmænts of the electorate. Is shown by the fact that he ran 
first or second In all but six counties. Despite his rural-oriented
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program, he even made strong showings in some of the more populous 
areas, owing in part to his labor and Negro support; Gary also is a 
prominent lay Baptist and has a strong following among Baptists in 
all sections. Atkinson carried only his home county of Oklahoma, 
but he finished second or third in fifty-seven counties, and it was 
this rather broad base of support that put him into the runoff.
Moore and Harris carried the most counties of the Anybody But Gary 
candidates, but their support was spotty; they ran well where they 
were well known or where their county organizations were strong.
Map XXV shows the counties carried by the candidates. It 
shows that Gary carried most of the counties in northwestern, south­
western, and southeastern Oklahoma, plus the less populous counties in 
northeastern Oklahoma. Obviously he was strongest in the rural areas. 
For one thing, he was the only major candidate who did not favor the 
constitutional formula for reapportioning the legislature; instead he 
proposed that representation in one house be based upon population and 
that in the other upon area (political entities), a plan which Gary said 
was modeled after that of the national Congress. Gary was weakest in 
these areas:
l) Northeastern Oklsdioma. Both the Wagoner county and Tulsa bypass 
scandals, which developed during Gary's term, occurred in the north­
eastern section. The Tulsa newspapers bitterly opposed Gary's re­
apportionment stand Emd they charged that northeastern Oklahoma did not 
receive a proportionate sheure in Gary's road building program. Grand 
River Dam is in northeastern Oklahoma; while the Grand River Dam 
Authority-Public Service Company contract had repercussions through-
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out the state, its effects were felt especially strongly in the northeast.
2) The more populous counties of central and. northeastern Qkladioma. How­
ever, he finished a strong second in Oklahoma county, partly because the 
Oklahoma City newspapers adopted a strong anti-Atkinson stand and did 
not attack Gary's z-ural-oriented program.
The principal issues in the cas^ign were these; (l) how to 
finance state government operations; (2) the brace of issues that were 
of especial interest to rural residents, including legislative re­
apportionment, consolidation of rural schools, the Edmondson program of 
equalizing ad valorem taxes among all the counties, and curbing the 
powers of the county commissioners; (3) the size of the highway program; 
(4) the proposed right to work law; and (5) various local issues.
The remaining developments in the primary will be discussed 
from the steuidpoint of the cajaqaaigns of each of the five leading 
candidates.
The Gary Canqpaign 
Gary, who was fifty-four years old, served fourteen years in 
the state senate before being elected governor in 1954. A resident of 
Madill in Marshall county, he was a political leader in Little Dixie.
He had been a school teacher and county superintendent of schools prior 
to his election to the state senate. He was superintendent of the 
Sunday School at Kingston Baptist Church for sixteen years, chairman of 
the board of deacons, and a member of the board of trustees of the Okla­
homa Baptist Convention. In the 1940's Gary and a Madill banker joined 
with Kerr-McGee Oil Conqpemy to buy out a wholesale oil smd gasoline
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distributing company, Comusrcial Oil Company, the name of which was 
changed to Sooner Oil Coipany. Gary's brother Joe bought the banker's 
stock after the letter's death, and in 19^9 the brothers bought out the 
Kerr-HcGee interest. Gary still operates Sooner Oil Company and has a 
farm of more than four hundred acres.
The issues.— In drafting his platform for the 1962 cax^ign,
Gary took account of the fact that the school and welfare blocs were 
the two largest voting blocs in Oklahoma and that an appeal to them 
would be essentially a "liberal" one, but he also felt that Oklahoma 
was drifting gradually toward a "conservative" point of vlew.^ He 
cited the three Bepubliean presidential victories since 1952 and the 
fact that a "majority" of Oklahoma congressmen were voting more con­
servatively in recent years as the basis for his view that Oklahomans 
were becoming more conservative. To win in Oklahoma, Gary expressed 
the view that a candidate's program must be sound enough to attract the 
business interests, but liberal enough to appeal to those who depend 
upon the state for pay or support, including the school and welfare 
blocs.
Gary officially announced his candidacy January I6, when he 
set forth his platform at a press conference. He set the tone of the 
campaign by proposing a $210,000,000 bond issue to help finance a seven- 
year road building program which, with federal matching funds and general 
revenue appropriations added, would cost an estimated $$81,000,000. This 
was the heart of both his highway program and his plan to finance state
^Interview with Raymond Gary, July 31, I962.
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government operations, for the proceeds from the bond issue not only vould 
make possible an extensive highway building and Improvement program but 
would also lessen the drain on the general revenue fund for highway 
purposes and thus make available more general revenue funds for school, 
welfare, and other purposes. This was the basis of his appeal to those 
voting blocs. To the businessmen, he said that a first-class system of 
highways and expressways Is essential to Industrial expansion.
Ho Increase In taxes was another strong plank In the Gary plat­
form. Gary explained that his twenty-five-year, tax-exempt highway bonds 
were to be Issued at the rate of $30,000,000 a year for seven years and 
were to be backed by the full faith and credit of the state. They were 
to be retired from "economic growth. " Gary estimated that existing 
road user taxes would produce $36,000,000 In the current fiscal year, but 
he said they would produce Increasingly higher revenues In the future.
He estimated that In the next fifteen years the road user taxes vould 
produce $3^0,000,000 above what they were then producing. This "surplus" 
above the current $36,000,000 a year revenue from the road user taxes was 
to be pledged to retiring the highway bonds. Thus no Increase In taxes 
would be required to liquidate them. Gary promised further to submit 
the list of highways to be built to the voters before they were asked 
to approve the bond Issue.
Gary’s positions on the Issues of Interest to rural residents 
probably gave him an even more distinctive position among the field of 
candidates than his highway bond proposal and no tax Increase stands, 
for he established himself as the avowed champion of Oklahoma rural 
Interests. On equalizing ad valorem taxes among the counties, he said
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such assessments vere the responsibility of county equalization boards 
aind he expressed his opposition to blanket Increases for entire counties. 
On consolidation of rural schools, he said no additional legislation 
beyond the 19^7 school consolidation and reorganization act vas needed.
On county commissioner spending practices, he advocated no additional 
regulations. And, of course, vith respect to legislative reapportionment 
he stood alone; as to this Issue, he never spelled out the details of 
his plan, such as vhlch of the tvo houses of the legislature vas to have 
Its representation based upon population and vhether there vas to be an 
Increase or decrease of membership In either or both houses.
There even vas an urban-rural cast to the Issue of hlghvays In 
1962. Gary said he vould build hlghvays vhere they vere needed, not 
according to population. Moore Insisted that hlghvays should be built 
vhere the traffic count justifies them.
Gary's opposition to the proposed right to vork lav earned him 
the support of labor. AFL-CIO leaders supported Gary because, according 
to Len Yarborough, executive vice president, Gary had declared his 
strong opposition to the lav and had promised to make speeches against 
It If he vere nosdnated.^ The AFL-CIO did not endorse Gary officially 
until early In the runoff, but the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 
endorsed him In the first primary.
Organization and finances. — Gary had the largest, most experienced, 
and most effective oasqpalgn organization of all the candidates, and only 
the Gary and Atkinson oarngMilgns vere adequately financed.
2
Intervlev vith Len Yarborough, executive vice president of the 
Oklahoma AFL-CIO, July 26, I962.
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Gary had county headquarters in at least fifty of the seventy- 
seven counties and active canqiaign workers in most of the remaining 
counties. A top Gary caiq>aign aide said, "We had just the kind of 
organization we wanted in about fifteen to twenty counties."
Eis eajqpaign msuiager was State Senator Robert L. Bailey, of 
Cleveland county, a young man who had been active in the senate on 
school matters because he represented the district in which the 
University of Oklahoma was located. Other top aides included James C. 
Eamill, Oklahoma City attorneyj Gary's son, Raymond Jerdi Gary, of 
Denison; Martin Eauan, Oklahoma City public relations executive; Mrs. 
Sue Rubel, Oklahoma City, woman's coordinator; Don Simmons, Muskogee, 
Negro coordinator, and six district coordinators who worked with the 
county chairmen. B.E. (Bill) Earkey, former speaker of the state 
house of representatives, headed the Oklahmna county organization and 
Robert L. Hicks, insurance executive, the Tulsa county organization. 
Eicks was aided in Tulsa county by George Horvel, former Tulsa mayor, 
and Walter Findley, editor of the weekly Tulsa Citizen-News.
In Oklahoma county, where Gary ran strongly, there were 
approximately one hundred fifty active workers, plus nearly one 
thousand persons doing some sort of part-time work. ^ One hundred 
women made door-to-door calls in Wards 1 and 3, twenty in Ward k, and 
fifteen in Ward 2. Pour women were used full-time to make telephone 
calls in those areas of the city where it was felt that Gery was 
weakest and where no house canvass was conducted. In addition, a
^Interview with B.E. (Bill) Earkey, Gary caiqpaign manager in 
Oklahoma county, August 20, 1^ 2.
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Voluntary Telephone Club vas organized; tventy-fiye to thirty women 
agreed to make telephone calls to their friends.
The house canvassers and telephone callers co^>lled lists of 
persons definitely for Gary, those definitely against, and the un­
decided. This list served as a private poll of Gary strength In Okla­
homa City and also as a basis for enlisting the support of the nearly 
one thousand part-time workers. Postcards vere supplied to Gary 
county managers throughout the state, and these managers vere asked 
to send In the names of pro-Gary former residents who had moved to 
Oklahoma City from the rural areas, where Gary was especially strong.
Throughout the campaign Earkey met frequently with the four 
full-time telephone callers to learn what the voters vere talking about. 
Two meetings were held with the women house canvassers to brief them 
on the Issues and to learn what Oklahoma City residents were saying 
about the candidates. Among the principal problems were how to explain 
Geury's stand on legislative reapportionment In an urban area end how to 
answer questions about the Wagoner county end Tulsa bypass cases. Late 
In the campaign bulletins were sent every three or four days to the one 
thousand part-time workers to provide them with Information on the 
ceumpalgn and the Issues.
The main effort of the Gary organization In Oklahoma City was 
concentrated upon the working-class areas of Wards 3 and 4 and among 
the Negroes In Ward 2. The same was true In Tulsa, where door-to-door 
canvassers were used In seventy-six of the city's two hundred twenty- 
five precincts; these were principally working-class precincts on 
Tulsa's north side.
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In the smaller counties the Gary organizations might consist 
of a few veteran organizers who quietly enlisted the support of key 
persons In the various areas of city and county, sometimes without 
benefit of county headquarters offices. Asked how he went about en­
listing the support of key persons In his county, a county manager in 
a medium-sized county said, "Maybe he would be satisfied If his daughter 
could work In the precinct election and earn five dollsurs; maybe he 
wants to earn ten dollsirs hauling voters to the polls; maybe he can be 
persuaded by someone who will Just take the time to sit on his front 
porch and talk with him." It Is In the area of having engaged In 
politics long enough to know who the key persons In the area sure, and 
on what basis they can be persuaded, that experience counts. Another 
mark of experience appears to be In knowing where to concentrate the 
casqpalgn effort; the county manager for one of Gary's opponents be­
moaned the fact that he spent too much time and money In the rural and 
Negro areas, "where we were beaten by Gary to begin with," and not 
enoufpi time holding coffees in the city residential areas, "where the 
people were more receptive."
The campaign.— Newspaper polls and private polls showed that 
Gary and Nigh Jumped off to an early lead In the caiq>algn. But since It 
was virtually conceded that Gary would lead In the first primary and 
since the real fight was for second place, the opposing candidates con­
centrated their fire at least as much upon Nigh as upon Gary.
However, Gary's program was roundly criticized. His opponents 
pointed out that bills proposing highway bond Issues had been Intro­
duced in the legislature many tlme% for amounts less than $210,000,000,
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and had been voted down consistently. The largest bond issue approved 
up to that time by the voters was the $66,000,000 authorized to build 
the Will Bogers turnpike, a self-liquidating project. Atkinson charged 
that the program would cost $80,000,000 In Interest, attorney fees, and 
other expenses. Edmondson said the voters did not have sufficient 
confidence In the Highway Department to approve a bond Issue of that 
magnitude.^ Harris said highway bond Issues are wise only In smeCLl 
sums and for non-recurring purposes. ^ It was charged further that Gary 
alone would be determining Oklahoma highway expenditures for seven years, 
that there would be a sparse highway program after the seven-year boom, 
and that the bond Issue constituted a mortgage to be passed on to the 
next generation.
But some voters liked the no tax Increase aspect of Gary's 
program. Others felt their communities would get more highways emd get 
them faster than could be accomplished under a pay-as-you-go plan. Gary 
benefited trom. his 195^-1958 reputation as a highway builder, and his 
promises of new highways caused many communities to feel that they had 
a personal stake in his candidacy. That Gary benefited from, his past 
road building was shown by election returns In the cities and counties 
along U.S. Highway 66. During his term as governor Gary had kept his 
promise to put the highway through the towns euid cities rather than to 
adopt the straight-line rcute, favored by the Bureau of Public Roads,
^^ i l y  Oklahoman, April 12, I962.
^Ibid., January 2 , I962.
^Ibid., February 1 , I962.
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that vould hare hypasaed the cities by as such as eight miles. These 
cities shoved their gratitude by their voting In the first primary. 
Against eleven opponents, Gary received 67.6 per cent of the vote In 
Beckham county, 6I.6 per cent In Custer county, and 40 per cent In 
the city of Bethany, just outside Oklahoma City. Of course, Gary's 
rural-orlented program also helped him In aJ.1 these areas except 
Bethany.
Gary vas virtually unbeatable In rural Oklahoma. In Sequoyah 
county, Wheeler Mayo, publisher of the Sequoyah County Times, decided 
not to enter the congressional race In his district so that he could 
vork against Gary In the gubernatorial contest. Mayo had been a member 
of the Grand Elver Dam Authority board of directors vhen the contract 
vith the Public Service Company vas signed, and he bitterly opposed 
Gary.'s efforts on behalf of the contract.? His nevspaper endorsed 
Harris. But Sequoyah county voters gave Gary k'J.6 per cent of the vote, 
Harris 8.6 per cent, and Atkinson l8 .2 per cent.
Gary also vas challenged to spell out the details of his legis­
lative reapportionment proposal. Harris noted that the smallest counties 
vere s.varded a state representative on as little as a half-populatlon 
ratio under the existing constitutional formula, but he pointed out that 
some of these counties vould lose their representative If representation 
In the house vere based upon population and If the membership of the house
Û
vere not Increased.° But some observers expressed the vlev that this
?Oklaltoma City Times, February 20, 1962.
8Ibid., April 16, 1962.
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issue vas too complex to be understood fully by many voters. Large 
numbers of rural voters just knew that Gary was on the side of the rural 
folks.
To nany, a vote for Gary was a vote against the Edmondson 
administration. Gary occupied the most distinctive position in the 
large field of osmdidates : most of the rural, anti-Edmondson vote could
be concentrated upon him, while most of the urban-progressive votes were 
being distributed among the other four leading candidates. As a result 
of this distinctive position, his excellent campaign organization, the 
gratitude of many for highways already built and the expectations of 
others for highways promised, Gary polled 33 per cent of the votes and 
led the field by a wide margin.
But what was an asset to Gary In the first primary became a 
liability to him In the runoff, when the urban votes could be concen­
trated upon a single opponent.
The Atkinson Campaign
Atkinson, who was fifty-five yeaors old, had served as a member 
of the Economic smd Development Commission under Governor Gary and a 
member of the Planning and Resources Board under Governor Kerr. His 
principal achievement was to develop the city of Midwest City In Okla­
homa county from a wheat field to the sixth largest city In the state 
In a period of from fifteen to twenty years— and to become a multi­
millionaire In the process. Atkinson was teaching journalism at Okla­
homa City Dhlvcrslty In the 1930's when he took a job selling real 
estate on weekends to leam the heme building business. He went into 
home building on a shoestring and soon became a major builder. In
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19^1, he said, newspapers carried stories that an air depot would be 
located within ten miles of downtown Oklahoma City, no nearer than four 
miles to an oil field, on a railroad and on a highway accessible to the 
city. Atkinson said he studied maps of the county, narrowed the pros­
pective location of the air depot to three possible sites, then purchased 
two farms totalling three hundred ten acres at a price of one hundred 
fifty dollars an acre. This land because the site of Midwest City. 
Atkinson skyrocketed into prominence in the home building field emd in 
1951 because president of the National Association of Home Builders. He 
has been prominent in Methodist Church affairs.
The issues.— Advocacy of a one-cent increase in the state sales 
taoc, fr«a two to three cents on the dollar, was the heart of Atkinson's 
1962 platform. It was partly to overcome Atkinson's 1958 ceuiqwiign image 
of lack of forthrightness that he amd his camq>aign advisers decided to 
advocate the sales tajc increase as the means of overcoming the state's 
deficit financing amd of laying the groundwork for ushering Oklahoma 
into am era of industrial growth. 9 Late in I96I his advisers sounded 
out the sentiment of key persons throughout the state on the tax in­
crease. The results were about fifty-fifty. On the one hand, any form 
of tax increase was aümost certain to be opposed by many housewives, by 
labor leaders, and by old age pensioners and others tied to i fixed 
incomes. But, on the other hamd, a tax increase would be appeailing to 
teachers seeking higher pay, to the reyenue-stairved towns amd cities, to
^Interviews with E.W. McNeil, csuqpaign coordinator, August 3,
1962; Cham Guffey, press aide, August 3, 1962; E.L. Roederer, Oklahoma 
county coordinator, August 20, 19o2 ; Clarke W. Ford, Tulsa county 
coordinator, August 29, 1962.
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local chambers of commerce Interested In the "Build Oklahoma" theme, 
and possibly to young persons interested in greater job opportunities.
The fact that such a platform plank would permit Atkinson to be 
forthright and specific in telling how the state's problems could and 
should be met weighed heavily in the decision to advocate the tauc in­
crease. Also, such sui approach to the state's problems would give 
Atkinson a separate image in the eyes of the voters, especially if his 
opponents were less forthright than he in spelling out how to meet the 
problems.
It was decided to take the calculated political risk of ad­
vocating the sales tax increase. It could be softened a bit by re­
ferring to it as a "penny increase," as Atkinson invariably did. And 
certainly it was better to specify the tax to be raised tham to talk in 
general about raising taxes, for that would alienate almost everyone. 
Overall, a proposal to increase the sales tax probably would meet less 
resistamce them amy other form of tauc increase. It does not hurt industry 
emd is more acceptable to the wesilthy them the income tax, and most 
persons appear to feem the sales tax less tham amy other.
The sales tax increase plamk permitted Atkinson to advocate a
$^35,000,000 pay-as-you-go highway program within the next four years.
Of the $27,000,000 increase in revenues in the first year, Atkinson pro­
posed to allocate $10,000,000 to the Highway Department amd twenty per
cent ($5,400,000) to the financially hard pressed towns amd cities.
On the rural issues, Atkinson ad^ted a sonewhat more middle 
of the road position tham Moore and Harris. With one eye on the big 
urban-progressive vote that went to Edmondson in 1958, he advocated
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leglslatlTe reapportionment according to the constitutional formula.
With another eye on his residue of rural support ftrom the 1958 campaign, 
he did not make equalization of ad valorem assessments or reform of 
county commissioner spending practices am important part of his plat­
form. He qualified his support of reorganization of rural school 
districts by pointing out that many rural roads were poor and that 
many pupils vere leaving home before daylight in the wintertime and 
not returning until after dark.
On the proposed right to work law, Atkinson handed out a pre­
pared statement of his position when he appeared before the Cklsdioma 
Press Association April 1. It said:
The question is of such a nature that it should not disrupt the 
legislature again. For this reason, I believe it should be 
settled by the people. It is now in the process of being 
initiated. I do not intend to be active for or against. If the 
drive is successful and the petitions found valid, the people 
will decide by their ballots. At that time, and as an in­
dividual, I shall vote against the measure.
It was a good stand on a potentially divisive issue. It permitted
Atkinson to take a positive stand as an individual, but recognized that
the people amd not the governor would decide the issue.
Organization amd finances.— Atkinson or High had the second 
largest campaign orgamization, but the Atkinson organization had far 
more experienced campaign workers in it than High's. And Atkinson's 
cauqsaign probably was the best financed of aUL. The Atkinson casqpaign 
begem with a nucleus of about thirty-five county organizations; this 
was expamded to fifty-one by late March.
E.W. (Coach) McNeil, Oklahoma City oilman, former camtpaign 
manager for Governor Turner amd leader of the successful 1959 csunpaign
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to repeal prohibition, agreed to serve as state coordinator of the 
Atkinson casq*aign about October, 196I. McNeil is one of the very fev 
Oklahomans who can put together a statewide political organization by 
telephone from his office. Other top caiqpaign aides were Dave 
Vandivier, former Chickasha newspaper publisher; Chan Guffey, former 
city editor of the Daily Oklahoman and later publisher of the weekly 
Prague News-Record; and former Governors Turner and William J. Holloway, 
who served as advisors.
McNeil chose the county managers in the key counties carefully, 
avoiding those experienced men who had accumulated a number of enemies 
from previous caaq)aign8 and where possible selecting men already identified 
with large vote-getting organizations. In Oklahoma county, the county 
coordinator was E.L. (jim) Boederer, Oklahoma City insurance executive 
who had just served as chairman of the Voters for City In^rovements 
Committee, an organization formed to work for passage of a $39,850,000 
city improvements bond issue. The bond issue was voted upon October 24, 
1961, amd Roederer Joined the Atkinson orgamization the next day, bring­
ing with him much of the Improvements Committee orgamization. In Tulsa 
county the coordinator was Clarke W. Ford, young Tulsa lawyer who had 
served for five years as administrative assistamt to Mayors George Norvel 
amd James Maxwell. He too was able to obtain the assistamce of former 
city officials amd of large numbers of workers who had taken part in 
city bond issue casqaaigns. In Muskogee county, the coordinator was 
Andrew Wilcoxen, who as district Judge presided at the Wagoner county 
absentee baiUot hearings.
There was a wealth of know-how at the top, there was much
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experience throughout the organization^ and finances vere adequate.
The only question Is vhether Atkinson generated much enthusiasm euaong 
the lover echelon vorkers.
The campaign.— In addition to the decision to advocate a sales 
tax Increase, a second major decision made before the start of the 
campaign vas to conduct an Intensive slx-veek campaign, vith an all- 
out drive In the last three veeks. This meant that Atkinson's campaign 
vould start approximately tvo months after those of the other candidates, 
and this vas another calculated risk. The decision vas made because It 
vas felt that Atkinson had gotten out In fl*ont too early In the 1958 
campaign and had become the target of the other candidates; also It vas 
believed that his 1958 ceuiqpalgn had peaked too eaorly and that there vas 
some loss of support In the latter stages. In addition, the Tennessee 
legislative reapport Ionment case vas pending, and there vas a possibility 
that the decision In this case might have an Important bearing upon the 
stand to be taken on this Issue.
The risk taken In delaying the start of the campaign until mid- 
March vas demonstrated In the results of the first statevlde nevspaper 
poll, vhlch vere released March l8, the day before Atkinson's klckoff 
speech. The poll shoved Gary leading vith ^95 votes, Nigh second vith 
436, Harris 199, Atkinson 1$2, Moore 125, Miskovsky 70, and U71 un­
decided.
The reaction to Atkinson's opening speech vas generally favorable, 
amd by the time the second Ihilted Press International statevlde poll vas 
taken he had climbed to third place and appeared to be gaining. The 
results of this poll vere published April 10.
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By mld-Aprll the Atkinson canqpaign vas in high gear, vith a 
saturation television and radio campaign, statewide newspaper adver­
tising, and signs and placards appearing on the highways. On April 22 
the Tulsa World endorsed him in a front-page editorial which said, "He 
is frankly telling the truth about our state finances--without offering 
any puny or 'painless' solutions." This was in reference to the fact 
that both the 1959 and I96I state legislatures had appropriated less 
than the sums required by the public schools and institutions of higher 
learning; in both sessions the legislators relied upon "economic growth" 
to overcome all or part of the deficit by the second year of the biennium. 
The situation in I962 was that the next legislature faced the prospect of 
picking up a "hot check" of up to $13,000,000 to make up the school and 
college deficits. In addition, the state's highways were below average, 
its aiental hospitals were under-finamced, and the cities and towns needed 
more revenue badly.
When the results Of the final statewide nevspaper poll were re­
leased April 30, Atkinson was in second place behind Gai-y.
Most of the campaign strategy appeared to work as planned.
Atkinson meuieuvered himaelf into a desirable position on the issues: the
proposed sales tax increase gave him a separate image in the eyes of the 
voters and attracted some important organizational support. He avoided 
alienating the rural supporters who backed him in I958, and his positions 
on reapportionment and industrial progress gave him some support in the 
urbain areas. Eis platform was geaired to progress, while his age amd 
business background gave his camdidacy am air of stability. Voters who 
opposed "youthful ideeQ.ism" or "turning the clock back" found him a more
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middle of the road ca-ndidate. And, vhat is very important in a many- 
sided scramble, his campaign was veil financed and his campaign organ­
ization vas sufficiently strong to convey the impression that he had a 
good chance to vin a place in the runoff.
The Moore Cas^ign
Moore, vho vas forty-tvo years old, vas born in Okmulgee county 
and vas reared in Bartlesville, in Washington county. In more recent 
years he had practiced lav, first in Stillvater in Payne county and later 
in OklahoBUi City. He had not held political office. He gained prominence 
first as state commander of the American Legion, then as national commander 
in 1958-1959" He made many political contacts as a canqpaign vorker for 
byndon Johnson in five southvestern or vestern states in advance of the 
i960 Democratic national convention. And he vas on good terms vith 
Senator Kerr, another former American Legion state commander and a Lyndon 
Johnson supporter. Among his political assets vere that he vas a good 
speeiker and that he vas not identified vith the Old Guard, the Edmondson 
Hev Guard, or the legislative branch.
The issues.— Moore had difficulty vith his positions on at least 
tvo of the major issues, and this vas harmful to his candidacy. He took 
a stand against an increase in taxes in the opening speech of his campaign, 
but he said at that time that he vould consider recommending a sales tax 
increase if it appeared that increased revenue vas absolutely necessary. 
Later in the caa^ign, in an effort to occupy a more distinctive position 
on this paramount issue,he ran advertisements vhich read: The Only
Candidate Who Stands Betveen You And A Tax Increase.
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On the right to vork issue, there is some difference of opinion 
as to what Moore said or intended to say with respect to this issue at 
his campaign kickoff rally at Stillwater February 10. But the opening 
paragraph of the Daily Oklahoman news article which gave an account of 
the rally quoted Moore as saying, "I cannot and will not support a 
right to work l a w . M o o r e  was quoted as saying further, "I don't 
believe it is going to bring the great strides in industry some persons 
would have us believe it will bring to Oklahoma," but as adding, "it 
might help in some instances." These remarks were not part of his 
prepared text; they were made in answer to reporters' questions follow­
ing his speech. Some of his aides indicated that he did not intend to 
take such a strong position against right to work, and much effort was 
expended in ensuing weeks in am effort to establish a more neutral 
position on the issue. The effect of his taüEing such a strong position 
at Stillwater was to alienate sane supporters of the right to work 
petition and, equally importantly, to make fund-raising more difficult, 
at least for a time.^ The moneyed interests generally flavored the 
proposed right to work law.
Moore's proposed $351 0^00,000 highway program for the coming 
four years was the smallest of all the major candidates. He advocated 
that no appropriations for highways be made from the general fund as one 
means of avoiding a tax increase. On legislative reapportionment and 
related issues, his positions generally were urban-oriented.
^%aily Oklahoman, February 11, 1962.
^Interviews with Dick Trent, Moore ca^>aign manager, July 27, 
1962; C.J. Wright, cas^ign coordinator, August 17, 1962; Bruce Hickman, 
press aide, August 11, 1962; and Hollis Hull, campaign aide, August 23,
1962.
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Organization and finances.— Because of Moore's strong American 
Legion connections, his campaign aides worked through local Legion posts 
to obtain county managers. Though am effort was made to avoid the ap- 
pearsmce of "too much Legion," It was necessary to rely rather heavily 
upon Legionnaires as county managers. But Legion strength and activity 
Is spotty In Oklahoma, and so was the strength of Moore's statewide 
organization.
There were county headquarters offices In about ten counties.
The headquarters list showed that there were county managers In fifty- 
nine counties, but msmy of these did not work actively. Few persons In 
the top or lower echelons of the organization had had any previous 
political experience. And there was virtually no organization down to 
the precinct level, even In Oklahoma City or Tulsa.
Moore's campaign manager was Dick Trent, an Oklahoma City 
Insurance executive, who was taking part In his first political caispalgn. 
C.J. Wright, a Vlnlta businessman and former state commander of the 
American Legion, Joined the headquarters staff In March as coordinator 
of the county organizations; he also was without previous political 
experience. Bruce Hickman, radio station news editor and a recent 
chairman of Citizens for Constitutional Reapportionment, became Moore's 
press aide, but he received a public relations contract during the 
campaign and was unable to devote full time to It. Hollis Hull, Okla­
homa City Insurance executive who aü.so was without previous political 
experience, served alternately as coordinator of county organizations 
and as publicity director at various stages of the campaign. A group 
of twelve to fifteen business and professional men, also without
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political experience, met regularly with these top campaign aides In an 
advisory capacity.
In Oklahoma county the campaign Initially vas headed by an 
Oklahoma City businessman who was unable to devote sufficient time to 
the casgxalgn. About April 1 the post vas assumed by Tom Harley, Okla­
homa City lawyer, who had been a member of the speakers' bureau for Coe 
In 19h6 and for Murray In 1950. There were four active workers at the 
county headquarters In addition to Barley. There was no ward or precinct 
organization in Oklahoma county, aind the principal effort there was this: 
five thousand bumper stickers were Issued, small hand cards were passed 
out by young girls and boys on three days, the headquarters staff passed 
out hand cards In front of the headquarters office as time permitted, and 
a half-hour coffee was given for Moore at the county headquarters office. 
In the Capitol Hill section of OkleOioma City a headquarters office was 
staffed by one woman, and It was reported that she had approximately one 
hundred fifty large yard signs built. Three Negro women were engaged to 
make telephone calls In the Negro area, but only one remained in the last 
two weeks of the caaqpalgn.
In Tulsa county the csunpalgn was headed by Bay Williams, thlrty- 
slx-year-old oil company attorney and Independent oil operator. He said 
approximately thirty women volunteers were given ten precincts each and 
asked to try to find one woman In each precinct who would make telephone 
calls or write letters on Moore's behalf. Williams said this effort was 
not entirely successful. For one thing. It was In^sslble to obtain
^Interview with Tom Harley, Oklahoma county manager for Moore, 
August 23, 1962.
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lists of current Democratic voters for the telephone callers; for 
another, it vas found that another candidate vas offering ten dollars 
a day for telephone csillers and some Moore volunteers began telephoning 
for h i m . T h r e e  weeks before the primary^ following the Tulsa city 
elections. District Court Clerk Saiauel V. (Ves) Fry and his organization 
Joined the Moore effort in Tulsa county. Fry, a brother-in-law of the 
late William 0. Coe, was an experienced political organizer and had an 
organization of fifty-five to sixty men, mostly his employees. In 
addition, Moore had at least the quiet support of a number of prominent 
Tulsans, including Ed Hughes of the Farmers and Merchants Bank, Robert 
Pleasauit of the North Side State Bank, County Commissioner Frank O'Brien, 
and M.J. Patrick, longtime mayor of nearby Skiatook. Some of these men 
were supporters of Senator Kerr, indicating the possibility of some Kerr 
support for Moore in the first primary.
There were hard-working, effective Moore organizations in perhaps 
a dozen counties, but some of them worked against heavy odds in the 
strong OaiTr areas.
Under-financing was another Moore problem. Raising funds re­
quired almost the full-time attention of his campaign manager until less 
than a month before the campaign ended. The rather widespread belief 
that Moore could not win made fund-raising more difficult. In February 
his campaign leaders contracted for sixty-six billboards in an effort 
to combat rumors that the campaign was under-financed; in March eighty- 
eight more were added. Actually, however, the caiqpaign till was virtually
^^Interview with Bay Williams, Tulsa county manager for Moore,
August 27, 1962.
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empty for at least tvo weeks In late March and early April.
The campaign.— Midway In the campaign Moore's aides decided that 
all the leading candidates had established a separate Image except Moore 
and Nigh, and hence that an Issue was needed that would set Moore apart. 
Gary was alone with his highway bond Issue and legislative reapportlon- 
ment proposals, Atkinson with his sales tax Increase, and Barris was 
attracting attention with advertisements which proclaimed that he was 
The Only Man Who Can Beat Gary. It was decided to proclaim Moore as the 
No Tax Increase candidate and newspaper advertisements were drawn up 
saying of Mooret The Only Man Who Stands Between You And A Tax Increase. 
Whether this was effective Is highly problematical. Barris had main­
tained a consistent no tax Increase position from the beginning, while 
Moore had entertained the possibility of considering a sales tax Increase 
In his opening speech; also, Gary was associated with a no tax Increase 
position.
Bowever, Moore did succeed In setting himself apart from the 
field to some extent by adopting a more aggressive posture In his 
campaign appearances late In the campaign. To many he conveyed the 
laq>resslon of "There's a fighter; he's against those people who are 
taking our money." Be was continuing to make the same good government 
appeal he had made Arom the beginning, but he was couching It In fighting 
language. Experienced casqpalgn managers agree that a thin line separates 
the "There's a fighter" Image which attracts votes from that of the overly 
aggressive attacker. Moore's posture, which apparently was a natural 
development rather than a planned one, had a wide appeal and did more 
to give him a separate Image In the race than any other single factor.
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But it came very late in the cauapaign.
Moore's strong third-place finish vas the biggest surprise of 
the first primary. The private polls of the candidates and the news­
paper polls did not show such strength on Moore's part at any stage of 
the campaign. Private polls taken by Gary aides from November, l$6l, 
through January, 1962, showed Moore to be running fifth, as did the 
statewide newspaper polls in March euid April. A Tulsa World poll, 
published April 22, showed Moore to be running such a distant fifth 
that it gave rise to a news article which began, "The Democratic guber­
natorial primary race May 1 apparently has narrowed down to four men—  
Fred Harris, W.P. Bill Atkinson, Raymond Gary, and George Nigh." News 
articles in the Oklahoma City newspapers also indicated that Moore's 
candidacy was lagging. Such articles were demoralizing to Moore campaign 
workers emd damaging to his campaign. They caused some of his aides to 
feel that Moore was being "read out of the race."
The only plausible explanation for Moore's strong finish, despite 
these difficulties, is that an unusually large number of Anybody But Gary 
voters remained undecided on their choice of candidate until the closing 
days of the campaign and that Moore got a large portion of the "against" 
vote from this group. One major reason why Moore got much of the un­
decided vote was this: when the Moore campaign ran out of funds late in
March, his aides decided that future cam>aign contributions would be used 
to purchase television time "from April 30 backwards"— that is, it was 
decided to make certain that Moore was on television in the closing days 
of the caiqsaign, even if that meant no television appearances through 
much of April. As it turned out, the High and Harris campaigns ran out
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of money by the last week and the television field was left to Moore, 
Atkinson, and Gary in that crucial period. One Moore aide characterized 
this decision as "the smartest move me made in the entire campaign."
Taking into account the weaknesses in the Moore camqwiign organ­
ization, Moore's lack of consistency on two of the major issues, and 
the under-financing of his campaign, Moore made a strong race. He missed 
being in the runoff by less than six thousand votes.
The High Campaign
High, who was thirty-four years old, had served as lieutenant 
governor since 1958 and had been a member of the state house of repre­
sentatives for eight years prior to that. He was a teacher of history 
and government at McAlester High School when he was elected to the state 
legislature, where he served as chairman of the house penal committee 
(the state penitentiary is at McAlester) and as chairman of the Legis­
lative Council's education committee. His opponents charged during the 
campaign that Nigh had played no major role in the legislature. He was 
a former state president of the Oklahoma Young Democrats and a state 
director of the Oklahoma Junior Chamber of Commerce. Among his political 
assets were that he was widely known in the state and that he was a 
personable young bachelor who appealed to young persons and to women.
High was $17^000 in debt from his caapaign expenses on the day 
he was inaugurated lieutenant governor in 1958, and he still owed $3,000 
of this sum when he called ten close friends to gather at his home in 
Norman in January, I962, to help him decide whether to run for governor.
ik ^
Interviews with George Nigh, August 10 and September 11, 1962; 
Joe Johnson, Nigh campaign coordinator, September 4, I962; Charles
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One of these close friends vas Joe Johnson, Stillwater lavyer, who had 
been in Europe from September until January. Johnson made a swing 
around the state immediately upon his return from Europe to sound out 
Nigh's probable chances in the governor's race. At that time "Gary 
had not built up a full head of steam" and Johnson's soundings in­
dicated that Edmondson's popularity was up from its I96O low. It was 
decided that the time was ripe for Nigh to run. Though Nigh was not 
part of the Edmondson inner circle of advisers, he was identified by 
many with the Edmondson administration because of his position as 
lieutenant governor. And, as things developed, he had the quiet support 
of Edmondson in the CGunpaign.
The issues.— It was decided that Nigh would campaign on a "U- 
Nj^ted Oklahoma" platform, with the rather idealistic aim of trying 
to unite all the warring elements of the party behind his csmdidacy.
This led to what Nigh's opponents chsuracterized as a fuzzy stand on some 
of the more controversial issues. Though Nigh supported the constitutional 
formula for legislative reapportionment and said he was personally op­
posed to the proposed right to work law, he was charged with playing 
down these issues by chsoracterizing them as issues that divide, rather 
than unite, Oklahomsms. In his opening speech he proposed a four-year 
highway program that would cost $600,000,000, a program that was even 
larger than Gary's. But this was not consistent with his stand on the 
question of state revenues, for his initial position here was that he 
would examine all existing revenues sind expenditures before ree<mmending
McWilliams, caiqwiign director, August 17, 1$62; O.E. Richeson, eastern 
Oklahoma coordinator, August 3I, 19^2; and Deem Rinehsirt, western Okla- 
hcana coordinator, September 10, I962.
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a tax Increase; he added that there should be no tax Increase unless It 
were approved by the people. He suggested a two-year "grace period" in 
which all state agencies would be asked to economize or at least to hold 
the line on expenditures; then, if the state's economic growth was not 
sufficient to permit efficient operation of state government from existing 
revenues by the end of the two-year period. High would go to the people 
to ask for a tauc increase. Initially, Nigh's principal suggestion for 
making available more general revenue funds for such purposes as high­
ways was to transfer more eleemosynary agencies to the Welf&re Department; 
since Welfare Department functions are financed by the two per cent sales 
tax, which is earmarked for welfare purposes, this would ease the drain 
on the general revenue fund. It was neither a no tsuc increase stand nor 
an unqualified call for more revenues, and Nigh admitted that this 
position had little political appeal. Nor did it square with a 
$600,000,000 highway program, for a large increase in revenues obviously 
was needed to support a program of that magnitude. Later in the campaign 
he proposed an increase in automobile drivers' license fees as a supple­
ment to his earlier suggestion for increasing general fund revenues. This 
came after repeated charges by his opponents that he lacked a carefully 
considered program. For example, Moore said "it's easy to talk about 
spending millions [for highways] for a playboy who doesn't have a family 
grocery bill, school books to buy . . .
Apparently somewhat more attention was devoted to campaign 
strategy than to the drafting of a platform in the initial stages.
^^Daily Oklahoman, March 27, I962.
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Here the plan vas to focus the appeal upon vomen, teachers, and young 
married persons. Talks for Nigh vere arranged before dozens of women's 
clubs throughout Oklahoma and direct mall literature vas sent to nearly 
every women's group In the state. Young married persons vere reached 
through the members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the Young 
Democrats.
Organization and finances.— Nigh's organization probably was as 
large as Atkinson's, but the tvo organizations vere about as unlike as 
they could be. Whereas the Atkinson organization was long on experience 
and somewhat lacking In enthusiasm, the Nigh organization was short on 
political know-how but long on enthusiasm.
There was somewhat more political experience In the top echelon 
of the Nigh organization than In the ranks. Johnson, the coordinator of 
the county organizations, had served as Nigh's manager In 1958, as Payne 
county manager for William A. Berry In the 1950 fifth district congres­
sional race, as a member of the Gary speakers' bureau In 195 ,^ and had 
served as state representative from Payne county from 1955 until 1957. 
Charles McWilliams, of Broken Arrow In Tulsa county. Joined the campaign 
In mid-March as camq>algn manager and concerned himself primarily with 
revising the Nigh platform and with publicity. The publisher of one 
dally and six weekly newspapers, he had had no previous political 
experience; he joined the csunpalgn because "George Nigh Is my kind of 
guy— no drink, no smoke, no cuss." O.E. (Pete) Richeson, of Eenryetta, 
a former state representative, served as eastern Oklahoma coordinator. 
Desm Rinehart, El Reno lawyer, served as western Oklahoma coordinator.
The county managers were recruited primarily through contacts
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of Nigh and Johnson in the Young Democrats and Junior Chamber of Commerce. 
There were county organizations of varying degrees of strength In approxi­
mately seventy counties, but only about six or eight county managers had 
had previous political experience. The chief forte of the campaign 
workers generally was their enthusiasm for Nigh. There was much random 
activity rather than planned vote-getting effort In many of the counties, 
but the Nigh volunteers made their presence known on the streets and at 
the shopping cehters and their enthusiasm was contagious.
In jDklahoma county, the canqpalgn was headed by John Ingram, a 
dancing school operator, and David Bridges, Insurance man, neither of 
whom had engaged In politics previously. They were assisted by six to 
eight persons who worked almost full time and by approximately two 
hundred part-time volunteers who reported in the evenings to make door- 
to-door calls, put up yard signs, emd distribute caiiq>aign literature at 
the shopping centers. Approximately fifty coffees were given to recruit 
volunteer precinct workers. There were designated workers in about half 
the Oklahoma City precincts, but little effective precinct work was done 
except in the Negro areas of Ward 2. Nigh finished fifth In Oklahoma 
county.
In Tulsa county, the county manager was Quentin Hantooth, an 
accountant who found that he was unable to devote full time to the 
campaign because It occurred at the height of the tax season. Two 
Okmulgee men, Phil Stekall and Elmer Wilson, took over In the last five 
or six weeks; Wilson had worked in the Edmondson and Kerr campaigns.
There was no precinct organization and little central direction of the 
one hundred seventy-five volunteer workers who reported to campaign
247
headquarters In the evenings and on weekends. As one campaign worker 
put it, "We held strategy meetings, hut we didn’t accomplish much; we 
would work up a chore for a particular night, but that was about all." 
The association of some prominent names with the Nigh campaign aided 
the effort; they included Harold Stuart, television fluid radio station 
owner, fluid Mike Pedrick, member of the State Boeurd of Affairs. Despite 
the orgfluiizational difficulties. Nigh finished second in Tulsa county, 
forty votes ahead of Atkinson.
The Nigh cetnqiaign, like those of Moore fluid Harris, was under­
financed. The fact that Nigh was unable to make any television ap­
pearances in the crucial final week of the ceu&paign because of lack of 
funds contributed to the fading of his effort in the late stages.
The cflunpaign.— The story of the Nigh campaign is flJmost a re- 
versflü. of that of the late-surging Moore cfluapaign. Nigh Junqied off to 
an early lead along with Gary, but he finished in fourth place, 844 
votes behind Moore.
One factor that contributed to the slipping of his csuspaign was 
his loss of much school bloc support as a result of his appearance before 
the Oklahoma Education Association legislative committee late in February 
or early in March. It is customary for this forty-member body to invite 
all the gubernatorial csmdidates before it to hear aui explanation of the 
association's aims fluid to meüce any statements they wish to make.
According to one of Nigh's aides. Nigh was tired out from heavy 
cEunpaigning when he appeared before the committee, arriving aui hour late 
for the meeting. As a member of the association, he felt that he had 
the support of most of its members; he went to the legislative committee
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meeting with the thought that he could relax among friends.
But when OEA. committee members set forth their alms. Nigh 
characterized them as "unrealistic." In the ensuing discussion Nlg^ 
vas asked questions about various school bills that had been before ' 
the legislature In recent years, and Nigh reportedly vas not conversant 
vlth the provisions of some of them. His aide said that Nigh had not 
briefed himself on school matters before attending the meeting because 
of his heavy campaigning, and the aide described this as probably one 
of the biggest mistakes of the canq)algn.
The upshot of the meeting vas that Nigh lost much of the school 
bloc support that he had virtually taken for granted. For the as­
sociation's leaders had other friends among the gubernatorial candidates. 
Gary, a former Marshall county school superintendent, had been friendly 
to the school bloc during his term as governor. Harris vas a former 
Parent-Teacher Association president In Lavton, and Moore's mother vas 
a mesAer of the school retirement system by virtue of the fact that she 
vas am ei^loyee of the county agent's office In StlUvater. But It vas 
Atkinson's proposal to Increase state revenues by raising the sales taix 
that apparently attracted most of the association's leaders, since most 
of their alms vere predicated upon larger expenditures for schools.
In addition, Nigh's lack of familiarity vlth some of the school
lavs became knovn to his opponents and they used this against him In
their campaigns. The Dally Oklahoman reported on April 8 :
Nigh didn't make a good Impression before the legislative 
committee of the Oklahoma Education Association on the 
school program. It Is reported that members of the 
committee vere astonished at his lack of knovledge of 
school problems, the school code, and finances . . .
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The other camps have quietly made use of the committee 
reaction.
Nigh’s lack of leadership emd his failure to play an 
important role on major issues in the legislature will 
be used against him.
Nigh campaign leaders made an effort to counteract the ad­
verse effect of his appearance before the OEA. committee by writing 
letters to school teachers over the state, saying that Nigh would pro­
mote the realistic parts of the OEA program.
To try to counteract charges of his opponents and newspaper 
articles to the effect that his canqpaign was slipping, full-page news­
paper advertisements were run showing that Nigh was running a strong 
second to Gary according to results of the second statewide newspaper 
poll, released April 10.
But the opposing candidates continued to insist that the Nigh 
campaign had passed its peak euid to chsirge that Nigh had no carefully 
considered program. The combination of these factors, plus the lack 
of funds that cut off his television appearances in the last week, led 
to his fourth-place finish.
The Barris Campaign
Harris was thirty-one years old, the youngest of the candidates. 
He was elected to the state senate in I956, when he was twenty-five, emd 
was serving his second term from the Comanche-Cotton county district. A 
native of Cotton county and a practicing attorney in Lawton, he had 
lived in Lawton only a little more than a year when he was elected to 
the state senate. In the 1959 legislative session Harris was one of 
four leaders of a fight to reform county commissioner spending practices
250
and vas the only one of the four to be reelected in I96O; he also led 
the fight for adoption of the merit system for state eiQ)loyees. In the 
1961 session he got through the bill authorizing construction of the 
southwestern turnpike that connects Oklahoma City and Lavton^ led the 
fight to save the merit system, authored a series of economy bills, 
and led another unsuccessful fight to put through the county commissioner 
reform bill.
The issues.— Harris's program definitely was urban-oriented. He 
favored legislative reapportionment according to the constitutional 
formula. He advocated reorganizing high school districts that had a 
daily attendance of less than fifty-five. He was on record as favoring 
bills to reform county commissioner spending practices. On the issue of 
state revenues, he was consistent throughout the campaign in opposing a 
tax increase; instead, he advocated governmental economies, along the 
lines suggested by the economy bills which he introduced in the I961 
legislative session. He opposed a sales tax increase on the ground that 
Oklahoma per capita income was lower than that of surrounding states, 
while per capita state tax collections and state expenditures were 
higher. On highways, he called for a $402,000,000 program with no in­
crease in taixes, to be finauiced by a $9,000,000 ajinual appropriation 
from general revenues and am amticipated four per cent increase in 
existing road user tsLX revenues.
Organization amd finances.— Harris's campaign strategy was con­
sistent with his urbam-oriented program.. He concentrated his cauq>aign 
in a relatively smaill number of populous counties. Edmondson had demon­
strated in 1958 that it was possible for a gubernatorial camdidate vith
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limited cas^ign funds to get into the runoff by ceurrying a small number 
of counties, and Harris tried to do the same. Among the counties in 
which he concentrated his campaign efforts vere Oklahoma, Tulsa, Comanche, 
Washington, Garfield, Cleveland, Stephens, Muskogee, and Carter.
Harris began to build his campaign organization in September,
1961. He started by attending coffees in private homes throughout the
state. At the close of each coffee a paper vas passed and all vho vere
interested in tevking part in his campaign vere asked to sign. In October,
the Onvard Oklahoma Committee vas organized, vith attorney James Work .
of Oklahoma City as secretary. With a letterhead containing the names
of twenty-five persons of prominence throughout the state, forty thousand
letters vere mailed out saying, in part:
. . . Many of us throuf^out the state, vho are concerned about 
Oklahoma's future, feel that [Fred Harris] possesses the 
combination of qualities which ideally fit him to provide the 
dignified, progressive and effective leadership which Oklahoma 
needs.
. . .  If you feel as ve do, . . . please forward your comments 
on the enclosed post card, which need not be signed, in order 
that your reaction may become a part of Senator Harris's decision 
on whether or not to enter the race for Governor.
A one-page reprint of newspaper comment about Harris's legislative
activities was enclosed. The letters went to bankers, doctors, lawyers,
dentists, and members of various farm and women's organizations. It
was financed by a loan of $3,000 which Harris obtained from a bank.
The replies to the Onward Oklahoma Committee letter, plus the 
names obtained at the coffees, produced the names of 3,750 potential
Interviews with Fred R. Harris, August S, 1962; James Work, 
canqpaign aide, August 20, 1962;< Markham Johnson, Jr., Tulsa county manager, 
August 27, 1962; Ross Hutchins, Tulsa county coordinator, August 27, I962.
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Barris supporters and canqiaign workers, some of whom were willing to 
give additional coffees on Harris's ‘behalf. Altogether, he attended 
approximately one hundred fifty coffees in the process of enlisting 
support and building his organization.
In December, 1961, Harris announced his candidacy at a press 
conference in the capitol. The name at the Onward Oklahoma Committee 
headquarters was changed to Onward Oklahoma With Fred R. Harris, Demo­
crat For Governor. "Onward Oklahoma" was adopted as the campaign slogan.
Harris's campaign manager was Highway Commissioner J.C. Kennedy 
of Lawton. Five district coordinators also were named: Highway Com­
missioner John B. Doolin, of Alva, in the northwest; Anthony Massad, 
Frederick lawyer, southwest; William C McCandless, Oklahoma City whole­
sale furniture deailer, central Qkledi(ma; Joe Mount ford, Miami lawyer and 
state representative, northeast; amd James Gassaway, Ada lawyer, south­
east. As indicated by their positions, the majority of these co­
ordinators had had political experience. But the district amd county 
organizations were not uniformly effective.
The Tulsa county orgamization approached the ideal and may 
have been the single most effective county organization of any candidate 
in the 1962 campaign. It was headed by Mamkhaun Johnson, Jr., thirty- 
three-year-old insurance executive, with attorney Ross Hutchins in 
charge of the area coordinators whose Job it was to orgamize the 
county's two hundred eighty-one precincts.
Four or five coffees were held in Jemupry, 196I, to interest 
key Tulsa residents in the Harris cau%g*aign. More numerous coffees 
were held, beginning in Januamy, I962, to recruit precinct workers and
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to round out the organization. Approximately seventy-five coffees were 
held early in I962, and an especially high caliber corps of workers was 
obtained.
Hutchins supervised the work of sixteen area coordinators, each 
of whom was responsible for organizing from thirteen to fifteen precincts. 
All the area coordinators were men, most of whom were lawyers and one of 
whom was a graduate in economics from Harvard University. The area co­
ordinators were charged with selecting a precinct captain for each 
precinct, and in turn the precinct captain was to enlist the help of 
others in the precinct. One entire surea was organized to the point where 
there was a Harris worker on each side of the street in each block.
Others were less effectively organized. When gubernatoriaj. candidate
Thomas Dee Frasier withdrew from the race in mid-April, he made his 
organization available to the Harris forces.
A steering committee of twelve active workers assisted in making 
campaign plans throughout the cai^ )aign. In addition, fifteen or more 
prominent Tulsans lent their names to the Harris effort.
The campaign leaders raised six thousand dollars in campaign
funds; sent out twenty thousand letters to school teachers, business­
men, amd oilmen; staged three automobile caravans in areas outside Tulsa 
county to try to bolster the Harris effort in the more rural areas; 
staged a twenty-two-car parade through Tulsa two days before the election 
to combat any "we don't want to waste our vote" sentiment; had fifteen 
costumed girls passing out literature on the streets amd a dozen high 
school boys distributing literature in outlying office buildings amd at 
shopping centers; amd they made contacts with such key orgarni zat ionaü.
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leaders as the union officials at the aircraft plants.
One of the most effective campaign devices in Tulsa vas the 
staging of three live, thirty-minute television appearances for Harris. 
Each vas staged like an informal coffee, vith prominent and repre­
sentative Tulsans asking questions of Harris. Effort vas made to have 
such a vide representation of Tulsa citizens on the prograun that vievers 
vho did not knov Harris vould he certain to recognize at least one member 
of the group. Tvo of these three shovs vere staged in the final veek of 
the canq)aign.
Harris polled 11,249 votes in Tulsa county; Nigh, 9^110; Atkinson, 
9,070; Moore, 7946; and Gary, 6,802.
In Okladioma county, there vas no vard or precinct organization.
The principal effort there consisted of holding approximately fifty 
coffees, vith each attended by thirty to forty persons, plus one larger 
coffee attended by six hundred; a large direct mail effort vas directed 
to members of many organizations; one distribution of penphlets vas made
to every home in Capitol Hill and the Negro areas; and the support of a
number of prominent Oklahoma Cityans vas enlisted. Harris finished a 
fhirly poor third behind Atkinson and Gary in Oklahoma county.
Harris failed to get into the runoff, in paurt, for these reasons:
(1) the failure of his county organizations or of his appeeü. in several 
of the populous counties in vhich he planned a concentrated effort and
(2) the adfflost total lack of organization or effort in a very large 
number of the smaller counties. It vill be recaü.led that Harris finished 
fifth in fifty-one counties; he received less than one hundred votes in 
eleven counties and less than tvo hundred votes in tventy-six. Because
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of this, he could not afford the setbacks which he received in several 
of the more populous counties; he received only 4.9 per cent of the 
vote in Carter county and 9.5 per cent in Muskogee county.
The campaign.--Harris presented a sound program and was con­
sistent in his advocacy of it, but he experienced difficulty in develop­
ing a captivating appeal. He thought he was taking somewhat of a gamble 
early in the campaign when he advocated legislative reapportionment ac­
cording to the constitutional formula, but soon all the leading candidates 
except Gary took a position close to this. He considered his opposition 
to the proposed right to work law another major early decision, but soon 
there was little to differentiate the candidates on this issue.
Under-financing prevented him from carrying out his campaign 
plans on schedule throughout much of the campaign. For example, he 
decided to try to get into contention in mid-January by "splurging"
$3,500 on billboards and $8,000 on television appearances. But it was 
late in February before the necessary funds were raised, and by that time 
two other candidates had beaten him to the punch in these respects.
It was not until he began to stress the I'm The Only Man Who 
Can Beat Gary theme in the last four weeks of the drive that his 
campaign began to pick up momentum. Some of Harris's advisers opposed 
the idea of challenging Gary; they were hoping by April that Gary would 
poll a tremendous vote and thus reduce the number required for the 
second-place candidate. The original Harris goal was to poll 125,000 
votes in the state, but by April it seemed clear the he would not poll 
more than 90,000.
But the new theme gave a boost to Harris's campaign in the first
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half of April. Stressed in his speeches and advertisements, it caused 
the other candidates to react to him, gave his candidacy a better play 
in the newspapers, and brightened up his press releases and television 
talks. It appeared to accomplish more than Any other ' campaign 
development to convince many that Barris could get into the runoff.
Then, in the last ten days of the campaign, Harris ran out of 
money and the late surges of Moore and Atkinson took away whatever 
initiative he had enjoyed. Gary said Atkinson spent large sums of 
money in the closing days of the first primary.
Harris polled 78,^76 votes, 12,706 less than Atkinson received.
Other Caunpaign Developments
The Oklahoma City newspapers endorsed no candidate in the primary, 
but they adopted a strong Anybody But Atkinson stand in the closing days 
of the campaign. On April 30, the day before the election, a front-page 
editorial in the Daily Oklahoman denounced Atkinson in such terms that 
it resulted in Atkinson filing a ten-miUion-dollar libel suit against 
the publishing company. Political observers still are debating the 
question of whether the editorial was so intemperate that it made a martyr 
of Atkinson and thus increased his vote or whether it reduced his vote. 
There is a possibility that it may have increased the Atkinson vote out­
side Oklahoma county, where the Daily Oklahoman's views on such matters 
as legislative reapportionment are none too popular, and reduced his vote 
in Oklahoma county.
Atkinson carried his home county of OkleJioma, but by a plurality
^^Tulsa World, May h, I962.
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of only 1,881 votes over Gary. All the other major candidates carried 
their home counties also. Moore not only carried Payne county, his 
more recent home, but also Okmulgee county, where he was born. Harris 
carried three counties in his home area, Comanche, Cotton, and Till­
man. The friends and neighbors influence is another mark of a multi- 
factional political system. However, although this influence is 
strong in the immediate area of the candidate's home in Oklahoma, it 
is not sufficiently important to serve as the basis for a statewide 
victory, as is the case in a few Southern states.
CHAPTER XII
THE ROLE OF OKLAHOIA VOTING BLOCS 
AND POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS
Questions have been raised about the laqportance of bloc voting 
and the influence of political interest groups in Oklahoma elections 
since Edmondson won the Democratic first primary in 1958 vith virtually 
no organizational support. Further questions vere raised when Bellmon 
won the 1962 gubernatorial election with a minimum of organizational 
backing.1
It appears, however, that organizational influence varies 
according to: (l) whether the particulair campaign is dominated by one
or more captivating issues that are strong enough to override organ­
izational ties and the influence of organizational leaders or whether it 
is a relatively issueless campaign marked by low voter interest, in which 
case organizational and financial support may be more important; and
(2) whether the claims upon the members of the voting blocs and interest 
groups are uni-directional or whether they create numerous cross pressures 
upon the members. It seems safe to say that the influence of group 
leaders, like that of newspapers, is more effective when these leaders 
are able to swim with the tide of sentiment sunong their followers and
T^ulsa World, November 11, I962.
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when cross pressures are at a minimum.
In 1958 the primary campaign was dominated by the Issues of 
good government and repeal of prohibition, and these unquestionably 
overrode organizational ties with many voters. In I962 both the 
primaries emd general election were dominated by the Issue of good 
government combined with a division of sentiment between the urban and 
rural segments of the electorate, growing out of controversies spawned 
In the Edmondson administration. In that year Bellmon combined op­
position to a sales taa Increase with an appeal to anti-Edmondson 
sentiment in the rural areas and an appeal to good government voters 
everywhere to win.
In the 1962 Democratic primaries especially the rural-urban 
split excited the strongest reactions on the part of the voters. Inso­
far as the rural voters were concerned, the principal cross pressure 
was that caused to Rural Electric Cooperative Association members by 
Gary's efforts on behalf of the Grand River Dam Authority contract. 
Otherwise, Gary had the preponderant support of all the groups that 
had been allied under the name of Oklahomans for Local Government to 
fight the Edmondson Initiative petitions In 196O.
Moreover, the strong showing made by Gary In some of the more 
populous areas was attributable to organizational support. Here he 
had strong backing from the AFL-CIO, the Negroes, the Retail Merchants 
Association, and the Baptists.
Four candidates conq>eted for the urban and Anybody But Gary 
vote, and no one of them could find an appeal comparable in captivation 
to that of the 1958 repeal Issue to set his campaign apart from the
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others. Except for the issue of state finances, their programs were 
not too dissimilar. The question of state finances is highly important, 
but it did not appear to excite the great mass of voters. In this 
setting a strong campaign organization, plus adequate financial and 
organizational backing can tip the scales in favor of a candidate.
The non-rural groups were by no means solid in their voting in 
1962, but Gary and Atkinson appear to have benefited most from their 
support. Atkinson had the support of a majority of school bloc and 
REA leaders, of many industrialists and large farmers who favored his 
pay-as-you-go policy of financing state government over Gary's bond 
issue, and of some city officials and others to whom the prospect of 
increased revenue was appealing. Moore appealed to the war veterans 
through the American Legion; one of the counties he carried was 
Muskogee, where the Veterans Administration regional office and 
Veterans Hospital together provide the single biggest payroll in the 
county. Nigh appealed to women through their various organization? end 
to young persons through the Young Democrats and Junior Chamber of 
Commerce. Harris probably had the least organizational backing, and 
his principal support appears to have come from the higher income 
groups and from those impressed by his logic and consistency. In 
Norman he led decisively in the areas of greatest University of Oklahoma 
faculty concentration; in Oklahoma City he led in such higher income 
areas as Nichols Hills, The Village, and Warr Acres; in Tulsa he carried 
the fashionable south side.
The larger voting blocs in Oklahoma, with some indications of 
their voting behavior in 1962, were:
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1) The welfare bloc. The number of Oklahoma residents over sixty-five 
years of age totalled 248,831 in i960. Of this number, 95,284 received 
old age assistance payments from the state of Oklahoma and 126,236 re­
ceived federal social security benefits in I962. Principal spokesman 
for the old age assistance recipients is the Oklahoma Welfare Federation, 
founded by the late Ora J. Fox and now headed by Dr. F. G. Conley of 
Tulsa. The Federation was said to have approximately 67,000 members in 
1962. Its aims are to keep sales tax revenues earmarked for welfare 
purposes and to oppose the adoption of a lien recovery law or relative 
responsibility law. Gary, with a no tax increase platform and a record 
of having raised welfare payments from aai average of $58.22 to $72.84 
during his administration,^ carried all but four of the state's thirty- 
one heaviest welfare counties in the first primary and all but five in 
the runoff primary. The heavy welfare counties are also strongly rural 
counties.
2) The school bloc. The Oklahoma Education Association has more than
20,000 members, and its influence is augmented by the fact that its 
leaders work closely with the 125,000 members of the Oklahoma Parent- 
Teacher Associations emd the more than 3OO members of the Oklahoma 
School Board Association. The OEA's principal aims in 1962 were: to 
raise the minimum pay of beginning school teachers from $3,600 to 
$4,400 in 1963-1984 and to $4,60O in 1964-I965; to seek a sufficient 
increase in legislative appropriations to pay off the 196I-I962 school 
deficit; to seek an increase in operational aid funds (funds that may
^Oklahoma City Times, December 6, 1958.
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be used for any purpose) for school districts; and to protect those 
revenues that are earmarked for educational purposes.^ OEA. leaders 
did not endorse a candidate in the Democratic primaries, but many vere 
known to favor Atkinson because they felt his proposed sales tsjc in­
crease would produce the revenue required to help accomplish some of 
the association's aims.
An examination of the voting in four precincts in Norman and 
four precincts in Stillwater where University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma 
State University faculty concentrations are greatest showed these re­
sults: Harris, 771; Atkinson, 520; Moore, 4l3; Nigh, 352; and Gary,
219, The precincts were 11, 12, I3, and l4 in Norman and 4, 6, 11, 
and 12 in Stillwater. When allowance is made for the fact that Moore 
was especially strong in his home town of Stillwater and that Harris 
was much stronger in Cleveland county than in many other counties, 
Atkinson's showing appears somewhat stronger. Admittedly, such a 
method does not pinpoint the school vote with precision, but it gives 
some indication that the vote was divided, that Atkinson probably 
fared fairly well among this group and that Gary probably fared rather 
poorly.
3) The labor bloc. Labor union membership in Oklahoma is estimated to 
be 85,000.^ The AFL-CIO has 266 locals and approximately 68,000 to
69,000 members. The Railroad Brotherhoods, United Mine Workers, Teamsters 
Union, and various independent unions have 46 to 49 locals and approxi-
^Interview with Fterman Phillips, executive secretary of the 
Oklahoma Education Association, August 6, 1962.
^Interview with Len Yarborough, executive vice president of the 
Oklahoma AFL-CIO, July 26, 1962.
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mately l6,000 members. Union membership is concentrated in the north­
eastern and central sections of the state, vith about 58 per cent of 
the AFL-CIO membership in Oklahoma and Tulsa counties. Estimated 
memberships in the more unionized areas of northeastern Oklahoma are: 
Tulsa county, 21,000; Okmulgee county, 4^ ,000; Ottawa county, 2,400; 
and Washington county, 1,800. In central Oklahoma the principal 
counties are: Oklahoma, 19,000; Kay, $,000; Garfield, 2,200; and
Comanche, 2,000. In I962 the principal concern of Oklahoma labor 
leaders was opposition to the proposed right to work law, but in 
the past they had stressed their opposition to the sales tax as a 
revenue measure on the ground that it falls hardest on the lower 
income groups. Union leaders also favored higher workmen's com­
pensation benefits.
Gary and Harris were favored by most AFL-CIO leaders in the 
first primary, vith a big edge to Gary for two reasons: (l) Gary
agreed to make speeches against the proposed right to work law if 
he vere nominated, according to Len Yarborough, AFL-CIO executive 
vice president; and (2) the AFL-CIO leaders, like many other Okla­
homans, were lukewarm toward the election of another young governor. 
Their particular grievances against Edmondson were that he had opposed 
increases in workmen's compensation payments and vetoed a bill to allow 
an injured worker to select his own doctor; his young Department of 
Commerce and Industry director endorsed the right to work proposal. 
However, if Gary had not been in the race, it was estimated that 95 
per cent of the union leaders would have recommended Harris to the 
membership. The AFL-CIO made no official endorsement in the first
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primary, but the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers endorsed Gary.
However, the labor vote appeared to be widely split in the 
first primary, according to voting results in twenty-seven labor pre­
cincts in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Muskogee. Oklahoma City precincts 
used as a basis for obtaining at least a rough approximation of how 
labor voted were 2, 3, 4, 5> 10, and 26 in Ward 1 and 5# 8^  9> 35> 3T> 
38, 39f and 4-9 in Ward 4; in Tulsa the precincts were 112, II6, 117, 
118, 167, 190, Red Fork 3, and Red FOrk 4; in Muskogee they were 2, 4, 
9, lOA euid lOB. The results were as follows, with the number of pre­
cincts examined in each county given in parentheses:
Gary Atkinson Moore Nigh Harris
Oklahoma (l4) 978 826 685 568 634
Tulsa ( 8) 247 181 228 239 242
Muskogee (5) 300 306 460 219 156
1,525 1,313 1,373 1,026 1,032
This sampling indicates that Gary probably led in the labor vote and 
that this constituted one of his sources of strength in the more populous 
areas.
4} The Retail Merchants Association, largest group within the business 
bloc. There are 30,000 retail proprietors in Oklahoma, and the Retail 
Merchants Association reaches a substantial number of these. However, 
such proprietors as gasoline dealers have their own association. In 
1962 the chief political concern of the merchants was their opposition 
to the proposed sales tax increase; they feared declining sales if 
consumer costs were increased and they feared being put at a disadvantage 
with merchants in neighboring states.
Approximately half the retail merchants supported Gary in the
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first primary and a majority of the remainder supported Harris, according 
to estimates by T.C. Knoop, executive secretary of the association. He 
said most merchants considered these two candidates to be the more "con­
servative and stable.Knoop himself worked closely with Gary, travel­
ling the state extensively with him.
The business bloc as a whole comprises too many diverse political 
views to permit being treated as an entity. For example, E.J. O'Connor, 
executive secretary of Associated Industries of Oklahoma, composed 
primarily of industrialists, said the members of his association were 
very interested in seeing that Oklahoma cities and towns got more revenues 
with which to carry out their functions. He expressed the view that, if 
additional revenues were needed, "the sales tax is the fairest tax.
5) The farm bloc. Leading spokesmen for farm interests in Oklahoma are 
the farmers IMion, farm Bureau, and Cattlemen's Association, and this 
bloc also contains many diverse views.
a) The farmers Union has 51>000 members that are fairly well 
distributed over the state, with probably its strongest membership in 
southwestern Oklahoma. There was conflict within the organization over 
which Democratic primary candidate to support in 1962. farmers Union 
leaders supported Gary's legislative reapportionment proposal and his 
opposition to curbing the county commissioners' powers, but they opposed 
Gary's efforts on behalf of the Grand River Dam Authority-Public Service
^Interview with T.C. Knoop, executive secretary of the Oklahoma 
Retail fferchants Association, August 7, I962.
^Interview with E.J. O'Connor, executive secretary of Associated 
Industries of OklsLhoma, August 2, I962.
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Company contract; the Farmers Union has very close ties with the KEA., 
since the national Farmers Union sponsored the REA. legislation before 
Congress in 1936-1937* But the group also opposed Atkinson's proposal 
to increase the sales tax. Apparently the GRDA contract weighed most 
heavily in the minds of the organization's executive board. George W. 
Stone, president, said the seven members of the board were divided be­
tween Atkinson, Gary, and Moore in the first primary, but that all but 
two supported Atkinson in the runoff. Since the Farmers Union also had 
close ties with Senator Kerr, it is possible that his influence may have 
been felt here.
b) The fbrm Bureau has 41,000 members, with two-thirds of them 
living in the western half of the state and probably the greater number 
in the northwest. Here too there was conflict within the organization. 
Farm Bureau leaders supported Gain's legislative reapportionment proposal, 
but opposed his highway bond issue. They also opposed Atkinson's pro­
posed tax: increase. From his examination of the election returns and
his knowledge of where most Farm Bureau members live, Ken Me Fall, 
executive secretary, said he believed the majority of the organization's 
members voted for Gary.? Since Me Fall worked actively for Republican 
Bellmon in the general election, it is possible that Farm Bureau leaders 
took relatively little interest in the Democratic primaries.
c) The Cattlemen's Association has from 5,000 to 6,000 members 
fairly well distributed over the state.® The association's fourteen-
?Interview with Ken MeFall, executive secretary of the Oklahoma 
Farm Bureau, August 6, 1962.
Q
Interview with Ellis Freeny, executive vice president of the 
Oklahoma Cattlemen's Association, February 25, 1964.
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member executive board authorized a contribution to Oklahomans for 
Local Government to assist in the fight against the Edmondson petitions 
in i960, indicating some possible support for Gary from the association's 
members. Since former Governor Boy Turner is an association member and 
since he actively supported Atkinson, it can be assumed that he en­
listed some support for Atkinson. But the executive board also adopted 
a resolution endorsing the proposed right to work law, indicating that 
Bellmon was not without some support from this group in the general 
election.
6) The Rural Electric Cooperative Association. The twenty-four Oklahoma 
REA cooperatives and four non-member cooperatives serve 12k, 000 families 
with electricity. Most of the members are rural, and the largest number 
live in the southern and eastern sections of the state.^ The political 
positions of the REA leaders were virtually the seuae as those of the 
Earmers Union. The various REA cooperatives had close ties with four 
of the Democratic primary candidates. Atkinson had REA's support in 
1958, when he opposed the GRDA contract. Moore was sm attorney for the 
cooperative in Stillwater suad Harris for the cooperative in Walters.
And, because Gary was the rural chanqpion in 1962, managers of four of 
REA's twenty-four local boards were for him, as were many REA clients. 
Czar Langston, REA general manager, said REA local leaders were divided 
in their support of Democratic candidates in the first primary, but 
that the majority worked hard against Gary in the runoff. Some effort 
was made to induce the forty-eight members of the state board of
^Interview with Czar Lemgston, general manager of the Oklahoma 
Rural Electric Association, August 3, I962.
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directors to endorse Atkinson in the runoff, but no action was taken. 
There was some opposition to Atkinson's positions on legislative re­
apportionment and the sales tax. It seems probable that there was 
more support for Atkinson among the leaders than among the member­
ship, for It cannot be overlooked that Gary carried the rural areas 
of Oklahoma by preponderant majorities. However, Atkinson finished 
second or third in many rural counties, and this snpport was important 
to him.
7) Negroes. There are approximately 80,000 Negroes of voting age in 
Oklahoma, and samplings indicate that approximately one-third of them 
voted in the first primary. Edward Goodwin, editor of the Oklahoma 
Eagle in Tulsa, and John Dungee, general manager of the Black Dispatch 
in Oklahoma City, said a majority of Negroes were for Gary because the 
Oklahoma National Guard was integrated during Gary's term and because 
of the skill with which Gary handled the school integration issue. 
Goodwin said that Gai-y promised in 1962 to integrate the Highway Patrol, 
to give Negroes posts on college boards of regents, and to give them 
jobs in the Highway Department.
Voting results in forty-one Negro precincts in Oklahoma, Tulsa, 
Muskogee, Gsurfield, and Comanche counties indicate that Gary had a sub­
stantial lead in the Negro vote, another factor that helped his showing 
in the more populous areas. Precincts examined in Oklahoma county were 
1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 27, 31, and 38 in Ward 1 and 8 
in Ward 3; in Tulsa county they were 3, 8, 11, 12, I3, 21, 22, 28, 37,
Interviews with Edward Goodwin, editor of the Oklahoma Eagle 
in Tulsa, August 28, I962, and with John Dungee, general manager of the 
Black Dispatch in Oklahoma City, August 20, 1962.
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138, 143, 153, 175, and 208; in Muskogee county 15B, 31A, 31B, 31C, 36B, 
19 and 20B; in Garfield county 1, 2, and 3 in Ward 3 in Enid; in Comanche 
county Precinct 1, Ward 1 and Precinct 8, Ward 5 in Lawton. The results 
vere as follows, with the number of precincts reported upon in each 
county given in parentheses:
Gary Atkinson Moore Nigh Barris
Oklahoma (15) 1,108 820 538 871 298
Tulsa (14) 916 346 173 260 206
Muskogee ( 7) 504 315 272 122 75
Garfield ( 3) 55 25 31 35 53
Comanche ( 2) 118 26 7 12 554
2,701 1,532 1,021 1,300 1,186
In the runoff primary, Gary polled 64 per cent of the votes in these same 
precincts.
8) War veterams. As former national commander of the American Legion, 
Moore appealed to Oklahoma'? 2$8,000 war veterans and much of his canqpaign 
organization was built from Legion support. Judging from his showing in 
Muskogee county, site of a Veterans Administration regional office and
a Veterans EospitaLl, it seems probable that Moore polled a substantial 
portion of the veterans' vote. Nigh was the other veteran in the race.
9) Junior Chamber of Commerce. The five thousand present members of 
this organization, plus their wives as members of the Jaycee Jaynes and 
former active members now beyond the thirty-six-year age limit, make up 
a rather sizeable group. Nigh made a special appeal to members of this 
organization. Barris also was am active member.
10) The League of Young Democrats. As past state president,Nigh also 
made a special appeal to the Young Democrats. Moore also had been active 
in the organization.
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11) Public officials. State legislators and county commissioners 
especially exercise a political influence disproportionate to their 
numbers, for some of them devote a large portion of their time to 
political activity. The county commissioners distribute surplus 
ccaamodities to needy persons, and from this activity a following may 
develop despite the fact that recipients are certified by the State 
Welfare Department. The commissioners also may develop an organization 
built around their road and other employees; each commissioner in 
Oklahoma county supervises about sixty eiqployees.^ It was mentioned 
earlier that the Tulsa county district court clerk, Samuel W. (Wes)
Pry, who is politically active in Tulsa county, has fifty-five to 
sixty county employees. The patronage of the state legislators was 
discussed earlier. City officials generally are somewhat less "political"; 
approximately 75 per cent of Oklahoma City elections are non-partisan.
Gary had the preponderant support of the state legislators, 
county commissioners, and city and county officials of the i-ural areas, 
with a number of them serving actively in his campaign organization. No 
other candidate had the support of more thsm two or three state senators. 
Most of the irural officials had been mobilized to fight the Edmondson 
petitions under the beumer of Oklsdiomans for Local Government in i960, 
and feelings still were strong on the rural-urban issues in I962.
Atkinson's promise to allocate a minimum of 20 per cent of the revenue 
from his proposed sales tax increase to the towns and cities probably 
gave him an edge among the city officials of the larger cities. But
^Interview with Ealph Adair, county commissioner of Oklahoma
county, August 20, I962.
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the support of Gary by the great majority of public officials and their 
organizations goes far toward explaining the overwhelming vote which 
Gary piled up in the rural areas.
Other political interest groups.— Other political interest 
groups figured in the I962 elections, but more as suppliers of campaign 
funds and as molders of opinion rather than as voting blocs conqparable 
in size to those already discussed.
Among the larger suppliers of campaign funds in I962 were 
members of Associated Motor Carriers of Oklahoma, representing truck 
and transportation interests; the Association of Oklahoma General Con­
tractors, representing the large road contractors and asphalt and cement 
interests; Associated Industries of Oklahoma, representing industrialists, 
mine owners, and oil companies; Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, 
representing the major oil companies; the Oklahoma Independent Petroleum 
Association, representing the independent oil producers; the Oklahoma 
Malt Beverage Association and Oklahoma Wholesale Liquor Association, 
representing the beer and liquor interests; certain public utilities 
officials, certain bankers, certain insurance men, large farmers, and 
persons interested in horse racing and pari-mutuel betting.
It is customary for the cemdidates or their representatives to 
call upon the executive secretaries (lobbyists) of most of these organ­
izations early in the campaign to show how their aims square with the 
aims of the individual associations, for it is known that the executive 
secretaries often mate recommendations to their memberships as to whom 
to support and that the members of the associations sometimes contact 
their executive secretaries before making canpaign contributions.
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The executive secretary of one interest group said quite 
frankly, "We're like all the other associations; we get a few friends 
behind each of the leading candidates, then use the ones that backed 
the winner to get,the governor's ear on what we need." But the larger 
and more numerous contributions go to those candidates who appear to 
have the best chance to win.
Campaign aides of Moore, Nigh, emd Harris indicated that fund­
raising was somewhat more difficult in 1962 than it had been in past 
years, owing in part to the fact that many large contributors had guessed 
wrongly as to who would win the 1958 Democratic primary. As a result, 
they appeared to be more cautious about parting with their money in
1962.
Gary and Atkinson had the bulk of the political interest group 
support. Gary's opponents said that members of Associated Motor Carriers 
were a good source of financial support for Gary; for one thing, Gary's 
Sooner Oil Company is a member of the Association. The majority of 
Associated Industries members were said to favor Gary and Atkinson in 
the first primary; in the runoff, the majority were believed to have 
shifted to Atkinson because Gary had received the endorsement of the 
AFL-CIO, there was some opposition to Gary's highway bond issue proposal, 
smd because Atkinson had a more positive program for aiding the towns
"] p
and cities. Sentiment among members of Oklahoma General Contractors 
was reported divided in the first primary, with an edge to Gary emd 
Atkinson "because their programs were somewhat more positive. "^3
Interview with E.J. O'Connor, op. cit.
T O
Interview with Glen (T-Bone) McDonald, manager of the 
Association of Oklahoma General Contractors, August 2, I962.
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Contributions from the major oil companies were reported to have 
followed the lead of Senator Kerr to a large extent in recent yeare, 
partly because many oil men felt that Kerr hsid the power to keep the 
national oil depletion allowance at its present figure; also, Kerr was 
a former president of the Kansas-Oklahoma division of Mid-Continent Oil 
and dag Association. Kerr's quiet support of Atkinson in the runoff 
primary reportedly had the effect of cutting off most of the oil money 
that went to Gary in the first primary.
The Oklahoma Bankers Association takes little part in the 
campaigns as an association, but individual bankers, acting on their 
own as civic leaders, constitute one of the most influential groups of 
political activists in the state at the county level. Some bankers 
openly assume direction of county campaigns for candidates, others 
operate through lieutenants who hold the title of county manager, and 
still others limit themselves to making sizeable campaign contributions. 
It is not uncommon for the presidents of a small city's two banks to be 
the county managers for the two leading gubernatorial candidates. Gary 
said, "Every town has two or more factions. Where I carried counties 
by especially big majorities I was able to get the support of both 
factions; in IfcCurtaln county both banks supported me." What these 
bankers expect in return generally are civic improvements, usually 
hi^mays. It appeared in I962 that most bankers had guessed correctly 
that Gary and Atkinson would be the two leading Democratic candidates.
^^Interview with Otis gallivant. Daily Oklahoman political
writer, November 20, 1963.
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Summary
The "bandvagon effect" in favor of one or tvo candidates can be 
an important factor in a multi-sided scramble for the Democratic nomination, 
especially in those years in which no especially captivating issue dominates 
the campaign. In 1962 Gary was virtually assured of a place in the runoff 
primary as a result of his rural support. But there was a scramble for 
second place in the first primary, and the interest group support which 
Atkinson received helped him to edge out the other Anybody But Gary 
candidates.
CHAPTER XIII
THE DEMOCRATIC RUNOFF PRIMARY; REPUBLICAN ACTIVITY 
DURING THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES
When Atkinson's aides examined the results of the voting In the
May 1 primary, they saw that Atkinson must poll approximately two-thirds
of the votes cast for the defeated ceindldates In order to edge Gary In
the runoff. The results In the first primary were:
Gary........ 176,525
Atkinson . . . 91,182
All others . . 266,591
If Atkinson were to poll 66.7 per cent of the votes of the defeated
candidates, he would edge Gary by 268,998 to 265,300, assuming that the
voter turnout remained the saime. And Atkinson had only three weeks In
which to try to win over the followers of the defeated candidates.
Actually, the voter turnout declined by 71,517, Atkinson polled
72.1 per cent of the total Increase In votes received by the two runoff 
candidates, and Atkinson won by 953 votes. Gary's vote Increased by 
5^,389 over that of the first primary, Atkinson's by 1^,685. Atkinson's 
margin of 953 gave him the narrowest gubernatorial runoff victory In the 
seven elections In which the runoff primary has been used In Oklahoma.
It was rivalled only by Johnston Murray's margin of 96O votes over 
William 0. Coe In I950.
The results of the runoff primary, following a recount of the
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votes, were:
Atkinson . . . 231,867
Gary.......  230,914
Map XXVI shows the counties carried by Atkinson and Gary. Though 
Atkinson led In only twenty-one counties, as against Gary's flfty-slx, 
Atkinson carried the nine most populous counties: Oklahoma, Tulsa,
Comanche, Muskogee, Garfield, Kay, Cleveland, Payne, and Washington.
Most of the counties carried by Atkinson also were In the northeastern 
quarter of the state, where Gary operated under his greatest political 
liabilities. Thirteen of these Atkinson counties were within the primary 
circulation area of the Tulsa World and Tulsa Tribune, perhaps the most 
strongly anti-Gary dallies In the state.
Candidate Organizations
Moore and Nigh declared their support of Atkinson less than a 
week after the close of the first primary csunpalgn and merged their 
campaign organizations with Atkinson's. They called upon their supporters 
to Join them In the fight against Gary, and many members of their state 
and county organizations worked actively for Atkinson In the runoff.
Harris declared himself to be neutral, but a number of his supporters 
also Joined the Atkinson campaign.
Thus, although Gary had the superior cempalgn organization In the 
first primary, the Atkinson organization probably was Its equal In the 
runoff.
Moore and Nigh not only merged their campaign organizations with 
Atkinson's, but they Joined Atkinson on his speaking tours. Gary 
characterized the Atkinson runoff campaign alternately as a "three-headed
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monster" and a "three-ring circus," but the fact is that the three 
speakers carried the attack to Gary so effectively and so steadily 
that Gary vas on the defensive through much of the three-week ninoff 
campaign. The triple-pronged attack also created an abundance of anti- 
Gary newspaper copy and headlines.
The Issues
Personality attacks figured largely in the canqpaign speeches 
in the runoff primary, with little fresh material added to what al­
ready had been discussed in the first primary. What discussion of the 
issues occurred was concentrated principally upon (l) state finances, 
including the financing of highways, and (2) legislative reapportionment. 
Atkinson continued to insist, as he had from the outset, that state 
finances was the issue of the campaign, and Gary was willing to meet 
him on this ground vith his no tax increase program. There was some 
effort by Atkinson emd his co-campaigners to draw Gary out on the 
details of his plan to reapportion the state legislature, for Gary had 
not yet explained which of the tvo houses vas to have its representation 
based upon population or whether there was to be an increase or decrease 
in membership in one or both houses.
The two rival camps succeeded mostly in taking much of the meat 
out of both the principal issues and leaving the voters only with the 
question of whether to vote for or against Gary.
The issue of state finances was watered down by repeated Atkinson 
charges that Oklahoma voters never would approve Gary's proposed highway 
bond issue and by Gary countercharges that neither the state legislature
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nor the people would approve Atkinson's proposed sales tax increase.
If a considerable number of the voters were convinced of the truth of
both these allegations, which seemed plausible, then neither cemdidate
had any program on state finances. Travis Walsh of the Tulsa World
reported at the very outset of the runoff that Gary appeared to be
backing off somewhat from his proposed highway bond issue
Gary is sounding more and more like he is not sure the voters 
will approve his $210 million road bond issue.
Atkinson contends that Gary won't have a program if his bond 
issue is turned down and state government will be back in the 
same financial fix it is in now. Geury is trying to convince 
the voters that he can finance government even without his 
bond issue.
Two days later the Daily Oklahoman said editorially that it had reliable 
information that Atkinson himself never was as committed to the idea of
p
a sales tax increase as were his campaign advisers:
. . .  It is reliably reported Atkinson wanted to back down to 
a tax if necessary shortly before coming out on the positive 
stand for a sales tax [increase], but his state coordinator,
H,W. McNeil, insisted upon it.
At a Gary rally in the Oklahoma City Municipal Auditorium on May 6, Gary
pointed to approximately twenty state legislators sitting behind him and
said, "There's the reason why Mr. Atkinson would never be able to get a
[tax] increase into l a w . O n  May l8, in a speech at Norman, Atkinson
said he might bypass the legislature smd take his proposed tax increase
directly to the people, since the Old Guard members of the state senate
4rulsa World, May 6, I962.
^Daily Oklahoman, May 8, I962.
^Ibid., May 7, 19^2.
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had declared they would block his program.^ Many voters must have 
gotten the impression that neither candidate's plan had much chance of 
passage.
Much of the meat also had been taken out of the legislative re- 
apportlonment Issue by the time of the runoff^ for the United States 
Supreme Court had ruled In March that federal courts may take Juris­
diction In legislative apportionment cases. In an appearance before 
the Oklahoma County Commissioners Association a week before the close 
of the runoff canqpalgn^  Atkinson saldi^
You and I know that no governor Is going to say how tuls state 
Is apportioned, and we are now In violation of the fourteenth 
amendment to the federal constitution.
On the same day Geury was citing Atkinson's stand on reapportionment In
the 19$8 campaign and contending that It was much like Gary's I962
position. Thus was the other principal Issue of the runoff watered
down, though It unquestionably had served Its purpose of causing many
to take sides along urban-rural lines.
However, one thing stood out plainly In the runoff that was not 
clear In the first primary; the Identity of the Anybody But Gary 
candidate. The anti-Gary votes that were divided sharply In the first 
primary now could be concentrated upon Atkinson. Hence antl-Garylsm 
was Atkinson's best Issue In the runoff, and It was pressed to the 
fullest. At the outset of the casgalgn Atkinson said the Issues were
*^Tulsa World. May 19, 1962. 
^Oklahoma City Times, May I5, 1962.
^Dally Oklahoman, May 16, 1962.
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"big debts, big bonds, and big scandals.Replying to Gary's charge 
that the Atkinson campaign was a "three-headed monster," Atkinson
Q
answered:
There's Tom Kight, Jr., of the famous Skelly bypass scandal, 
who took the fifth amendment and who leads the campaign for 
Gary in his home county [of Rogers].
Then there's A.B. Green, the Gary highway commission chair­
man who always was so lucky in his guesses as to where to buy 
farm land so that a highway would pass right by it.
And then there is Jenks Craig, the right hand man of Gary—  
the man who was accused of delivering the relief checks to 
buy the votes in the Wagoner vote scandal.
The next day Atkinson said Craig had gone to work for Green's oil
company after Gary went out of office, end "now he's fronting for the
Gary campaign."^ Referring to Gary as "hog trough Gary," Moore said in
Tulsa, "Soooo— eeeee. That’s the way old Raymond's calling his cronies
together these days, and they're just knocking each other down trying to
get to the trough. Nigh charged that Gary "in speech after speech
promised the people anything they desired in highways." He added that
Gary had made his home county of Marshall the "concrete capital of the
world" by spending five million dollars there during his administration
while spending $173,000 in much more populous Washington county.^ These
attacks kept Gary on the defensive and drew thousands of anti-Gary votes
to Atkinson.
Through all this Gary retained the support of a majority of rural 
Oklahomans. The Anybody But Gary segment of the electorate appeared to
'^Ibid., May 9, 1962.
^Tulsa World, May 14-, 1962. ^i^id.. May I5, I962.
^Qjbid.. May l4, I962. ^Loc. cit.
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divide roughly into three groups;
1) Some vere for Atkinson and his program, including school bloc and 
Rural Electric Association leaders.
2) A larger number were more anti-Gray than pro-Atkinson, a view attributed
to Moore in this Tulsa World report
Before the Vlnlta rally, Moore met with a group of his more active 
supporters at the home of C.J. Wright, his state campaign [co­
ordinator], and won their pledge to support Atkinson . . .
At the meeting at Wright's home and again at the Vinita rally 
Moore made it increasingly clear that his stand in the runoff 
campaign is more anti-Gary than pro-Atkinson.
'I can't tell you if Bill Atkinson will be a great governor,' 
said Moore. 'I don't know whether he will be or not, but he's 
1,000 per cent better than nothing and that is what Gary is.'
3) Some were disappointed with the outcome of the first primary and 
either hesitated or declined to support either candidate in the runoff.
Some expressed the view that both candidates were cut out of the same 
Old Guard cloth and said they would support the Republican nominee in 
the general election. A poll of 725 Tulsa Democrats by the pro-Atkinson 
Tulsa World, released three days before the close of the runoff campaign, 
showed that Atkinson was leading Gary 371 to 196. But it was added, "A 
surprisingly leirge number— 158— said they intended to vote, but did not 
favor either candidate, and were presently undecided.
Senator Kerr's Role 
Followers of Senator Kerr were divided in their support of the 
Democratic candidates in the first primary, with most of them apparently 
behind Moore, Atkinson, or Gary. Both Atkinson and Geury had sought Kerr's
^Ibid.. May I3, I962. ^3ibid., May 19, 1962.
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support by promising not to run against him in I966; the question of vho
his future opponents might be was a subject of recurring interest to
Senator Kerr.
The Tulsa World reported on May 6 :^ ^
Supporters of Senator Robert S. Kerr are reported to be moving
into the Atkinson camp in large numbers. The senator will stay 
out of the cançaign publicly, but there are many who believe he 
is against another term for Gary.
Gary and his aides noted an increasing number of Kerr supporters coming
out for Atkinson in the runoff. For example, the Altus Times-Democrat
published front-page editorials favoring Atkinson on May 9 and May I3.
The Altus newspaper is published by Harrington Wimberly, who was named
Democratic party state chairman in 19^4 emd later was appointed to the
Federal Power Commission, with Kerr's help in both cases. Though the
Altus newspaper had endorsed no candidate in the first primary, Wimberly
was thought by many to be favorable to Gary, After the runoff Gary said:^^
I know Senator Kerr supported Atkinson in the runoff. The 
Kerr influence was not statewide. Not sü.1 his followers knew 
he was supporting Atkinson, but his key people did.
Word went out two weeks before the runoff. Rex Hawks, United 
States marshal for western Oklahoma, filtered the word to the 
peace officers.
Robert Bailey, Gary's oeunpalgn manager, said that the number of prominent 
Kerr men coming out for Atkinson during the runoff spelled out a picture 
of Kerr support of Atkinson.
Kerr's position was a delicate one. He would not want to risk 
losing his rural support by opposing Gary, for Kerr's support originally
I'+Ibid.. May 6, I962.
15Interview with Raymond Gary, July 31^ 1962.
281+
had been much more rural than urban— many urban residents were not 
impressed early in his career when he campaigned in a work shirt, 
galluses, and flowery tie— and only in very recent years had his urban 
support increased. In seven gubernatorial and senatorial primary, run­
off, and general election campaigns prior to 1960, Kerr had carried 
Tulsa county only once; that was in the 19I+8 senatorial first primary, 
when he led Gomer Smith 5^990 to l+,533- His urban support increased, 
especially in Tulsa county, after he advocated the Arkansas River 
navigation project, which promised to be a big boon to Tulsa county and 
eastern Oklahoma. However, Kerr still relied heavily upon his rural 
support and would not wish to alienate any portion of it by declaring 
for Atkinson in the runoff.
Hence Kerr could give only quiet support to Atkinson, through 
certain of his supporters, but his was eui important factor in helping 
Atkinson overcome Gary's big first primary lead.
Voter Turnout
Total voter turnout declined by 71,517 from that of the first 
primary, and Gary contended that most of those who stayed away from 
the polls were rural Gary supporters who were working in the fields or 
who were lulled into overconfidence by his big primary lead. It is true 
that this did occur, but the figures show that voter turnout generally 
was higher in the fifty-six counties carried by Gary than in the twenty- 
one counties carried by Atkinson. Overall, voter turnout for the run­
off was 86.6 per cent that of the first primary, but in the twenty-one 
Atkinson counties the average was 8I.I+ per cent.
285
Only Cotton, Pontotoc, Pushmataha, Sequoyah, and Tulsa counties 
registered a larger turnout for the runoff than for the first primary.
Of these five counties, only Tulsa county returned a majority for 
Atkinson. Of the twenty other counties where turnout exceeded the state 
average, only two (Oklahoma and Wagoner) were Atkinson counties.
One voter turnout factor mfavorable to Gary was that there 
was a 6.8 per cent increase in Tulsa county, where the Junior Chamber 
of Commerce sponsored a get-out-the-vote drive by giving away an 
automobile, a boat rig, and other prizes to those who voted. Atkinson's 
vote in Tulsa county increased from 9,070 in the first primary to 3^,&59 
in the runoff.
The Voting Results
Of greater importance in explaining Gary's defeat than the 
location of areas showing increases or decreases in turnout is the fact 
that Atkinson got the largest number of the votes from supporters of the 
defeated candidates in every county except Jefferson. Only in Jefferson 
county did Gary's runoff vote show a greater numerical increase over his 
primary vote than the increase registered by Atkinson. Gary had reached 
almost the peak of his strength in the first primary, emd once the anti- 
Gary voters had only one alternative choice they voted for Gary's 
opponent.
Gary polled fewer votes in the runoff than in the primary in 
these fourteen counties: Adair, Atoka, Beaver, Bryan, Cimarron, Dela­
ware, Harmon, Harper, Johnston, Love, Marshall, McClain, Texas, and 
Woodward. Atkinson polled four less votes in Cimarron county, the only
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county where his vote declined.
In Oklahoma and Tulsa counties, Gary's runoff vote increased 
by a total of 18,3^6, while Atkinson's vote increased by 49,560. Out­
side these two counties, Gary's biggest vote increase was the 2,190 
additional votes he received in Comanche county. Atkinson registered 
gains in excess of 2,190 in these counties: Caddo, Cleveland, Comanche,
Garfield, Grady, Kay, Muskogee, Okmulgee, Payne, Pittsburg, Pontotoc, 
Pottawatomie, Stephens, and Washington.
Analysis of the Atkinson Victory 
In an election in which the victory margin is only 953 votes out 
of 462,781 cast, the victory may be attributed to any number of factors. 
But, largely by way of summary, the more inqportant factors that helped 
Atkinson overcome Gary's first primary lead of 85,343 were the following:
1) Exploitation of Gary's political liabilities, especially in the north­
eastern quarter of the state. These include the Wagoner county relief 
check and Tulsa bypass scandals, the Grand River Dam Authority contract, 
the feeling that the northeast had not fared well in Gary's highway 
building program, and the linking of Gary with a number of "political 
cronies."
2) Support of Atkinson by the more populous counties, partly because of 
the legislative reappo?tionment issue. Some of this vote also was a 
progressive-good government vote.
3) The support of Moore and Nigh and their campaign organizations. The 
triple-pronged attack kept Gary on the defensive, gave the Atkinson 
campaign a strong play in the newspapers, and lent enthusiasm to his 
campaign.
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h) The strong pro-Atkinson, or anti-Gary, stands of the Tulsa news­
papers, which vas buoying to Atkinson casqpaign workers and demoralizing 
to Gary workers.
5) The quiet support of Atkinson by Senator Kerr, which was felt in the 
area of campaign contributions as well as in the voting.
6) Overconfidence of some Gary supporters and the fact that others 
worked in the fields. Both these factors, plus the lack of enthusiasm 
for either candidate on the part of some, helped to account for the 
decline of 71,517 in the runoff vote.
7) Adequate Atkinson financing and a strong campaign organization.
E.W. McNeil, Atkinson's campaign manager, is one of Oklahoma's most 
experienced campaign directors. His care in selecting caoqpaign workers 
who had a minimum of political scars, his care to avoid antagonizing 
Atkinson's primary opponents, and his stress upon laying down a care­
fully considered program and sticking with it were Importemt factors
in the campaign.
8) Support of Atkinson by the leaders of several ijQ)ortant organizations, 
including the school bloc, at least the large city wing of the Municipal 
League, the Rural Electric Association and Farmers Ihiion.
9) There are indications that, in at least scaae counties, Gary workers 
made little or no effort to enlist the aid of the supporters of the de­
feated candidates immediately following the first primary. Some 
supporters of defeated candidates said it appeared to them that, in view 
of Gary's large first primary lead, the local Gary workers did not want 
to "let us in on a good thing."
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Atkinson Liabilities for the General Election Campaign 
As Atkinson vas gaining second place in the first primary smd 
winning the runoff primary he vas also building up two big liabilities 
to carry into the general election campaign;
1) His proposed sales tax increase .gave him a separate image in a 
crowded field of candidates in the first primaz*y. It also enabled him 
to be forthright in his approach to state problems and specific in 
promising aid to agencies or organizations that needed more money. But 
this proposal, which helped to put him into the runoff, was to prove a 
big burden to carry in the general election. For one thing, Atkinson's 
opponents in the two primaries had convinced many of the inadvisability 
of a sales tax increase, or that it stood little chance of adoption, be­
fore the general election ceunpaign began. For another, many lacked 
confidence in the state government and were unwilling to vote for a 
candidate advocating a tax increase.
2) His anti-Gary statements in the runoff unquestionably attracted many 
votes and helped greatly in his efforts to overcome Gary's big primary 
lead. But they led Gary to demand a public apology from Atkinson 
following the runoff «md to Gary's refusal to support Atkinson in the 
general election. The party split, between the Gary emd anti-Gary 
partisans, helped to pave the way for a Republican victory in November.
In short, the two issues that appeared to benefit Atkinson most 
in the primaries were to prove to be among his biggest liabilities in 
the general election campaign.
Republican Activities During the Democratic Primaries 
Republican nominee Henry Bellmon had one opponent in the
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Republican primary, Leslie C. Skoien, 51-year-old founder of the Sunshine 
Gospel Tabernacle in Tulsa, real estate man and tax accountant, and former 
Justice of the peace. Skoien vas virtually unknown in Oklahoma, and 
Bellmon defeated him 56,560 to 5,313 without a canq)aign. For all practical 
purposes, there was no Republican gubernatorial primary contest in 1962.
There was some prospect of a spirited contest in January when John N.
(Happy) Camp, president of the Waukomis State Bank in Garfield county and 
a state representative for twenty years, announced that he was considering 
entering the race. However, he withdrew February 2 when it became apparent 
that most key Republicans already were committed to Bellmon and that Bellmon, 
as Republican state chairman, would have the backing of the official party 
organization. Since the only other Republican primary contests were those 
for lieutenant governor, commissioner of charities and corrections, and 
three congressional races, relatively little was heard of Republican! 
activities during the Democratic primaries.
Bellmon formal 1y announced that he would run for governor on 
Februanry 12, Lincoln's birthday, saying that "Just as Lincoln was the 
first Republican to be elected president of the United States, I intend 
to be the first Republican elected governor of Okleihoma.He predicted
that a Republican governor would be able to get along with a Democratic
17legislature and added: '
The Democratic aspiramts . . . fully realize that no permanent, 
far-reaching change or isqsrovement in Oklahoma's government is 
possible so long as the same group is in control of the state- 
house .
Any Democrat elected will be forced to make one of two choices.
^^Daily Oklahoman, February I3, I962. ^^Loc. cit.
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He can either surrender to the Old Guard politicians who prey 
upon Oklahoma's taxpayer^ or he can suffer the same humiliating 
experience of Governor Edmondson.
Bellmon continued to serve as Republican state chairman until March and
devoted his time trying to recruit Republican primary candidates until
the filing period ended on March 2.
Once the Democratic primary campaigns had begun^ Bellmon said 
there was no reason for him to go around the state making speeches be­
cause he could not compete for attention with the Democratic contestants. 
Instead, he toured the state shaking hands and attending a large number 
of two-party tea parties, the first step in building up a statewide 
Bellmon organization that was to operate almost independently of the
18Republican party organization in the general election campaign.
Bellmon visited seventy-two towns and cities between March and August, 
accompanied by his wife, Shirley, a former Republics state committee- 
woman, his three daughters, and part of the time by eleven-year-old 
Koalani Ban, of Hawaii, whose father was a close friend of Bellmon during 
World War II.
The value of the handshaking visit to a city, according to Bellmon, 
was that he was able to reach more uncommitted voters in this way than by 
holding political rallies. The usual procedure was for Bellmon to walk 
up and down the main street shaking hands while his wife and daughters 
made door-to-door calls in the residential sections.
The procedure for staging the two-party tea parties was to contact 
a key Republican woman in a county, often the Republican county vice chair­
man, and ask that she contact six to ten other women living in various
18Interview with Governor Henry Bellmon, August 28, 1963.
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sections of the county who would be willing to invite friends from both 
political parties to their homes. The tea parties were arranged at one- 
hour intervals generally, and Bellmon spoke for twenty minutes or more 
at each gathering. The largest number of parties arranged for a single 
day was sixteen, in Woodward county. Nearly three hundred tea parties 
were held between March and June, and Bellmon's goal was to enlist the 
active support of ten thousand casqpaign workers by this method.
Prom a statement made by Bellmon early in May, it appears that 
he kept his plans for the general election cai^ >aign somewhat fluid until 
it was determined in the May 22 runoff who his opponent would be. In a 
television appearance with Gary and Atkinson in Tulsa on May 8, Bellmon 
said:^9
I should be able to carry the municipal areas if Gary gets the 
nomination. . . . But, if I run against Atkinson, I should be 
able to carry the rural aureas.
As to the urban areas, Bellmon was on record as favoring legislative re­
apportionment according to the formula laid down in the state constitution, 
and Eisenhower and Nixon had run well in Oklahoma's more populous areas.
As a Noble county wheat farmer opposing a multimillionaire Oklethoma county 
home builder, Bellmon was certain to be popular with many rural residents.
As the general election approached. Republican prospects looked 
brighter than they had in msuiy years: the party organization had been
revitalized under Bellmon's direction as state chairman; Bellmon was well 
known as a result of his two years' service as state chairman and his 
extensive tours during the Democratic primaries; smd, as usual, the 
party had not tom itself apart in the primaries as the Democrats had.
^%aily Oklahoman, May 19^ 2.
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In 1964, after Louisiana Republicans staged their strongest 
campaign there since the Civil War, newly elected Democratic Governor 
John J. McKeithen said that Louisiana Democrats must consider abandoning 
their primary if the party is to face strong Republican opposition. He 
addedi^O
While we've been running against each other, the Republicans 
have been standing on the sidelines and clapping their hands.
^°Ibid.. March 5, 1964.
CBAPTER XIV
GENERAL ELECTION CANDIDATES, ISSUES,
AND ORGANIZATIONS
"Time for a change" sentiment vas especially strong in the 
northern half of the state prior to the I962 Democratic primaries, 
growing out of a dissatisfaction with Democratic management of state 
affairs since the Johnston Murray administration. This was the meaning 
of the gubernatorial election in 1958, when all the Republican counties 
returned majorities for the Democratic nominee for the first time in 
Oklahoma history. It vas a mandate to Edmondson to make good on his 
promise to "clean out the Old Guard." To many voters in the northern 
half of the state, especially in the more populous areas, Gary symbolized 
the Old Guard in the I962 primaries. Nearly all the counties carried by 
Atkinson in the runoff were in the north central and northeastern sections 
of the state, in the area of the state’s larger population concentrations.
Nov, following the I962 primaries, "time for a change" sentiment 
gathered momentum in the Democratic counties in the southern half of the 
state. To those who subscribed to the principles of the Oklahomans for 
Local Government organization, euid this no doubt included many in the 
rural northwestern counties, Gary symbolized opposition to Edmondson and 
opposition to the urban forces gaining domination over the i-ural forces 
in the state. Many rural Oklahomans had been deeply dissatisfied with
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the Democratic state administration since 1959-1960, when Edmondson 
announced the content of his controversial initiative petitions and 
then had them put to a vote.
Shortly after the I962 runoff Gary announced that he could not 
support Atkinson in the general election, and this perpetuated the split 
between the urban and rural wings of the Democratic party that had been 
in existence since 1959* With Gary's help, possibly the breach could 
have been healed before the general election. A key Democrat who had a 
prominent role in the general election campaign summarized the Democrats' 
situation in this way following the election; "With Gary's support, the 
race would have been close; there may have been a narrow Democratic 
victory." In short, the Democrats were operating under some disabilities 
even without Gary's refusal to support Atkinson; Gary's action contributed 
to but was not the sole cause of Atkinson's defeat.
With much of the northern half of the state disturbed about the 
Old Guard and with much of the remainder of the state disturbed about 
the Edmondson New Guard, there probably was no Republican better suited 
to capitalize upon both sources of dissatisfaction thsua Henry Bellmon.
In the more populous areas of northern Oklahoma he pledged to 
eliminate "waste, graft, and corruption" from state government. And it 
was the fact that Bellmon exuded a quality of rugged honesty that made 
his pledge convincing. In addition, Bellmon amd the Republican party 
were on record as favoring legislative reapportionment according to the 
constitutional formula.
In the rural areas, where the Edmondson administration was none 
too popular, he provided a contrast both to the more urbane "crewcuts"
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of the Edmondson administration and to multimillionaire Atkinson. To
these audiences he vas able to say, "I am your kind of folks because
I'm a farm boy from Noble county." And here he was able to concentrate
his fire upon the New Guard. Referring to the Edmondson administration
at Talahina, in LeFlore county, Bellmon said:^
After four years of a governor who had nothing but scorn for 
even the sincere and honest members of the house and senate,
[the state legislature] is in the mood for economy and reform.
In short, he could take up the Job of reform that Edmondson had promised
to do in 1958f but he could do it better because he could get along
with rural legislators where Edmondson could not. And it was a mark of
the Edmondson administration that the governor was "inaccessible to
p
most members of the legislature."
Voter reaction to the personalities of the candidates is one of 
the more important short-term influences that affect election outcomes, 
and in 1962 this factor must be said to have favored the Republicans.
The tendency of many voters appeared to be to link Atkinson with the 
ills that flowed from fifty-five years of Democratic control of the 
statehouse, while regarding Bellmon as the "fresh breeze" in Oklahoma 
politics. Bellmon had served as a state representative from Noble 
county from 19^6 until 19^, but as a Republican he could hardly be 
accused of having shared in the spoils of office.
^Daily Oklahoman, October 28, 1962.
^Ibid., December 16, I962.
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Candidate Personalities^
Henry Louis Bellmon^ who became forty-one years old during the 
general election campaign^ is a non-smoker and non-drinker who emnounced 
before assuming the governorship that he planned to serve nothing 
stronger than milk at receptions in the governor's mansion. A former
elder in the First Presbyterian Church of Perry and teacher of its
largest adult Sunday School class, he requested a 6:k^ a.m. communion 
service there on the morning of his inaugural. Bellmon also is a twice- 
decorated veteran of World War II, in which he took part in the invasions 
at Hoi, Ramur, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima as a platoon leader of a 
Marine Corps tank compemy. He received the Legion of Merit in the Saipan
campaign and was decorated with the Silver Star for bravery on Iwo Jima.
His conversation occasionally is peppered with the salty language familiar 
to Marine Corps veterans.
The Republican nominee summed up his political views in this way, 
"Basically I am a conservative, but I am sure as hell not a John Bircher 
nor an isolationist."
Bellmon is a successful farmer. He farms 1,400 acres, four 
hundred acres of his own and a thousand acres that he leases, and his 
annual gross income has been estimated at $20,000 to $2$,000.^  In 
addition to growing wheat and maize, he raises calves and leunbs.
A close friend described him as a "not real social person," in 
the sense that he is a hard-working farmer who "hardly ever comes to
^Some facets of Bellmon's personality are illustrated by actions 
that occurred after he became governor, but it is believed that he dis­
played these qualities in one form or another prior to his election.
^3aily Oklahoman, Septeniber 2, 1962.
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town" and who does not attend many social events. Shortly after his 
election he announced that he would not wear a "cockeyed tuxedo" to the 
inaugural ball because he had never worn one and did not see any sense 
in starting now. Another friend said of him that he is "sometimes a 
little rough around the edges; he's just what he is . . . there's no
pretense. "5
But he also is described as a very sociable person, in the 
sense that he enjoys being with people aind is at ease with them. A 
complaint often heard during his campaign was that it was difficult to 
keep him on schedule because he liked to stop and chat.
Bellmon also has the vigor and habits of a man of the soil.
During the canqpaign he was up at 5s30 a.m. and kept going until after 
midnight. On his first Saturday in office the new governor was virtually 
alone in the capitol when he arrived at his desk at 8 a.m. A week later 
he designated 7s30 a.m. each Monday as the time for a coffee and doughnut 
session with his top aides.
His sense of humor is as earthy as his other mannerisms. In his
first speech to the state legislature he likened the handling of some of
Oklahoma's problems to the handling of a litter of kittens brought home
by the family cat. He said nobody wemts to take the kittens to the
river, but added
Some of these nice kittens that came into being some time ago 
have grown up into mean, mangy, vicious tcmcats. About all they 
C6U1 do is hunt quail and suck eggs. It's time to sack them up 
and haul them to the river.
^Loc. cit. ^Ibid., January l6, 1963.
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Bellmon's earthiness and folksiness lies behind one political 
development that may prove Important: since he became Republican state
chairman In I96O, he worked to change the Image of the Republican party
In Oklahoma from that of a party dominated by Tulsa millionaires to that 
of a party of the people. To what extent this goal has been accomplished 
Is difficult to say, but It seems certain that the Republican candidate's
traits were an asset to him In his campaign.
The fact that he exuded a quality of rugged honesty was another 
asset to his campaign, since his pledge to eliminate "waste, graft, and 
corruption" from state government was at the heairt of his platform.
Joseph Dever, a writer for the Mew York World-Telegram who landed side by 
side with Bellmon on Iwo Jima, said of Bellmon after his election: "This
Is the most honest man [Oklahomans will] ever get."^ Former Governor 
Henry S. Johnston, a fellow resident of Noble county, said of him, "He's 
a good man, honest and fairly well Informed."®
His greatest liability was his lack of governmental experience. 
That he offered little In the way of a positive program In the I962 
campaign will be discussed later. However, Oklahoma voters seem prone 
to prefer honesty to governmental experience In their gubernatorial 
candidates, as was noted In Chapter VIII.^ Hence his lack of experience 
was not so much a liability to him during the campaign as It was after 
he assumed office.
W.P. Bill Atkinson also Is a non-smoker and non-drinker, and he 
Is a prominent Methodist. He taught a children's Sunday School class at
^Ibld., Jainuary 1$, 1963.
Û
Oklahoma City Times, December 29, 1962.
9see chap. vlll, pp. l44-l$7.
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Wickline Methodist Church and vas on hand every Sunday during the I962 
campaign. At a party in his hotel suite for delegates to the Democratic 
national convention at Chicago in 1956, Atkinson was reported to have 
served buttermilk.^® But, unlike Bellmon, he did not see service in 
World War II. It was during the war period that he was beginning to 
build Midwest City from the ground up. This was unfortunate for him 
politically, and was often referred to in the 1958 campaign.
That he came out of the 1958 gubernatorial ceunpaign with a
relatively poor political image is a factor that Atkinson had to try
to overcome in I962. As the front-runner in 195®, he had been charged 
by his opponents with being vacillating on the issues, as knowing little 
about the problems of state government, with being a rich man trying to 
buy the office, and with having the bulk of the Old Guard support. As 
already mentioned, the proposed sales tax increase in I962 was seen by 
Atkinson and his aides partly as a platform plank that would permit the 
candidate to be forthright in dealing with the issues in his second try 
for the governorship. In the interim between 1958 and 1962 he studied 
problems of state government and improved his speaking technique.
Atkinson was characterized by the pro-Atkinson Tulsa World two
days before the election as a "man of contrasts.
Many people get the impression that he lacks warmth. Perhaps
this is because on a public platform he foregoes the glib 
phrases and the warm-up jokes and is so deadly serious when he 
talks about his program.
But those who have travelled with him have seen a different 
image of a man with rare personal charm and a wry sense of
Oklahoma City Times, August I3, 1956.
~^^T*ulsa World, November It, I962.
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humor. Associates feel he is at his political best when he 
shakes hands and greets people individually on the streets 
and a varmth comes through which is more difficult for him 
to achieve before a large audience.
That he did not enjoy full rapport with all his audiences was referred
to by another Tulsa World reporter who accompanied the fifty-six-year-
old Democratic nominee on one of his campaign swings in the runoff
IPprimary. He wrote:
Gary, a veteran of the political campaign trail, generally 
has drawn bigger and more responsive crowds in his tour of 
the state. Atkinson has iaqproved considerably over his 
first unsuccessful ceunpaign in 1958 • • • but he still is 
not able to project to the crowds like Gary.
An observer who watched Atkinson's ceunpaign closely said Atkinson was 
more persuasive when he appeared before small groups of businessmen them 
when he addressed large audiences.
Discussing Atkinson in 1958, when the Oklahoma City Times was 
not so anti-Atkinson as in 1962, a reporter for that newspaper character­
ized the Democratic nominee in the following way after interviewing as­
sociates of Atkinson in his university days, former employees, smd 
others: "Composite memories of folks who 'knew Atkinson when' sketch a
genial but scmewhat humorless man who arouses more awed respect than 
warm admiration. "^3
In a lengthy biographical sketch, printed at the outset of the 
general election csuspaign in I962, a Daily Okledioman reporter wrote
Talk to people about the Midwest City builder and you run into 
conflicts. They cem't agree. Pew people adopt a middle-of-the-
^^Ibid.. May 20, I962.
^ O^kleihoma City Times, July I6, 1958.
^^ hOaily Oklahoman, September 2, I962.
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road attitude toward him— most people like him very much or 
they don't like him at all.
He's fastidious. He has a huge ego. He's a meticulous dresser.
He Insists on respect from those around him and yet he is still 
seeking the respect emd acceptance of the big men in the state. 
Despite an apparent gregariousness, he is really uneasy with 
people. . . .
But on the other side you get a different picture. You hear of 
his generosity to his personnel and to institutions in Midwest 
City. You hear he is friendly, gracious, and even-tempered.
People speat of the loyalty he eaurns from associates. You hear 
of his affection for and attention to children. You hear him 
described as a man with vision and planning ability that few 
can equal.
The Oklahoma City Times, more anti-Atkinson in I962, characterized 
Atkinson a month before the election as a "man who does not evoke natural 
enthusiasm even among partisan Democrats.
Democratic Organization and 
Casqoaign Strategy
The Democrats were facea with some difficult problems following 
the May 22 primary: trying to merge the Atkinson organization with the
regular Democratic party organization, attempting to heal the breach 
with the Gary supporters, and reorienting their campaign strategy in 
such a way as to fashion an appeal to the strongly Democratic rural 
areas.
The northeastern quarter of the state had been a happy hunting 
ground for the Anybody But Gary candidates in the primaries and much of 
their campaign efforts were concentrated there. But much of this area 
is Republican territory, smd some of the anti-Gary vote that went to 
Atkinson there in the runoff would go to Bellmon in the general election.
^^Qklahoma City Times, October 5, I962.
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Moreover, Atkinson no longer enjoyed the great preponderance of anti-Gary 
newspaper support there that he had enjoyed during the primaries; the 
Tulsa Tribune’s support of Bellmon now countered the Tulsa World's support 
of Atkinson. It was time for the Democrats to look to the strong Demo­
cratic sections of southeastern and southwestern Oklahoma. But that was 
Gary territory, and Gary was saying he would support the Democratic 
party but not the Democratic gubernatorial nominee.
The first step in Democratic camqaaign strategy was to seek out 
Gary's support. Atkinson made an airplane trip to Gary's home in Madill 
in July to talk with him, but Gary was quoted as having told Atkinson
If I campaigned for you, I think it would hurt me and hurt you; 
and the reason would be that people would be saying, 'I wonder 
how much old Atkinson is paying Gary.'
Later Gary was said to have laid down four conditions for supporting
Atkinson:
1) That Atkinson publicly retract the charge that Gary kept Jenks Craig 
from going to Jail in the Wagoner county relief check case.
2) That a retraction be made of the charge that Gary built the Willis 
bridge across lake Texoma and its approaching highway to serve his farm 
property.
3) That Atkinson withdraw his proposal to increase the sales tax.
4) That Atkinson abandon his advocacy of the constitutional formula for 
legislative reapportionment.
Obviously these conditions could not be met, and Atkinson's 
aides decided to follow several courses of action aimed at trying to
l^Tuisa Tribune, August 29, I962.
303
overcome or minimize the opposition of Gary and his supporters to 
Atkinson. They were:
1) Atkinson would do relatively little campaigning before mid-September, 
and above all he was to avoid controversy throughout the summer. It was 
hoped that the tenqpers of Gary supporters might cool after several 
months. Also, an intensive six-week campaign had worked well in the 
first primary and it was hoped that a similar effort would produce good 
results in the general election. In addition. Congress would be ad­
journed by then and the congressional team headed by Senator Kerr would 
be home to Join in the Democratic "team effort."
2) The Atkinson organization was to be subordinated to the regular Demo­
cratic organization in the general election casqpaign, a procedure that 
always takes place in theory but seldom in actual practice. It was 
deemed necessary to do this in I962 in the hope that the Gary supporters, 
including those on the state executive committee, could thus be induced 
to work on behalf of the entire Democratic ticket. The initiative for 
this move came from the Atkinson organization, not the party officials.
3) The Democratic fall campaign would begin with a dinner honoring a 
prominent Democrat from deep in the heart of Gary territory, Carl Albert, 
Democratic majority leader in the lower house of Congress. Albert, 
hailed as the "Little Giant from Little Dixie," represented the third 
congressional district in southeastern Oklahoma. The Carl Albert 
appreciation dinner was arranged to honor the majority leader, raise 
funds, and— it was hoped— heal party wounds.
But none of these courses of action worked entirely satis­
factorily. The testers of the Gary supporters did not cool during the
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Bvumner and many vorked openly or covertly for Bellmon in all sections of 
the state. In fact, Gary supporters constituted the most effective 
support Bellmon had in a number of counties.
The support of Atkinson by Senator Kerr and other members of 
the "team" probably vas less than vas hoped for. Republican senatorial 
nominee B. Hayden Cravford began making gains in his contest with 
Monroney by September, and many felt that Kerr began concentrating more 
upon helping to reelect Monroney than upon electing Atkinson. A number 
of state legislators did not vant to be too closely identified with 
Atkinson because they thought his proposal to increase the sales tax was 
unpopular in their districts.
Nor was the Atkinson organization effectively meshed with the 
regular Democratic party organization. Workers identified with a 
successful primary campaign are reluctant to take a subordinate role in 
the general election. State Chairman McGill said after the election that 
there was "no cooperation at all" between the two organizations in at 
least ten or twelve counties.
Party orgsinization troubles developed in the two most populous 
counties, Oklsdioma smd Tulsa, smd throughout southeastern Oklahoma. In 
Oklahoma county, the Atkinson county coordinator and six ward workers 
reportedly were dismissed in mid-September and were told that the 
Atkinson ca^>aign would be run by the Democratic county central committee; 
but about ten days later the coordinator and most of the vard workers were 
said to have agreed to work under the county committee. In Tulsa county, 
county chairman Ed Parks was reported to be lukewarm toward the Atkinson 
candidacy smd a local Democratic psirty split was said to exist between
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the adherents of Parks and those of primary gubernatorial candidate 
Thomas Dee Frasier. A top Democratic aide said that Democratic county  ^
organizations were weak throughout the third congressional district.
The Carl Albert dinner did not succeed in healing the party
split, and in general Democratic party morale was not high as the
general election campaign got under way in September. Phil Dessauer,
associate editor of the Tulsa World, wrote late in September
Enthusiasm--that's the element missing from the Democratic 
efforts to this point, . . .
In all truth, there is a lack of fiery ardor in the party. It 
was noted by observers at the Carl Albert appreciation dinner 
last week, and it has marked the previous preliminary phases of 
the campaign.
Republican Organization and 
Campaign Strategy
With virtually no primary campaign of his own to conduct,
Bellmon was able to spend the time from February until August building 
up a Bellmon organization in the various counties, and there was little 
discontinuity in his efforts as between the primary and general election 
campaigns.
Bellmon began the campaign with the knowledge that he could not 
win unless he could attract the votes of a large number of Democrats—  
about 200,000 was a commonly used figure. Hence his campaign strategy 
was to advocate a change in control of state government, but in such a 
way as not to alienate too many Democrats. This strategy was evidenced 
in a number of ways:
^^Amarillo (Texas) Daily News, September 27, 1962, "Inside Okla­
homa" column.
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l) A Bellmon organization, mostly separate from the Republican party 
organization, vas developed by the nominee so that he could avoid being 
identified with support of national issues of the type that would alienate 
many Democrats. For example, Bellmon did not wish to be identified with
Republican senatorial nominee Crawford's allegations that Democratic
• 18Senator Monroney was "soft on ccmummism." Bellmon especially wanted 
to avoid attacking Monroney so that he would not alienate the Gary 
supporters; in addition, it was felt that financial support would be 
easier to obtain if Bellmon did not attack the popular Monroney. Another 
reason for the separate organization was that Bellmon supporters felt 
that their candidate had a better chance to win them Crawford and the 
other statewide nominees. The Bellmon orgemlzation was developed 
primarily through the two-paurty tea parties held between February and 
August; there was, however, some overlapping of the Bellmon and Re- 
publicsui party organizations.
In some counties Crawford also had an organization separate 
tram, both the Republican party and Bellmon organizations. For example, 
in Tulsa county Congressman Page Belcher and Dale J. Briggs, candidate 
for lieutenant governor, operated out of Republican party headquarters 
at 515 South Boston. Crawford and Bellmon headquarters were at Seventh 
and Detroit; there was a partition between the staffs of the two 
candidates. Irwin Mus grove. Republican county chairman in Tulsa county, 
said that the disadvantages of having separate organizations were that 
key persons sometimes were pulled out of the regular Republican organ-
Interview with Wayne Mackey, Bellmon campaign manager,
January 2, I963.
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izatlon to work for one of the individiial candidates; also, he said 
there was poor communication between the Bellmon and Republican organ­
izations until three or four weeks before the election. But he said 
one advantage of having separate organizations was that some workers 
were drawn into the campaign who otherwise would have taken no part 
in it.
2 ) Bellmon headquarters sought close liaison with former Gary supporters. 
It was felt that Bellmon had the Republican vote and was well known in 
Republican areas as a result of his service as state chairman. The main 
task was to go after the Democratic vote, and one of the best ways to 
accomplish this was to capitalize upon the party split that grew out of 
the Democratic party primaries. Gary followers constituted the most 
effective support Bellmon had in such counties as McClain, Garvin, and 
Pottawatomie, as well as in Bryan and other Little Dixie counties.
3) Bellmon made a much stronger bid for Democratic votes in the southern 
half of the state thsin Republican nominees usually make. He made a 
swing through the southeastern section in July and again in October, as 
well as an extended swing through the southwestern section early in 
November. Bellmon billboards were seen in areas that normaJJLy are pre­
ponderantly Democratic.
4 ) Bellmon himself had no printed platform, and he ignored or disavowed 
those portions of the Republican party platform, adopted at the party's 
1961 state convention, that might alienate large numbers of Democrats.
For example, he assured the welfare bloc in southeastern Oklahoma that
^^interview with Irwin Musgrove. Republican chairman of Tulsa 
county, January 29, 19^3'
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he would not raid welfare funds, despite the Republican party platform 
plank which called for elimination of earmarked funds.
3) When Bellmon announced a 1$ to 20 per cent reduction in the number 
of state en^loyees as one of his platform planks, he was careful to 
make clear that this meant no mass firings of Democratic office holders. 
He said the reduction in state personnel would be accomplished by not 
replacing workers who resigned rather them by a wholesale housecleaning.
The strategy of capitalizing upon the Democratic party split and 
of going after the Democratic votes vas successful. Bellmon carried all 
the Republican counties, ten of the thirteen Democratie-oriented swing 
counties, and the four strongly Democratic counties of Beckham, McClain, 
Marshall, and Roger Mills. Equally importantly, he received more than 
30 per cent of the vote in every southern county except Love. In fact, 
he received more than per cent of the vote in approximately half the 
southern counties, an area where Republican vote percentages of 1$ to 
23 per cent have been common.
Wayne Mackey, forty-one-year-old registered Democrat, was the 
manager of the Bellmon campaign. He was Sunday editor of the Daily Okla­
homan when he resigned to Join the Bellmon organization in July. He and 
Bellmon had been friends as schoolboys in Noble county. Drew Mason, 
thirty-four years old, was the coordinator of the county organizations.
He is a native Iowan who first came to Oklahoma in I96O as a fund-raising 
consultant with a Kansas City firm that was engaged to raise funds for 
the Nixon-Lodge canç)aign. He returned to Oklahoma in April, I96I, to 
work in a similar capacity with the Republican central committee; he 
became executive secretary of the central committee and continued in
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that capacity until he Joined the Bellmon organization in July. State 
Senator Robert Breeden, fifty-four years old, the research, legislative, 
and press liaison director, is a former publisher of the Cleveland American 
and vas state senator from Pavnee and Noble counties until 1962. Though 
he vas a candidate for corporation commissioner in I962, he devoted most 
of his time to the Bellmon campaign. Robert Nevhouse, of Tulsa, retired 
executive of Fan Americaua Petroleum Corporation, headed the Bellmon 
finance committee. Mrs. Darla Hunt, of Tulsa, Bellmon*s niece, vas 
director of the Bellmon Belles, an organization of five hundred vomen 
from throughout the state vho appeared at Bellmon rallies in costume, 
passed out canqpaign literature at shopping centers, did door-to-door 
canvassing, smd staged coffees smd chili suppers.
Other casqpaign aides upon whcm Bellmon relied for advice were 
the tvelve district coordinators vho headed the Bellmon organization in 
the state's six congressional districts or in parts of those districts.
Yhey vere: District 1, Martin Garber, Enid; District 2, Phil Rhees,
Bartlesville, smd R.L. Kershaw, Muskogee; District 3> Morris Carr,
Atoka; District 4, E.L. (Bud) Stewart, Shawnee, smd Hugh Jones, Ysü.e; 
District 5j Jack Wells, Oklahoma City; District 6, Albert Stone of 
Marlow, Gordon Thomas of Altus, Esml Goerke of Watonga, Gordon Ray of 
laverne, smd Cooper West of Elk City. District 6 is not only the 
largest congressional district geographically, but it also is the 
district in which Republicsm Clyde Wheeler almost defeated Democratic 
incumbent Victor Wickersham in the I96O congressional race.
The strongest Bellmon county orgsmizations, according to Mason 
and Breeden, were in these counties: Beckhsun, Carter, Cleveland,
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Muskogee, Okmulgee, Pottawatomie, and Seminole in the Democratic areas 
in the southern half of the state; Alfalfa, Grant, Kay, Kingfisher, 
Lincoln, Major, Noble, Oklahoma, Payne, Rogers, Texas, Washington, and 
Woodward in the northern half.
There were fairly strong Bellmon organizations in Garvin, Jackson, 
Pontotoc, and Stephens counties in the southern half and in Beaver, 
Cimarron, Garfield, Barper, Logan, Nowata, Tulsa, and Woods counties in 
the northern half.
Bel]mon had no organization at all in the strongly Democratic 
counties of Barmon, Jefferson, Johnston, Love, and Roger Mills.
In general. Republican party morale was high, and there was a 
strong feeling that "this is the year." Organizationally, the Republicans 
were much stronger and the Democrats weaker than in previous years.
The Central Ceunpaign Issue 
State finances was the central issue of the general election 
ceunpaign, and it was put in this way by the two candidates:
Atkinson: A one penny increase in the state sales tax is
essential to overcome the state's deficit financing, to operate state 
government efficiently, and to effect those improvements required to 
usher Oklahoma into an era of space age industrial growth.
Bellmon: Existing state revenues are adequate if "waste, graft,
end corruption" are eliminated from state government.
With respect to this pareuaount issue, the superiority of the 
Republican position rested upon several factors:
l) There was a genereü. reaction against Democratic control of the state­
house as a result of the scandals, charges and counter-charges, and
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legislative bickering that had occurred since the early 1950's. A
prominent Tulsan said that Tulsa residents vere not reluctant to vote
city bond issues, but they lacked similar confidence in both the state
and national levels of government. Similar sentiments were heard in
Democratic areas
Sentiment for change is apparent among Democrats. Some of it 
stems from opposition to Atkinson because of the bitter runoff 
primary, but voters sounded in polls and voting for Bellmon 
didn't seem bitter toward the nominee.
It was more disgust with Democrats in control and an inclination 
to give the Republicans a chance.
With confidence in state government low, Atkinson was fighting an uphill
battle when he asked the voters to give state officials more money to
spend.
2) With inflation and heavier tax burdens already keenly felt, and with 
figures showing that state taxes aind expenditures were higher per capita 
in Oklahoma than in surrounding states, the burden of proof that a 
sales tax increase was essential definitely was upon the Democratic 
nominee. If the Republican candidate could just raise a doubt in the 
minds of the Oklahoma Jury, the verdict would be for the Republicans.
The voters preferred to look upon a tax increase as a last resort measure 
that might be forced upon a reluctant governor than as a step that an 
inccH&ing governor was committed to take because of his camg)aign promises. 
Bellmon got some help in this respect from Atkinson's Democratic primary 
opponents, all of whom argued against a tax increase.
3) Bellmon's promise to make existing revenues adequate by eliminating 
waste, graft, end corruption was what the voters were predisposed to
^^ ^ i l y  Oklahoman, September 16, 1962.
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accept. It vas not only Edmondson's 1958 campaign that gave the voters 
reason to believe that vaste, graft, and corruption existed, but this 
vas pointed up in the I962 Democratic primaries as veil.
There vas no difference in the stands of the tvo candidates on 
legislative reapportionment, vhich had been a major issue in the Demo­
cratic primaries. But Bellmon's stand on this issue had not hurt him 
as it had hurt Atkinson, for Bellmon had not been forced to campaign 
against a rural champion.
The Atkinson Ceuqpaign
To confound an already disadvantageous situation vith respect 
to the sales tax issue, Atkinson made perhaps the most serious error of 
his cauqpaign not long after the Democratic runoff vhen he told a group 
of Democratic state senators that he vas "not married to the sales tax 
increase." The remark vas made at an unannounced party given by 
Atkinson for Democratic state senators at his home on July 8. When 
first asked about the remark, Atkinson vas quoted as saying that the 
Democratic general election campaign vould not start until after 
September 19, that many things could happen between July and September, 
and that a firm decision on the tax issue should be reserved until after 
the fall campaign began.^1 Atkinson's headquarters said the next day 
that Atkinson's full remark to the state senators vas that he vas not
married to the sales tax increase— if anyone had a better plan for
22solving the state's problems.
The real source of the damage here vas that the Democratic
^ I b i d . , July 12, I962. ^Tulsa World, July I3, 1962.
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nominee appeared to vacillate on the Issue that constituted the heart 
of his platform, on the Issue that he alone had espoused, and on the 
Issue as to which the burden of proof of Its wisdom rested squarely 
upon him. If the sole advocate of a sales tax Increase was at all 
doubtful about the wisdom of It, It Is certain that the voters would be. 
Moreover, the apparent vacillation probably damaged the Image of forth­
rightness which Atkinson and his aides had worked so hard to build up 
In an effort to combat his 19$8 campaign Image.
Atkinson probably erred In meeting with the state senators as 
a group. Since many state senators are Interested primarily In what can 
be done for their own constituencies, Atkinson would have done better to 
meet with them Individually to ask each what was needed In his home 
district. Instead, he put himself In the position of allowing the 
pressure of the entire body to be brought to bear upon him.
To make matters worse, Atkinson was charged with changing his 
position on another Issue later In the caiqpalgn. This was the right to 
work Issue. Relatively little had been said about this Issue prior to 
September 29, vhen both candidates appeared before a state meeting of 
the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education In Oklahoma City. to 
that time It had appeared that right to work would not become much of 
an Issue In the general election campaign. On the night before the AFL- 
CIO meeting, Atkinson told the Oklahoma City Press Club that right to 
work was a matter for the people to decide but that as an Individual he 
would vote against It. But on the following day Atkinson made these 
two commitments to the COPE delegates: (l) If a right to work measure
were passed by the state legislature, he would veto It; (2) If an
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initiative petition were submitted to him, he would put it on the general 
election ballot, where the silent vote would count against it.^^ This 
was a much stronger stand against right to work than Atkinson had taken 
up to that time, and his caaqpaign aides were caught by surprise at their 
candidate's stand.
Atkinson obtained the COPE endorsement following his unusually 
strong stand, but in doing so he alienated some important support. A 
number of industrialists and large farmers had been favorably disposed 
toward Atkinson's pay-as-you-go plan of financing state needs, several 
high level Democrats pointed out, but they also were strongly for right 
to work. In addition, here again it appeared that Atkinson had vacillated 
on an issue. H.S. (Tex) Newman, president of Oklahomans for Right to Work, 
charged that Atkinson previously had proposed to submit the matter at a 
special election rather than at a general election. He was quoted as 
saying:
Mr. Atkinson in a major public appearance before the Oklahoma 
Press Association in Oklahoma City as well as to Tulsa leaders, 
both in public and in private, made it clear that he would not 
be active for or against right to work, but that if the petition 
were sufficient would call a specisü. election.
The high level Democrats previously referred to expressed the view that
Atkinson lost more than he gained by going all-out against right to work,
in view of the fact that Oklahoma is not a strong labor state and the
fact that the state's labor leaders had been only lukewarm toward his
candidacy, partly because of his sales tax increase proposal. In the
twenty-seven labor precincts in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Muskogee pre-
^^Daily Oklahoman, September 30, I962.
^^Ibid.. October 5, 1962.
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viously referred to in connection with the voting in the primary, Atkinson 
polled less than per cent of the vote in the general election.
Late in the canq)aign Atkinson headquarters sent a letter to welfare 
recipients promising these benefits if Atkinson were elected: (l) an in­
crease in welfare payments, commensurate with the cost of living increase, 
to be effected within six months after the election, and with assistance 
checks to be mailed twice a month instead of once; (2) an effort to raise 
assistance payments to $100 a month during the Atkinson term; (3) creation 
of a system under which welfare recipients might pay their doctors for 
both home and office calls; and (U) creation of a system under which they 
might pay their druggists for prescription medicine.
The Oklahoma Public Expenditures Council, a private treasury 
watchdog agency, said it would cost more than $36,000,000 to raise the 
checks of the state's 85,198 old age assistance recipients from the current 
average of $64.73 to $100 a month. It was pointed out that Atkinson's 
proposed one cent increase in the sales tax. would yield about $30,000,000 
a year and that a number of other expenditures had been pledged from this 
revenue. Council leaders said Atkinson's pledge to raise teachers' pay 
$800 a year would cost an estimated $14,000,000 to $16,000,000 for the 
biennium. Also, Atkinson had pledged 20 per cent of the increased sales 
tax revenue to the towns and cities.
In a front-page editorial printed three days before the election, 
the Daily Oklahoman tabulated Atkinson's promised expenditures as follows
25ibid., November 2, 1962. ^^Ibid., November 1, 1962.
Ibid., November 3, I962.
316
Welfare increase . . . .  $36,000,000
Aid to cities.. 10,000,000
Teachers* aid.. 8,000,000
Mental health............  ? ? ?
Higher Education . . . .  ? ? ?
Good roads . . . . . . .  ? Î ?
$54,000,000 plus ? Î ?
Atkinson carried twenty-four of the twenty-nine strongest welfare counties, 
most of which are strongly Democratic counties. But his strong welfare
stand undoubtedly alienated many voters in such areas as western Oklahoma,
where welfare rolls are low.
Meanwhile, the Democrats were finding it somewhat difficult to 
attack Bellmon*s program for the simple reason that the Republican 
candidate’s platform was very brief and highly general. As mentioned 
previously, Bellmon had no printed platform; the Republican party had 
one, but Bellmon did not run upon it. The Democrats could not attack the 
Old Guard, as they had in the primaries, because they needed rural Demo­
cratic support. They could not attack the New Guard, as Bellmon was 
able to do, because Edmondson was supporting Atkinson and his help was 
needed. Moore and Nigh could not be used as campaign speakers because 
they were jassociated with the heavy attack on Gary in the runoff. Hence 
Atkinson was forced to concentrate his attacks primarily upon (l) the 
Republican party platform, much of which Bellmon either ignored or 
disavowed, and (2) E.K. Gaylord, publisher of the Daily Oklahoman smd 
Oklahoma City Times, who opposed Atkinson in the primaries as well as the 
general election. Atkinson charged that Bellmon was a "puppet" of 
Gaylord and that there was a similarity in their political views. His 
most telling points were scored against the Republican party platform, 
to be discussed in connection with the Bellmon caspaign.
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Atkinson had a positive program to offer, and it was on the side 
of progress in that it called for making many state improvements, a 
number of vhich Atkinson contended were essential if Oklahoma was to be 
launched into an era of industrial growth. But he was operating under 
two severe liabilities: Gary's refusal to support him hurt his candidacy 
in the Democratic arural areas and his proposed tax increase was un­
popular with many.
The Bellmon Campaign
Bellmon took a calculated risk when he decided to set forth a 
minimal program, for he laid himself open to the charge that he had no 
program at aü.1. But the offsetting advantages of such a platform were, 
as one of his aides put it, that the Democrats could not concentrate 
their fire upon it and Bellmon could choose the time and place for bring­
ing up various issues.
The Republican candidate set the tone of his cajiqpaign in his 
kickoff speech at his home town of Billings on September 8, vhen he said 
that Oklahomans had the choice of cleaning up their state government or
pfi
coughing up more taxes. Beyond that the most specific platform planks 
which he set forth in his speech were these: (l) on highways, the ac­
celerated federal program coupled with existing revenues would provide 
more than $100,000,000 for road building and improvements in each of 
the first two years of his term; (2) on mental health, he recommended a 
one-third increase in appropriations; (3) on modernizing and reforming 
state government, he promised to reduce the number of state employees by
28 Ibid., September 9, 1962; Tulsa World, September 9, I962.
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not less than 15 per cent by 1966 and to reorganize the executive 
departments to gain more efficiency; (4) as to welfdre payments^ he 
vould raise them by removing grafters from the welfare rolls; (5) on 
education, he said the school code must be adequately financed and 
teacher pay adjusted upward.
Since there was little to attack here, Atkinson and the 
Democrats were forced to concentrate their attacks upon the Republican 
party platform. And it appeared for a time late in October that the 
Democrats might be putting Bellmon on the defensive with respect to 
three issues drawn mainly from the party platform. They were:
1) The party plank which advocated eliminating earmarked funds. Because 
the two per cent sales tax is earmarked for welfare purposes and thus is 
of prime concern to the welfare bloc of voters. Democratic speakers 
charged that Bellmon planned to finance state government without a tax 
increase by raiding state welfare funds. Bellmon denied it and replied 
that the state's financial picture was so sound that there was no reason 
even to consider tampering with the welfare program.
2) The party plank saying that "local government should bear a larger 
share of the financial support of our schools." This was linked to a 
Bellmon speech at Norman in which, according to Democratic speakers, 
Bellmon said he would increase the school levy from twenty to thirty 
mills. "That's am increase of 50 per cent in ad valorem taxes on 
businesses, farms, and ranches," Atkinson said.Atkinson told 
Pushmataha county voters that this would increase their taxes by
^9%bid., September 29, 1962.
30Tulsa World,September 25, 19^2.
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$73,938 a year, whereas his proposed sales tax increase would increase 
taxes there by $49,710. Bellmon replied that his Norman speech was mis­
understood. He said he proposed only that schools be permitted to use 
their five-mill building fund levy for any purpose they wished. ^
3) The party plank which said, "We stand for the principle of homestead 
exemption as it was originally conceived to protect the small home owner 
but we oppose the homestead exemption as an escape for taxpayers who are 
able to bear their flair share of the tax load. " Atkinson charged that 
Bellmon was a "puppet" of E.K. Gaylord and said Gaylord had advocated 
doing away with the $1,000 homestead exemption for more than twenty-five 
years. Bellmon replied that if he were elected governor he would veto 
any proposal to do away with homestead exemptions.3^ ^
Two top-level Republican aides said after the election that 
these Democratic charges appeared to be damaging the Bellmon campaign. 
They said a large number of persons contacted Bellmon headquarters to 
inquire whether they were true. These aides expressed the view that if 
the charges had been raised prior to late October and had been exploited 
more fully, they might have turned the tide in Atkinson's flavor.
Bellmon's most effective weapons against the Democrats were
these :
l) He kept alive the doubt that Atkinson's sales tax increase was 
essential. The Democrats employed the full machinery of the state in an 
effort to establish that more state revenue was absolutely essential for 
the coming biennium. In an unprecedented action, the State Board of
^^Ibid.. October 31, 1962.
^^Daily Oklahoman, October 3I, 1962.
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Equalization announced in mid-September that the 19^3 legislature vould 
have $4,000,000 less to spend than the 196I legislature; such reports 
on revenue estimates usually are not released until late December.
Early in October the state budget officer announced that requests for 
funds by state agencies exceeded estimated state revenues by $117,000,000. 
Bellmon charged that these actions of the state agencies were "political" 
and countered with the statement that the state could expect at least 
$40,000,000 more income in the next biennium. He added that reducing 
the number of state employees to a point equal to the national average 
vould save $12,000,000 to $1^,000,000 a year. He also issued a reminder 
that Edmondson and the Democrats had said in 1958 that the additional 
liquor taxes following the repeal of prohibition vould be adequate to 
take care of the state's needs. "Raising teuces in this state is like 
pouring water into a leaky bucket," he said. Late in the canqpaign he 
said representatives of the Mid-Continent Oil and Qas Association vent 
to the statehouse to get the financial facts and found that the next 
legislature vould have $20,000,000 more to spend than the last one. As 
the campaign closed, it appeared that Bellmon had at least created doubt 
about the necessity of the tax increase.
2) He kept alive the charges of Democratic mismanagement of state 
affairs and supplied seme new data vhich might be added to the electorate's 
accumulation of grievances. When the Insurance Commission approved an in­
crease in automobile insurance rates in October, Bellmon charged that no 
increase was warranted because car insurance losses had declined in 1961. 
Less than a week later the commission's action was rescinded and the 
Republicans received some credit for saving ceur owners $4,700,000. About
33ibid., October 13, I962.
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a week later Bellmon charged that state checks made out to a consultant 
for the Department of Commerce and Industry were later endorsed by the 
department director or his secretary and deposited In the director's 
account.3^^ The director later was tried In district court on a charge 
of grand larceny and a mistrial was declared when the jury was unable 
to reach a verdict.35 About two weeks later Bellmon charged that $5,000 
In state funds was spent to move the home of the superintendent of the 
Ardmore Veterans Home two hundred yards away from the noise of a busy 
highway and to have the home air conditioned. The superintendent replied 
that the home was moved to provide a site for a needed recreational 
facility.3^ Then, although no wrongdoing was alleged, Bellmon's cause 
was probably helped when the Oklahoma City newspapers made a big Issue 
out of the fact, late In October, that Edmondson and three friends had 
purchased a quarter section of land near Oklahoma City for $96,000 and 
that Edmondson planned to build a $56,000, ten-room home on his a c r e a g e . 37 
The news articles caused Edmondson to go on television on two successive 
days a week later to explain how he financed the purchase of the land and 
the home.3®
The caiiqpalgn Issues constitute another short-term factor that 
may deflect the vote from normal expectations In an election. In 1962 
It appeared that the Republicans had the better of It with respect to 
the Issues, even though Bellmon had relatively little to offer In the
3 y^?ulsa World. October I8, I962.
35i)ally Oklahoman, February 21, 1964.
3^Tulsa World, October 30» 19^2.
37pally OkleOioman, October 21, 1962. 38jb^a., October 29, I962.
322
way of a positive progreun. Bellmon was swimming with the tide when he 
contended that there was no need for a sales tax increase and that it 
was "time for a change" in state government. As to the latter, he was 
taking up where Edmondson left off in 1958.
After the election Bellmon expressed the view that perhaps the 
principal reason for his victory was the mobilizing of a large number of 
women to work on his behalf. He said he worked almost entirely vith 
women in the early stages of his campaign. At other times he attributed 
his victory to the turning out of many "new voters" and to the fact that 
"party barriers are breaking d o w n . O t h e r  favorable factors cited by 
Bellmon were his brief and simple platform, his handshaking vith voters 
of the type who do not attend political rallies, his decision to act 
"as if you're going to win" to overcome the feeling on the part of many 
voters that they might be wasting their votes on a Republican candidate, 
the contracting for four hundred billboards to give substance to his 
csumpaign and to help create a bemdwagon effect, and the adoption of an 
"aggressive position" with respect to the issues— "don't defend your­
self; if you're hit, hit back harder with something different.
An analysis of the voting wilJ. be given in the next chapter.
39ibid., April 27, 1963. ^Ibid.. December 9, I962.
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Interview with Henry Bellmon, op. cit.
CHAPTER XV
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING
IN THE GENERAL ELECTION
Bellmon received 55*2 per cent of the vote and carried forty- 
one of the seventy-seven counties, including most of the populous ones. 
Atkinson received 44.k per cent of the vote and carried the remaining 
thirty-six counties, nearly all of them by margins that were well be­
low the usual Democratic majorities. L. Richard 2Lavitz, the Independent 
candidate about whom virtually nothing was heard during the campaign, 
received less than one per cent of the vote. Bellmon was the only 
Republican to be elected in a statewide contest. Republican senatorial 
nominee Crawford received 46.3 per cent of the vote and lost to incumbent 
Democrat Monroney.
An examination of the voting returns shows the following:
1) In terms of the number and location of counties carried by Bellmon 
and the size of the Republican vote in the various areas of the state, 
the 1962 gubernatorial election results conformed rather closely with 
those of previous elections in which a strong Republican tide was 
running in the state.
2) The most important reason behind the Bellmon victory was this: 
reaction in the Democratic counties against the Edmondson administration's 
efforts to reduce rural influence in state affairs and to rural champion
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Gary's defeat in the primaries coincided with a reaction in the Republican 
counties against Democratic mismanagement and— in the more populous Re­
publican counties— against rural domination of state government. As 
Edmondson and the New Guard Democrats were associated with what were 
regarded as the anti-rural initiative petitions of I96O in the minds of 
most rural Democrats, so Gary and the Old Guard Democrats were associated 
with the Wagoner county and Tulsa bypass scandals and with rural domination 
of state government in the minds of most Republicans. Bellmon was able 
to turn both these sources of dissatisfaction to his advantage: he
benefited from the anti-New Guard vote in the Democratic counties and 
ftom the 8uati-01d Guard vote in the Republican counties. The Republican 
candidate's percentage of the vote exceeded the 19^2-195^ Republican 
average by approximately eight per cent in the Republican counties and 
by approximately twelve per cent in the Democratic counties, showing 
that there was a rather uniformly high motivation to vote for him in 
both sets of counties.
3) Switch voting in the Democratic counties was more significant in 
Bellmon*s election than the turnout of "new voters" in the Republican 
areas. Of the 3^9^000 switch votes required to convert a 1958 Demo­
cratic plurality of 292,000 into a 1962 Republican plurality of 77 0^00, 
the Democratic counties contributed approximately one-third. Voter turn­
out increased by nearly 171,000 over that of 1958, but 50 per cent of 
this increase occurred in the Democratic counties and 30 per cent in 
Oklahoma county; only 20 per cent of the voter turnout increase occurred 
in the Republican counties. The area where there was a substantial turn­
out of new voters and where nearly all voted Republican was Oklahoma
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county.
U) Disaffection with Atkinson's csmdidacy was rather general throughout 
the state. He trailed the Democratic ticket fairly uniformly in all 
geographic areas and in both urban and rural areas.
5) Bellmon was about equally populeur in the urban suad rural areas, in 
both the Democratic and Republican sections of the state. His victory 
was not a predominantly urban one, but one that must be attributed to 
general approval of his candidacy.
6) tfembers of the welfare bloc and Negroes voted Democratic, but Bellmon 
polled a substantial vote among the other large voting blocs.
Comparison of the Bellmon Victory 
With Other Republican Successes
The 1962 gubernatorial voting followed the pattern of those 
years in which a Republican tide has run in Okleihoma: the Republican
percentage of the vote rose to 6$ to 80 per cent in most of the north 
central and northwestern counties, to $0 to 60 per cent in the middle 
tier counties, emd to 30 to ^$.8 per cent in the southern counties.
Bellmon carried all sixteen strongly Republican counties, twenty- 
one of the twenty-four swing counties, emd four strongly Democratic 
counties. The only swing counties he did not carry were Ottawa, Delaware, 
and Cherokee, all in the northeastern comer of the state. The four 
strongly Democratic counties which he carried were Beckham, McClain, 
Marshall, and Roger Mills, all counties in which the Gary influence was 
very strong. Atkinson's best showing was in the rim of counties along 
the Texas border emd in the southeastern section, traditionally the 
strongest Democratic counties.
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A comparlBon of Maps VI and XVIII shows much similarity between 
the 1962 gubernatorial and 1952 presidential election results, with 
Bellmon and Elsenhower carrying much the same counties, many by approxi­
mately the same percentages. Elsenhower carried forty-three counties. 
Including all the swing counties and the strongly Democratic counties 
of Beckham, Kiowa, and Roger Mills.
When allowance Is made for the fact that Republican Senator Ed 
Moore was from Tulsa and was better known In the northeastern section 
than In fUr western Oklahoma, the results of the 1962 gubernatorial and 
19^2 senatorial elections appear not too dissimilar, as shown by Maps VI 
and XVII.
In short, the I962 gubernatorial election results conform 
generally with those of previous years In which a Republican tide was 
running In Oklahoma. It was not a Republican landslide year compsirable 
to 1920 and 1928, when Republican majorities were returned In a sizeable 
number of strongly Democratic counties^ and all Republican statewide 
candidates were carried Into office. But the Republican tide was enough 
stronger than that of 1950 to produce a Republican victory rather than a 
close contest. In 1950 Republican gubernatorial n(mlnee Jo Ferguson was 
strong enough to carry nearly all the Republican counties, but he 
carried only one Democratlc-orlented swing county smd none of the 
strongly Democratic counties.
The Gary Influence Is responsible for the prlnclpaü. surprises 
of the 1962 gubernatorial election: the fact that Marshall county re­
turned a Republican majority for the first time In Its history, that
^See Maps XIV and XVI.
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McClain county returned a Republican plurality by a one-vote margin, 
and that Atoka and Johnston county residents gave Bellmon 45 and 47 per 
cent of their votes.
The Voting in the Democratic, Republican 
and Swing Counties
The number of votes cast in the fifty strongly Democratic and
Democratic-oriented counties, in the twenty-six strongly Republican and
Republican-oriented counties, and in Oklahoma county was as follows:
Démocratie counties . . . 307,233 
Republican counties . . . 274,599 
Oklahoma county ........  127,931
With Oklahoma county excluded, the vote in the Democratic counties
exceeded that in the Republican counties by 32,634. If the Oklahoma
county total vote were added to that of the Republican counties because
of the fact that this crucial swing county voted Republican in the 1962
gubernatorial contest, the total vote in the Republican counties would
then exceed that in the Democratic counties by 95,297.
Bellmon's plurality of 72,000-plus in the sixteen strongly 
Republican counties was more than enough to offset the Democratic 
plurality of 32,000-plus in the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties, 
the only set of counties which returned a Democratic plurality. But it 
could hardly be said that Bellmon won the election in the strongly Re­
publican counties alone, for the heavy switch voting in the strongly 
Democratic counties severely reduced the size of the customary Democratic 
plurality there.
Voting in the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties: the
328
Gary Influence.— Atkinson's vote was approximately 14 per cent below the 
1942-1954 average Democratic percentage of the vote in the strongly Demo­
cratic counties, and much of this loss is attributable to the Gary in­
fluence.
Geiry himself did not work actively against Atkinson in the 
general election. He served as chairman of the Democratic fund-raising 
drive in the third congressional district in advance of the Carl Albert 
appreciation dinner, which signalled the start of the Democratic general 
election campaign. And he escorted the Democratic candidates for secondary 
state officea on a stump tour through Little Dixie. But he remained stead­
fast in his refusal to announce his support of Atkinson. However, many of 
Gary's active supporters worked openly for Bellmon and many Gary followers 
switched their votes to Bellmon, in part because they were chagrined over 
Gaxy's defeat in the runoff. Hence there was a "Gary influence" in the 
general election, and this was one of the more important short-term in­
fluences that deflected the vote from normal expectations, especially in 
the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties.
In assessing the Gary influence, it should be noted first that 
it did not operate uniformly throughout the strongly Democratic counties. 
There was a relatively strong anti-G«u?y or pro-Atkinson vote in some of 
them. In the I962 runoff the Atkinson vote increased by a greater amount 
than the Gary vote in all but one county, indicating that the anti-Gary 
campaign of Atkinson, Moore, and Nigh, plus the quiet support of Senator 
Kerr, struck a responsive chord with a substantial number of Democratic 
voters. Atkinson received more than 40 per cent of the runoff vote in 
nearly half the thirty-seven strongly Democratic countiesi Coal, Comanche, 
Cotton, Grady, Haskell, Hughes, Jackson, Jefferson, McIntosh, Muskogee,
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Okfuskee, Okmulgee, Pontotoc, Pushmataha, Seminole, Stephens, and Tillman.
Secondly, It seems certain that the Gary influence vas the primary 
factor in Bellmon's carrying Marshall, McClain, Beckham, amd Roger Mills 
counties. One has only to note the small vote which Atkinson polled in 
three of these counties in the runoff against Gary to understand why he 
lost them in the general election: 8 .6 per cent in îfershall, I9.I per
cent in Beckham, and 24.4 per cent in Roger Mills.
Two methods were used to assess the Geury influence in the strongly 
Democratic counties :
1) Gary's percentage of the vote in the runoff primary was compared with 
Atkinson's vote in the general election. Such a comparison showed that 
Atkinson's general election vote was from 5 to 52 per cent below Gary's 
runoff vote in fourteen counties; there was a differential of less than
5 per cent in twelve; and Atkinson's general election vote exceeded 
Gary's runoff vote by from 5 to 19 per cent in the remaining eleven 
counties. This indicates that the Gary influence was especially im­
portant in the first category, of more moderate importance in the second, 
and of minimal importance in the latter.
2) Atkinson's percentage of the general election vote was compared with 
the average Democratic percentage of the vote in the gubernatorial 
elections from 1942 through 1954 in each county. This showed that 
Atkinson's vote percentage was from 19*5 to 44.1 per cent below the 
1942-1954 average in nine counties, from 10.1 to 19 per cent below the 
average in seventeen, and 10 per cent or less below the average in 
eleven. Only in Sequoyah county did Atkinson's vote exceed the long­
term average; that was by eight-tenths of one per cent.
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Quite con5>arable resuite were obtained from both methods. For 
example, in Marshall county Atkinson's general election vote was $2.6  
per cent below Gary's runoff vote there and kk.l per cent below the 19^2-
195^ average Democratic vote in Marshall county. In Roger Mills county
the comparable figures were 37 per cent and 29.3 per cent; in Beckham 
county 36.9 and 21.1; in McClain county 12.9 and 20.3. As to those 
counties in which the Gary influence was shown to be minimal, in Okmulgee 
county Atkinson's general election vote was 19.k per cent above Gary's
runoff vote there and only 6 per cent below that county's 19^2-19$*+ Demo­
cratic average. In McIntosh county the comparable figures were 10 per 
cent and three-tenths of one percent; in Comanche county I8. 9 and 10; 
in Muskogee county 9-6 and 6.
Counties in which the Gary influence was shown to be strongest 
by both methods were Marshall, Roger Mill^ Beckham, McClain, Johnston, 
Murray, and Atoka. Other counties in which it was shown to be very 
strong were Bryan, Garvin, MeCurtain, Carter, and Choctaw. Except for 
the two far western counties, these are mostly Little Dixie counties.
Counties in which the Gary influence was shown to be weakest 
were Sequoyah, McIntosh, Okmulgee, Muskogee, Comsmche, Pittsburg,
Haskell, and Pushmataha. Other counties in which it was fairly weak 
were Okfuskee, LeFlore, Hughes, and Jackson. The majority of these 
counties are in east central Oklahoma and several are among the state's 
more populous counties. Reaction against the Wagoner county scandals 
was especially strong in Okmulgee county, which Moore carried in the 
first primary; Moore also carried adjacent Muskogee county and ran well 
in nearby McIntosh. The Kerr influence was strong in Jackson county.
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In a number of these counties it appears that the strong Demo­
cratic allegiances of the voters outveighed their Gary sympathies when 
the time came to vote in the general election. There was a feeling 
among some Democrats that Gary had bolted the party in his refusal to 
support Atkinson; the fact that Gary ran third in the 1^64 Democratic 
senatorial primary indicated that his I962 stand was not popular with 
some Democrats. Though LeFlore county voters gave Gary a 66.3 per cent 
majority in the I962 runoff, they gave Atkinson a 65.6 per cent 
majority in the general election; this was only 5*9 per cent below the 
19^2-195^ average Democratic percentage there.
Since factors other than the Gary influence contributed to 
Atkinson's reduced vote in the general election, as previously dis­
cussed, it seems fair to assume that the Gary influence reduced his 
vote by approximately I5 to 20 per cent in a third of the strongly Demo­
cratic counties and by 5 per cent or less in the remainder. Roughly 
this produces an average loss throughout the Democratic counties of 
approximately 10 per cent that may be attributed to the Gary influence. 
Reference to Table 46 shows that nearly 125,000 voters cast ballots in 
the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties. TsGcing 12,500 votes 
from Atkinson's total and adding them to Bellmon's total— since switch 
voting has the double effect of reducing one candidate's total and in­
creasing that of the other— puts the Gary influence in the strongly 
Democratic counties at approximately 25,000 votes. These 25,000 votes 
represent nearly one-third of Bellmon's statewide plurality.
Voting in the Democratic-oriented swing counties.--Ten of the 
thirteen Democratic-oriented swing counties returned majorities for
332
Bellmon, and the Republican candidate received a plurality of more than 
four thousand votes from this bloc of counties.
Atkinson's vote vas below the 19^2-195^ Democratic average and 
Bellmon's vote was above the 19^2-195^ Republican average by approxi­
mately 11 per cent in these counties. Previous Democratic gubernatorial 
nominees had received an average of 57.1 per cent of the vote; Atkinson 
polled an average of k6 per cent.
When the 11 per cent decrease in the Democratic vote in the 
Democratic swing counties is combined with the 14- per cent decrease in 
the strongly Democratic counties and an average of the two is taken, it 
shows that the I962 Democratic vote for governor decreased by more than 
12 per cent in the state's Democratic sureas.
The principal reasons behind the decrease in the Democratic vote 
in the Democratic swing counties appear to be these: (l) the pro-Bellmon
portion of the vote stemmed from the good government influence and the 
favorable reaction to Bellmon's personality; (2) the anti-Atkinson 
portion resulted from the Gary influence and resistance to Atkinson's 
proposed sales tax increase.
More than 93>000 votes were cast in these thirteen counties. 
Bellmon's increased vote of 11 per cent gave him more them 10,000 votes 
in excess of the number usually received by Republican candidates in the 
Democratic-oriented swing counties.
Voting in the sixteen strongly Republican counties.— In these 
counties Bellmon's vote averaged 8.9 per cent hi^er than the average 
Republican percentage of the two-party vote for governor in the 19*+2- 
195^ period. Previous Republican gubernatorial nominees had received an
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average of 6I.6 per cent of the vote; Bellmon received an average of
70.5 per cent.
The major reason behind this strong motivation to support the 
Republican nominee here vas the good government influence : the reaction
of Republican voters against the Democratic "politics" and mismanagement 
of the 1950’s. îfeny voters in these counties had expressed a similar 
reaction in 1958 vhen they voted for the Democratic reform candidate, 
Edmondson. Some nev voters vere dravn to the polls in these counties, 
but not nearly so many as in Oklahoma county. There vas even some 
possible Gary influence in the more sparsely populated northvestern 
counties, vhere Gary ran veil in the primaries.
More than 200,000 votes vere cast in these sixteen counties.
Since Bellmon polled approximately 9 per cent more votes than previous 
Republicsm gubernatorial candidates here, approximately 13,000 votes may 
be attributed primarily to the stimulus of the good government influence 
from this bloc of counties. This represents about one-fourth of Bellmon’s 
statevide plurality.
Voting in the Republican-oriented sving counties.— In these ten 
counties Bellmon’s vote averaged 7*1 per cent more than the average vote 
polled by Republican candidates from 19^2 through 195 .^ Previous Re­
publican candidates had polled an average of 51.2 per cent of the vote; 
Bellmon received an average of 58.3 per cent.
Bellmon’s vote therefore averaged about 8 per cent more than 
that of his predecessors in the Republican aireas of the state: 7-1 per
cent in the Republican sving counties and 8 .9 per cent in the strongly 
Republican counties.
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The motivation to support the Bepubllcau candidate in the 
Republican sving counties vas much the same as that in the strongly 
Republican coupties.
Ifore than 72^500 votes vere cast in the Republicein-oriented 
sving counties. Bellmon's 7 .1 per cent increase here accounts for 
approzlssately 5, GOO more of his statewide vote plurality.
The voting in Oklahoma county.— Bellmon polled B.k per cent 
more votes in the state's largest county than the average polled by 
Republican gubernatorial candidates from 19^2 through 195%. His 
predecessors polled an average of 49.8 per cent of the vote; Bellmon 
received 58.2 per cent.
Oklahoma county vas the biggest source of nev gubernatorial, 
election voters vho voted Republioam. The county's voter turnout vas 
37,689 greater and the Republican vote east vas 24,753 higher than in 
any previous gubernatorial election. The extent of these increases 
vas much higher than in Tulsa county, vhere the turnout vas 5,830 
greater and the Republican vote 13,338 higher than in,any previous guber­
natorial election. In all the other more populous counties the voter 
turnout and Republican vote increases vere less than 5,000 above previous 
highs; in most of them voter turnout increased by less than 2,000 and 
the Republican vote by less than 3,000.
Heanly all the short-term influences that bore upon the 1962 
gübematorisü. election appeared to converge in this crucial sving 
county: the good government influence, Bellmon's personality, the Gary
influence, resistance to the sales tax increase, and the influence of 
the Daily Oklabr«M.n.
335
Voter turnout exceeded normal expectations by 19,176 in Oklahoma 
county,^ and the Republican vote exceeded normal expectations by 20,310. 
Hence it appears that nearly all of Oklahoma county's 20,000 new voters 
cast Republican ballots.
Summary.— It is difficult to pinpoint vith precision the in­
fluences that gave Bellmon his 75,000-plus plurality of votes in 1962, 
but a conqposite of the foregoing analysis produces this rough accounting:
25.000 —  the Gary influence in the strongly Democratic
counties
10.000 —  the good government and Gary influences in the Demo­
cratic-oriented swing counties
18.000 —  the good government influence in the strongly Re­
publican counties 
5,000 —  the good government influence in the Republican- 
oriented swing counties
20.000 —  new voters in Oklahoma county
78.000
The foregoing represents a summary of the major Influences that were 
operative in the various categories of counties. Such contributing in­
fluences as Bellmon's personality and resistance to Atkinson's proposed 
sales tax increase also were iaqportant.
Disaffection with Atkinson's Candidacy 
Was Rather General.
A congparlson of the percentage of the vote received by Atkinson 
in each of the seventy-seven counties with the percentages received by 
Senator Monroney and Leo Winters, Democratic candidate for lieutenant 
governor, shows that Atkinson trailed these Democratic candidates by a 
fairly uniform percentage throughout the state. îtonroney received 53-2 
per cent of the vote in the state as a whole. Winters 53*7 per cent, and
^3ee Table k7.
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Atkinson 44.4 per cent. Hence Atkinson's percentage was 8.8 per cent 
below that of Monroney and. 9*3 per cent below that of Winters in the 
state as a whole. And Atkinson's vote percentage was more than 5 per 
cent below those of Monroney and Winters in al1 but these ten eastern 
counties: Adair, Cherokee, Delaware, Haskell, LeFlore, McIntosh,
Okmulgee, Ottawa, Sequoyah, and Washington. He trailed Winters in all 
seventy-seven counties and Monroney in every county except Sequoyah. 
Sectionally, Atkinson fared slightly better in the northeastern and 
southeastern sections of the state than elsewhere and slightly worse in 
the vest central and northwestern sections, but in general he trailed 
the Democratic ticket rather uniformly throughout the state.
Nor was there much variation in the percentages by which he 
trailed his Democratic colleagues in the urban emd rural areas. In the 
twelve most populous counties Atkinson's vote averaged 9*3 P«r cent 
below Monroney'8 and 8.9 per cent below Winters'. In the twenty least 
populous counties, his percentage averaged 7*1 per cent below Monroney's 
and 12.3 per cent below Winters'.
Maps XXVII, XXVIII, and XXIX show the counties carried by Atkinson, 
Monroney, and Winters emd the percentage of the vote which the three 
ceuididates received in each county. Map XXVII shows that Atkinson 
cen-ried only three of the twenty-four swing counties, Cherokee, Delaware, 
and Ottawa, and that he lost four strongly Democratic counties. Monroney 
carried sixteen of the twenty-four swing counties and Winters eighteen; 
Winters carried all the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties and 
Monroney lost only Marshall county.
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Democratic Switch Voting More Significant 
Than Republican Hew Voters
Of the 369,000 switch votes required to convert a 195® Demo­
cratic gubernatorial plurality of 292,000 into a I962 Republican 
plurality of 77,000, the Republican counties contributed slightly 
more than half, the Democratic counties approximately one-third, and 
Oklahoma county the remaining one-sixth, as shown by the data in Table 
43. In assessing this switch voting, it will be recalled that the more 
populous Republican counties returned heavy majorities for Edmondson in 
1958; hence, in the light of the heavy voting there for reform candidate 
Benmon in I962, the switch voting in the more populous Republican 
counties was certain to be heavy.
TABLE 43.--Number and percentage of switch votes cast by the Republican 
and Democratic counties in I962 as compared with 19$8
1958 1962 Number of Pet. of
Pluralities Pluralities Switch Votes Total
Republican counties 78,427 D 72,814 R 151,241 40.9
Republican-orineted 28,723 D 11,273 R 39,996 10.8
Democratic-oriented 35,068 D 4,175 R 39,243 10.6
Democratic counties 113,351 D 32,634 D 80,717 21.9
Oklahoma county 36,460 D 21,691 R 58,151 15.7
The inq>ortance of Democratic switch voting to Bellmon's victory may be 
pointed up by this one fact* if Atkinson had received the 113,351 
plurality in the thirty-seven strongly Democratic counties that Edmondson 
received in 1958, he would have won by more than 3,000 votes.
Bellmon's victory has been attributed by some observers to a 
large turnout of "new voters" in the more populous Republican areas of
3^1
the state. Total voter turnout did Increase by 170^884 over that of 
1958, but exactly half the increase took place in the Democratic counties, 
30 per cent in Oklahoma county, and only 20 per cent in the Republicein 
counties, as shown by Table kk.
TABLE 44.— Republican counties' increase in turnout in I962 over 1958 
coaq>ared with that in the Democratic counties
1953
Turnout
1962
Turnout Increase
Pet. of 
Total
Republican counties 181,027 202,037 21,010 12.3
Republican-oriented 59,145 72,562 13,417 7.9
Democratic-oriented 67,645 93,343 25,703 15.0
Democratic counties 154,101 213,335 59,734 35.0
Oklah<mia county 76,961 127,931 50,970 29.8
533,879 709,763 170,884
There was a substantial turnout of new voters in Oklsdioma county. But 
the increase over 1953 was quite small in the more populous Republicam 
counties: 5,330 in Tulsa county, 2,764 in Garfield, 1,595 in Kay, and
3,979 in Washington.
A "Good Government" Bloc?
One reason for the smaller increase in turnout in the north 
central counties than in the southern Democratic counties in I962 appears 
to be that the former were more motivated to vote in 1953, when Edmondson 
ran, than the latter. The smaller turnout in the Democratic counties in 
1953 might be explained partially by the fact that the contest did not 
appear to be a close one and hence excited less interest; but also 
Edmondson's pledge to "clean out the Old Guard" was not popular with
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some Gary supporters, and some of these undoubtedly stayed home in I958.
Therefore, if there has been a tençorary bloc of "good government" 
voters who voted for Edmondson in 1958 and for Bellmon in I962, for the 
same reasons, it appears that large numbers of them are residents of the 
north central counties. For, with very little increase in turnout—  
indicating that largely the same persons voted there in 1958 and I962—  
the voters of the north central area gave quite comparable majorities to 
both Edmondson and Bellmon, as shown by the following vote percentage 
figures ;
Democratic Republican
Pet., 1958 Pet., 1962
Garfield 64.0 71.8
Grant 64.2 69.6
Kay TO. 5 67.6
Logan 64.0 66.2
Noble 64.1 70.7
Pawnee 65.0 64.6
Tulsa 74.2 65.3
Washington 70.5 69.2
To the voters in the north central Republican counties might be added 
those in the swing counties. For the voters in twenty-one of the 
twenty-four swing counties returned majorities for Edmondson in 1958 
and for Bellmon in 1962, and the sizes of the majorities for the two 
candidates of opposite parties were quite comparable in such counties 
as Canadian, Cimarron, Dewey, Lincoln, Payne, and Texas.
Bellmon's Popularity in the Urban and Rural 
Areas Was About Equal
The voting results in thirty-one representative counties of 
varying sizes and locations were examined to try to determine Bellmon's 
relative popularity in the urban and rural areas. The voting in the
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principal towns and cities of each of these counties was separated from 
that in the smaller towns and rural precincts, the percentage of the 
urban and rural vote for Bellmon in each county was computed, and then 
an average was taken for all the Bepubliceui, Democratic, and swing 
counties. The results are shown in Table k^ , with the number of counties 
examined given in parentheses.
TABLE 4$.— Percentage of the urban and rural vote received by Bellmon 
in thirty-one Democratic, Republican, and swing counties
Urban Pet. Rural Pet.
Republican counties,(7) 69.3 70.7
Republican-oriented (5) 57.0 60.3
Democratic-oriented (5) 49.2 56.7
Democratic counties (l4) 47.0 44.6
The data show a disparity of less than three per cent in all but the Demo­
cratic swing counties, where Bellmon was more popular in the rural areas.
Since the disaffection with Atkinson's candidacy was rather 
general throughout the state, it follows that support for Bellmon was 
quite general. Bellmon's victory therefore cannot be termed a pre­
dominantly urban victory. Oklahoma emd Tulsa counties combined to contri­
bute neeirly 35 per cent of his total vote suad 36.6 per cent of the switch 
votes required to convert the 1958 Democratic plurality into the 1962 
Republican plurality. This corresponds closely to the voting strength 
of these two counties with respect to that of the remainder of the state. 
When the counties are ranked in order according to the highest percentage 
of Republican vote cast in the I962 gubernatorial election, it is found 
that ten of the top twelve counties are those with populations of less
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than fourteen thousemd. These counties are. In order of the highest 
Republican vote cast; Major, Alfalfa, Ellis, Kingfisher, Woodward, 
Garfield, Cimarron, Noble, Blaine, Grant, Harper, and Washington.
The Normally E;q>ected Democratic Vote 
emd Voter Turnout
Another useful tool for analyzing the voting results is to con­
struct an approximation of the vote which the I962 gubernatorial 
candidates normally could have expected to receive in I962, then to 
note the deviations from it. As explained earlier, the normally ex­
pected vote for the I962 nominee was confuted on the basis of the average 
Democratic percentage of the vote cast in each county from 1$42 through 
19^4 and upon the basis of the voter turnout in each county in the 
relatively good Republicem year of 19^0 and the good Democratic year 
of 1954.
These computations showed that the Democratic nominee normally 
could have expected to receive 53*38 per cent of the total, vote in 1962, 
provided that the short-term influences bearing upon the election did 
not fhvor the Democratic or Republicem candidate to any great degree.
It is interesting to recall that Democrat Monroney "received 53.2 per­
cent of the vote and Democrat Winters received 53*7 per cent.
Actually, Atkinson received 44.4 per cent of the vote, or 
approximately 9 per cent below normal expectations based upon past 
voting records. Voter turnout increased by 66,262 over the average 
turnouts for 1950 and 1954. Thus two facts stand out from a coiqparison 
of the normally expected Democratic vote amd the voter turnout with the 
actual vote and actual turnout: (l) the short-term influences in 1962
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were favorable to the Republican candidate and (2) a fairly substantial 
body of nev voters cast ballots in 1962; but here again, vhen 1962 voter 
turnout is compared with that of the average for the years 1950 and 195^, 
the biggest increases occurred in the Democratic counties and in Oklahoma 
county.
The normally expected Democratic vote.— Table 46 contrasts the 
normally expected Democratic vote with the actual Democratic vote in the 
various categories of counties, and the data confirm previous observations 
that disaffection with the Atkinson candidacy was quite general throughout 
the state.
TABLE 46.— The normally expected Democratic vote contrasted with the actual
Democratic vote
•
Expected
Vote
Actual
Vote
Per Cent 
Decrease
Republican counties 72,371 64,328 11.1
Republican-oriented 33,486 30,525 8 .8
Democratic-oriented 48,092 44,484 7.5
Democratic counties 134,971 123,241 8.7
OklahcMsa county 54,595 52,779 3.3
The average percentage decrease in the Democratic vote below normal ex­
pectations approximates the nine per cent decrease by which Atkinson 
trailed the Democratic ticket.
The Democratic vote held up best in Oklahoma county. When this 
is related to the fact that Oklahoma county had a large increase in voter 
turnout over normal expectations and that Bellmon carried Oklahoma 
county by more than 21,000 votes, it shows that a substantial number of 
new voters cast Republican ballots there.
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The Democratic vote fell 30 per cent or more below normal ex­
pectations in the following counties: Marshall, 52.6; Cimarron, 42.3;
Barper, 41.7; Beaver, 3^.6; Ellis, 33.9; and Texas, 30. Except for 
Marshall county, where the Gary influence predominated, these are all 
rural, far western counties. All adjoin one or more other states;
Cimarron county adjoins four and the other Panhandle counties two. In 
addition to other reasons already given for the disaffection with the 
Atkinson candidacy, it should be noted that Atkinson's proposed sales 
tax increase was especially unpopular in counties that adjoined other 
states where the sales tax was less than three per cent. Also, most of 
the western Oklahoma counties are among those that receive the least 
return in welfare expenditures in proportion to the amount of sales 
taxes paid into the welfare fund. There was some Gary influence through­
out western Oklahoma, for that section voted almost solidly for him in 
the Democratic primary and runoff; it will be recalled that western 
Oklahoma is almost entirely rural. The director of Oklahomans for Local 
Government was a resident of Woodward county.
The number of Democratic votes cast exceeded normal expectations 
in only fourteen counties, ten of which were eastern counties. These 
counties, and the percentage by which the vote in each exceeded the 
number expected on the basis of past voting records and past voter turn­
out, were: Cleveland, I3.3 per cent; Greer, 11.9; McIntosh, 8.3; Muskogee,
8 .2; Okfuskee, 6.1; Ottawa, 5.7; Okmulgee, 5.4; Pittsburg, 5*4; Stephens, 
5.O; Wagoner, 4.0; Hughes, 3.4; Nowata, 2.9; Harmon, 1,8; and Cherokee,
1.0. The fact that the size of the Democratic vote exceeded normal ex­
pectations in these counties does not mean that Atkinson carried all of
3^7
them; in some cases voter turnout increased significantly and most of 
the new voters were Republicans, as was the case with Oklahoma county. 
However, these were the counties in which the Democratic vote held up 
best in relation to past voting records. Eight of the fourteen counties 
might be classified as northeastern, the section of the state where the 
Gary influence was weakest. Two others, Greer and Birmon, are south­
western counties where welfare expenditures are relatively high.
Normally expected voter turnout.— Table h? contrasts the normally 
expected turnout with the actual turnouts in the various categories of 
counties. It shows that Atkinson's defeat cannot be attributed to a 
heavy turnout in the Republican counties and to the residents of the 
Democratic counties staying at home, for the largest increases over 
normal expectations were in Oklahoma county and in the Democratic counties.
TABLE kj.— Normally expected voter turnout contrasted with the actual
1962 voter turnout
Expected
Turnout
Actual
Turnout
Per Cent 
Increase
Republican counties 189,952 202,037 6.4
Republican-oriented 68,604 72,562 5.8
Democratic-oriented 84,350 93,348 10.7
Democratic counties 191,840 213,885 11.5
Oklsdioma county 108,755 127,931 17.6
Voter turnout increased by 20 per cent or more above the 1950 
and 1954 averages in these thirteen counties: Cleveland, 38.6; Stephens,
36.1; Greer, 33.8; Harmon, 3O.3; Roger Mills, 30.0; Major, 2$.0; Beck­
ham, 24.4; Pontotoc, 23.1; Garvin, 22.4; Carter, 22.1; Alfalfa, 21.1; 
Hughes, 20.5; and Muskogee, 20.0. Ten of these thirteen counties are
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strongly Democratic counties, where the general, election vote traditionally 
declines most sharply below the vote cast in the primaries. The feeling 
that the gubernatorial contest would be close, increased organizational 
activity by both parties, and the desire of some Gary supporters to cast 
an anti-Atkinson vote undoubtedly contributed to the increased turnout 
in these ten counties.
The only counties in which the voter turnout fell below normal 
expectations were: Jackson, 17.7 per cent; Harper, 14.5; Pawnee, 13.2;
Creek, 12.6; Sequoyah, 6.4; Bryan, 5*1> Comanche, 4.5; Blaine, 2.3; and 
Grant, Ottawa, and Atoka, less than 1 per cent. Approximately half these 
counties are Democratic and half Republican. The two Democratic counties 
of Jackson emd Comanche have had notoriously low voter turnout records 
because of their large militemy and transient populations. No particular 
pattern emerges to explain why turnout was relatively lower in this group 
of counties; possibly less effective organizational work may account for 
some of it.
At emy rate, it can be said that the size and location of voter 
turnout in 1962 were not critically unfavorable to Atkinson.
The Behavior of the Voting Blocs 
and Interest Groups
Retail Merchants Association and Farm Bureau leaders were among 
those supporting Bellmon in 1962. The majority of the leaders of the 
school, welfare, amd labor blocs and of the Rural Electric Cooperative 
Association were friendly to Atkinson.
The claims upon the members of most groups were contradictory in 
1962, and hence their votes were divided. For exasgle, though Atkinson's
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position on the proposed right to vork law was more to labor's liking 
than Bellmon's, labor union members had long been schooled to oppose the 
sales tax. And though Atkinson made a strong appeal to the welfare bloc 
with his promise to increase old age assistance checks, Bellmon was able 
to score some telling points with this group--especially the housewives—  
by pointing out how much of a bite the sales tax increase would take out 
of their limited, fixed incomes.
The welfare bloc. — Atkinson carried twenty-four of the twenty- 
nine strongest welfare counties, sixteen by majorities of 60 per cent or 
more. Of the seventeen counties which are both strong welfare counties 
and where median family incomes are below $3>000 a year, Atkinson carried 
all but two. But, though Atkinson made a good showing in the welfare 
counties, Bellmon cut into that vote to a much greater extent than Re­
publican candidates usually do. For exaa^le, Bellmon received k6.9 per 
cent of the vote in Atoka county, U4 .7 per cent in Johnston, and 44.2  
per cent in Murray. The Gary influence was a factor in this voting.
The Little Dixie vote.— There is much interest in the voting of 
the southeastern counties because they constitute such a Democratic 
stronghold. In 1962 the thirteen counties in the third congressional 
district cast about 5,000 fewer Democratic votes and 10,000 more 
Republican votes than their average since 1950, as shown by the following 
figures :
1950 1954 1958 1962
Democratic votes 48,916 53,816 44,188 41,995
Republican votes 17,672 13,278 4,230 26,065
Republican per cent 26.5 19.8 8.7 38.3
It is seen that the Little Dixie counties move with the sentiment in the
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remainder of the state to a large extent. The Republican percentage of 
the vote rose substantially in the good Republican years of 1950 and I962 
and declined in the good Democratic years of 195^ and 1958* The large 
Democratic vote in 19$k is attributable to the fact that Gary vas the 
nominee.
The labor vote.°-This vote vas so sharply divided in the general 
election that labor leaders seemed reluctant to discuss the subject more 
than a year after the election. A sampling of tventy-seven labor pre­
cincts in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Muskogee indicates that Bellmon may 
even have received a majority of the labor vote. The results were as 
follows, with the number of precincts examined in each city given in 
parentheses :
Bellmon Atkinson
Oklahoma City (l4) 3,319 2,26$
Tulsa (8) 1,18$ 1,044
Muskogee ($) 762 86I
5,266 4,170
The voting in the labor precincts corresponded very closely to that in 
the county as a whole in Oklahoma City and Muskogee. In Tulsa the vote 
in the labor precincts was approximately 12 per cent less Republican 
than the vote in Tulsa county as a whole.
The Negro vote.— Atkinson received 60.2 per cent of the vote in 
forty-one Negro precincts in these five cities: Oklahoma City, Tulsa,
Muskogee, Enid, and Lawton. The results are given below, with the number 
of precincts examined in each city given in parentheses. The vote appears 
to correspond with results found in other studies, which show that the 
majority of Negroes have been voting Democratic since the days of Roosevelt.
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Bellmon Atkinson
Oklahoma City (15) 1,891 2,k^
Tulsa (Ik) 1,11k 1,956
Muskogee (?) 536 807
Enid (3) 327 280
Lawton (2) 125 k91
3,993 6,028
The school bloc.— Bellmon received 53*6 per cent of the slightly 
more than three thousand votes cast in the eight precincts in Norman and 
Stillwater where University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State IMiversity 
faculty concentrations are heaviest. The voting results in four pre­
cincts in each of these cities were;
Bellmon Atkinson _
Borman 89I 886
Stillwater 766 5k7
The fact that Bellmon polled a larger vote in Stillwater than in Norman 
is attributable in part to the fact that he is an Oklahoma State Uni­
versity graduate and in part to the fact that Payne county has been a 
Republican-oriented county while Cleveland county has been Democratic- 
oriented.
While these figures are far from adequate to pinpoint the 
division of the school bloc vote, they provide one indication that it 
probably was sharply divided. Top Republican cas^ign aides said after 
the election they felt that Bellmon received a substantial portion of the 
school vote; they based this upon the fact that a number of teachers 
worked actively for Bellmon throughout the state and that a number of 
others were seen at Bellmon rallies.
CHAPTER XVI 
THE PRESENT STATUS OF OKIAHCMA POLITICS
Oklahoma has had a combination of unusual gubernatorial elections 
in 1958 and 1962% the greatest Democratic victory in the state's history 
in 1958 vas followed by the election of the state's first Republican 
governor in I962. In addition, the Republican percentage of the vote in 
the major races has been appreciably higher since 19^2 and there have 
been three successive Republican presidential victories in Oklahoma since 
1952. Offsetting these seeming trends in favor of the Republican party 
is the fact that increases in the number of registered Republican voters 
have been minimal, participation in Republican primaries currently is 
only twelve per cent of that in the Democratic primaries. Republicans 
have had only fifteen per cent of the seats in the lower house of the 
state legislature in recent years, no Republican has been elected to a 
secondary state office in a contested race since 1928, and the number of 
elected Republicem county officials has been declining since 1952.
Various theories have been advanced to explain the one guberna­
torial and three presidential victories registered by Republicans since 
1950. It has been suggested that a "non-party vote" is developing in 
the state, that an "end of ideology" in political parnty operations has 
left little basis for distinguishing between the parties, or that—  
especially with reference to the gubernatorial elections— a "good govern-
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ment bloc" bas come into being and that its members are ignoring party 
lines in flavor of electing officials who -fei-ll clean up the state govern­
ment.
The non-party vote concept appears contrary to the recent findings 
of the Itoiversity of Michigan Survey Research Center, which found from 
extensive national surveys that political party affiliation still is the 
single most important determinant of the vote. Even among those who 
styled themselves as Independents, it was found that only a tiny fraction 
did not feel closer to one political party than to the other. This con­
cept was advanced by Dr. Harry Holloway of the University of Oklahoma.
The end of ideology concept was suggested as a possible explanation 
of recent political developments in Gklahaaa Votes, 1907-1962, a publi­
cation of the Bureau of Government Research of the University of Oklahoma. 
It was said:^
. . . the sweeping Democratic victory in the governor's race 
of 1958, in the midst of recent Republican successes, seems 
to strengthen the opinion that in contemporary political con­
tests electoral success is based on issues which do not rest 
upon traditionally Democratic and Republican points of view.
If this pattern of party 'flip-flops' continues (a pattern 
which has been thought to indicate 'the end of ideology'—  
meaning party ideology) it may presage a future of more com­
petitive elections, but an era not encompassed within the realm 
of party systems.
Attachment to a political party may rest upon bases other than sub­
scribing to its principles. In fact, the Michigan Research Center found 
that only ten per cent or less of the electorate has a coherent political 
philosophy, plus the interest or capacity to relate a personal philosophy
p
to the positions of the political parties. To the great mass of
^Ihiversity of Oklahcma Bureau, op. cit., p. 53»
^Campbell, The American Voter, pp. 216-217.
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politically apathetic or less well informed persons, belonging to a 
political party is more akin to belonging to a social group, around 
which one builds up in-group and out-group feelings, them an exercise 
in logic. Moreover, "there is psychological economy in depending upon 
the party as an organizing principle;it requires much less effort 
to give allegiance to a political party and to assume that its prin­
ciples are correct than to give serious consideration to party differ­
ences- -or the lack of them.
The idea that a "good government bloc" of voters has come into
being in Oklahoma was suggested editorially by the Oklahoma City Times
shortly before the I962 election;^
One can build a case for the idea that recent elections have 
been decided by a disorgsmized anti-Old Guard bloc of voters.
This includes not only progressives emd idealists but 'again- 
sters.*
This bloc helped give J. Howard Edmondson his smashing majorities 
four years ago, split the vote badly in this year'3 first Demo­
cratic primary to allow Raymond Gary a commanding lead, emd then 
turned around emd knocked him off in the runoff primary to give 
Atkinson the nomination.
Some credence must be given to the view that a so-called "good government 
bloc" contributed heavily to the results of the 1958 emd I962 gubernatorial 
elections, in view of the imposing list of grievances detailed in Chapter 
X emd the data in Chapter XV showing that comparable majorities were re­
turned for Edmondson emd Bellmon in a number of counties where the voter 
turnout varied little as between 1958 emd I962. That a good government 
appeal cem create a strong political tide in Oklahona seems indicated by
3Ibid., p. 328.
^Oklahoma City Times, September 12, 1962.
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the fact that the two largest gubernatorial majorities in the state's 
history have been given in reaction to the extravagance or "politics” 
of previous administrations ; the 70 per cent majority given to Leon 
Phillips in 1938 and the 7^.1 per cent majority given to Edmondson in 
1958. Phillips offered economy and retrenchment following the ex­
travagance of the Marland administration and the political manipulations 
of some of Marland's aides. Edmondson promised to clean out the Old 
Guard following the "politics" of the 1950's. Bellmon promised to 
eliminate waste, graft, and corruption from state government. How­
ever, this so-called good government bloc does not seem destined to 
become any sort of permanent force in Oklahoma politics. Experience 
seems to have shown that "mismanagement and corruption are not issues 
that are easily kept alive after a change in the control of the govern­
ment."^
The approach to the understanding of the 1962 gubernatorial 
election in this study has been to present first the long-term partisan 
division of the vote, which has been favorable to the Democrats, and 
then to present the short-term influences that deflected the voting 
from normal expectations in 1962. On the basis of past voting records, 
it was shown that the Democratic nominee for governor normally could 
have expected to receive 53-38 per cent of the vote in 1962. Earlier 
it was shown that Democratic candidates for the secondary state offices 
had been receiving approximately 60 per cent of the vote through the 
years.
The major departures from normal expectations in I962 were that
^Campbell, The American Voter, p. 50.
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the Democratic gubernatorial nominee received only 44.4 per cent of the 
vote, that the Democratic nominee for state treasurer received only 51.4 
per cent, and that the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor re­
ceived 53*7 per cent. Other Democratic ceuididates for the secondary 
state offices received from 56.3 to 6I.9 per cent of the vote. The 
Democratic nominee for secretary of state polled 56.3 per cent; for 
attorney general, 57-3j for commissioner of charities and corrections, 
56.4; for commissioner of insurance, 61.9; for corporation commissioner, 
58.4; and for Justice of the state supreme court, 58.3*
In the state treasurer's race a fairly strong Republiesui candidate 
was pitted against a rather vulnerable Democrat. Republican nominee Tom 
R. Moore received considerable publicity earlier in the year when he con­
sidered making cue race for governor. Democratic nominee Cowboy Pink 
Williams was decisively defeated in the 1958 Democratic runoff primary 
by George Nigh in another of the fresh breeze-Old Guard contests. In 
the lieutenant governor's contest Dale J. Briggs, a Tulsa attorney who 
had been prominent in the fight for constitutional reapportionment of 
the state legislature, put on a much more spirited campaign in I962 
than has been customary for Republican candidates for secondary state 
offices.
The principal short-term influences that led to Bellmon's 
victory emd to Atkinson's defeat, as found in this study, were these;
1) Dissatisfaction with Democratic management of state affairs was deep 
and widespread, resulting fnmi an accumulation of grievances that dated 
particularly from 1950. These grievances included the "politics" in­
volved in the Selected Investments case, the Wagoner county absentee
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ballot and relief check scandals, the Tulsa bypass case, and the wrangling, 
patronage-seeking sessions of the state legislature. In the more populous 
areas the demeuad for reform was accooQ^anled by a demand for legislative 
reapportionment. This dissatisfaction was especially deep In the north 
central counties and In a number of the swing counties, giving rise to 
what may be called a "good government bloc" of voters, a temporary and 
unorganized segment of the electorate that returned comparable majorities 
for the Democratic reform candidate In 1958 and the Republican reform 
candidate In I962. To them, for the time being at least, reform of state 
government appeared to be more Important than party affiliation. Prior 
to the Bellmon election, this dissatisfaction was expressed In the 
election of Edmondson In 1958 and In the vote against Gary In the I962 
Democratic primaries. The Anybody But Gary candidates made their best 
showings in the north central and northeastern counties In the I962 
Democratic primaries. But, althou^ this dissatisfaction was more pro­
nounced In the Republican areas of the state than In the Democratic 
areas, as would be expected. It was not confined wholly to them. This 
Is evidenced by Atkinson's strong showing throughout the state In the 
1962 runoff.
2) The foregoing coincided with another form of dissatisfaction that 
was more pronounced In the rural Democratic areas: a deep dissatis­
faction with the Edmondson administration and something less than general 
approval of the national Kennedy administration. These grievances dated 
from 1959, when Edmondson made known that his aides would circulate three 
Initiative petitions calling for legislative reapportionment, curbing the 
powers of the county commissioners, and Insulating the Highway Commission
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from the influence of the governor. The feeling about legislative re- 
apportionment in these counties vas of course the opposite of that in 
the more populous north central counties, and the feeling vas equally 
strong in both areas. Prior to the Bellmon election this dissatisfaction 
vas expressed through formation of the Oklahomans for Locsü. Government 
organization to fight the Edmondson petitions and through stripping 
Edmondson of virtually all control over the Democratic party. The 
effect of the fight over the initiative petitions vas to solidify the 
rural Democrats in their opposition to the Edmondson administration, 
of increasing Gary's popularity in the ruraJL areas, and of creating a 
deep split betveen the Edmondson emd Gary partisans. As Gary vas the 
symbol of the Old Guard In seme parts of the state, in the rural Demo­
cratic areas he vas a symbol of "fair representation" and a "fair share" 
of highvays for the rural areas. To some of these Democrats the prin­
ciples of Oklahomans for Local Government, their opposition to Edmondson, 
and their sympathy for Gary vere more important than their party af­
filiations in the 1962 election.
3) Bellmon vas the "right man at the right time" for the Republicsms 
in 1962, in that he had the capacity amd the personality that permitted 
him to turn both these tides of dissatisfaction in his favor. In the 
northern areas he made himself the symbol of opposition to the Old Guard; 
he and the Republican party vere on record in favor of constitutional re­
apportionment of the state legislature, emd his promise to hold the line 
on teLxes by eliminating vaste, graft, and corruption from state govern­
ment vere highly popular there. In the rural Democratic areas he vas 
"the country boy from Noble county" running against a multimillionaire
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who demonstrated that he did not understand the problems of the common 
folks when he suggested a sales tax increase. In these areas he also 
fanned the anti-Edmondson and anti-Kennedy fires. Since there was
nothing to choose between the Atkinson and Bellmon stands on legislative
reapportionment, the Democrats were estopped from making Bellmon's stand 
on reapportionment an issue in the rural areas. Since Atkinson needed 
all the help he could get from Gary supporters, he was estopped from 
continuing his anti-Gary campaign into the general election. And, since
Atkinson needed Edmondson's support in the northern areas, he was
similarly estopped from attacking the Edmondson administration. Hence 
the "against" vote went to Bellmon in 19^2, both in the northern and 
southern areas. Atkinson, a relatively poor campaigner, was left with 
his promise to loprove the state's financial position and to launch 
Oklahoma into an era of industrial growth.
4) Republican voting has been higher in Oklahoma since 19^2, stemming in 
part from a not too solidly based conservative trend that is related to 
national trends and developments. There was dissatisfaction with the 
way the Allied war effort was going in 19*+2, there was resistance to 
continued price controls in 19^6, and then came the highly unpopular 
Korean war in 1950 and the ensuing aggravation of the nation's in­
flation. Not only was the not-too-Republicem military hero Eisenhower 
highly popular in Oklahoma, but the 1952 Republican issues of Korea, 
corruption in national government, and too much taxing-spending struck 
a responsive chord. Then in 196O came the Democratic party's second 
Catholic nominee and a third successive Republican presidential victory. 
These national trends and developments, coupled with the dissatisfactions 
as to Oklahoma affairs, have reduced the Democratic margin of superiority
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in the gubernatorial races to 55 per cent in the period since 1942. The 
three Republican presidential victories since 1952, especially the Kennedy- 
Nixon contest, undoubtedly introduced the idea of split-ticket voting to 
some die-hard Democrats. In sum, the major trend in Oklahoma politics 
since 1942 has been somevhat more favorable to the Republicans than to , 
the Democrats.
5) As to candidate personalities, Bellmon struck the more responsive chord 
with the electorate. He possessed the political assets of the tvo previous 
governors, but at the same time he provided a contrast to both of them in 
the areas of their greatest political liabilities. Like Gary, he vas 
popular in the rural areas, but unlike him he vas not identified vith the 
Old Guard; he vas able to establish himself as a relative "fresh breeze" 
in Oklahoma politics because he had virtually no political scars. Like 
Edmondson, he was a reform candidate vho vas popular in the more populous 
areas, but unlike him he vas popular in the rursil areas; vhere the contro­
versial outgoing governor vas young, urbame, not too accessible to rural 
legislators, but without Old Guard connections, Bellmon was not too 
young, earthy, easily met, at home with the rural folks, and without 
either Old Guard or New Guard connections. As to Atkinson, the pro- 
Atkinson Tulsa World said of him that "many people get the impression 
that he lacks warmth" and that "he still is not able to project to the 
crowds like Gary." Though many who were close to him saw him as a man 
of warmth and charm, he vas unable to project these qualities to many of 
his audiences. He emerged from the 1958 gubernatorial political campaign 
badly defeated and with a relatively poor political image, he altered his 
1962 platform and appeal considerably from that of 195Ô, and he appeared
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to change his position on two of the more important issues in the I962 
general election ceunpaign. Bellmon led the eight Republican cemdidates 
for secondary state offices by an average of 11.9 per cent, while 
Atkinson trailed the eight Democratic candidates by an average of 12.3 
per cent.
6) As to the campaign issues, Bellmon was swimming with the tide of public 
sentiment when he contended that state government could be operated on 
existing revenues if waste, graft, and corruption were eliminated. Taking 
into account that there was a rather general lack of confidence in 1962 
in the state agencies that appropriate and spend the state's tax money 
and that a tax increase never is entirely welcome, the burden of proof 
that a "penny increase" in the state sales tax was wise or essential 
definitely was upon Atkinson. Bellmon not only created doubt that a tax 
increase was needed, but he supplied more exanples of Democratic mis­
management during the campaign to dramatize his position on this issue. 
This not only further established Bellmon as the "fresh breeze" and as 
the man who will "give us our money's worth," but it also lent substance 
to his contention that a more competitive political system would bring 
many advantages to Oklahoma. Atkinson, on the other hand, was made to 
suffer the bioint of all the ills that flowed from the Democrats' fifty- 
five-year control of the statehouse, a disadvantage that was less onerous 
upon Senator Monroney and the candidates for the secondary offices. Such 
"against" votes often are directed at the office of the governor. The 
Democrats tried to overcome the natural opposition to the sales tax in­
crease by citing to the important voting blocs the advantages that would 
accrue to them from the approximate $30,000,000 annual increase in state
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revenues that the tax increase vould produce. But the claims upon the 
members of most of the voting blocs were contradictory and their votes 
were sharply divided. To many voters subjected to contradictory claims, 
Bellmon'8 personality and his good government appeal probably tipped 
the scales in his favor.
7) Organizationally, the Republicans were much stronger and the Demo­
crats weaker than in previous years. As state chairman of the Republican 
party from I96O until I962, Bellmon had reorganized and revitalized the 
party. He had infused much new and younger blood into the organization, 
eradicated some of the defeatist attitude that had beset some of the old 
hands in the party, made the party somewhat less dependent financially 
upon the Tulsa group that bad dominated the party for so many years, and 
by his own personality had generated much enthusiasm for his candidacy 
among his followers. Republican party moraü.e generally was high in the 
1962 cauopaign, while that of the Democratic party was not too high. The 
Democratic party had suffered a series of party splits of vanying degrees 
of intensity since 1950, culminating in the serious urban-rural split of 
1959 and i960. Atkinson himself failed to generate any surge of enthusiasm 
for his candidacy aunong the Democrats, and his proposed sales tauc increase 
cost him the all-out support of many Democratic state legislators and 
"took the wind out of the sails" of many Democratic precinct workers. In 
the words of Democratic State Chairman Gene McGill following the election, 
"When the precinct workers heard every third or fourth person they called 
upon say they would not vote for a candidate who wanted to raise taxes, 
it took the wind out of their s a i l s - T h e  state legislators hesitated
^Interview with Gene McGill, I962 state chairman of the Demo­
cratic party, November 23, 1962.
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to identify themselves too closely with the head of the ticket because 
they felt that the tax increase was unpopular in their districts.
These were the principal reasons for the Bellmon victory and the 
Atkinson defeat, as found in this study.
The major question remaining is: What do the Bellmon victory
and the three recent Republican presidential victories signify as to the 
future of Oklahoma politics?
Three possible answers suggest themselves: (l) a major voting
realignment is taking place in Oklahoma, with more voters becoming 
Republican; (2) party barriers or loyalties are breaking down, with more 
voters becoming political independents; or (3) there have been specific 
causes that motivated many Oklahoma Democrats to switch their votes in 
these four elections; with these causes removed, the normal Democratic 
majority will reassert itself.
As to a voter realignment, unquestionably there has been a 
gnawing away at the margin of Democratic superiority in Oklahoma since 
19^2, the result of a conservative trend based in large part upon re­
sistance to heavier taxes and inflation and upon frustrations over the 
Korean war and the cold war. However, according to the numerous indices 
employed in Chapter IV, Oklahoma still must be classified as a "one- 
party predominant state" or as a "modified one-party state." Recent 
election results are more confusing than enlightening with respect to 
the question of voter realignment. In the senatorial races since 1950, 
Republican strength appears to have levelled off at 44 per cent of the 
vote; Republican senatorial candidates received 45.1 per cent in 1950, 
43.6 in 1954, 44.6 in 1956, and 44.6 in i960. In the presidential races. 
Republican nominees have received an average of 56.2 per cent in the
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three contests since 1952. But, sandwiched between these Republican 
presidential victories were two resounding Democratic gubernatorial 
victories I Gary received a $8.6 per cent majority in 195^ and Edmond­
son a 74.1 per cent majority in 1958.
It is these contradictory election results that apparently 
has given rise to the thesis that party barriers or loyalties are 
breaking down. It is not that thousands of Democrats have switched 
their votes to Republican candidates while retaining their Democratic 
loyalties, according to this thesis; rather, many voters have become 
political independents or political neutrals and their vote is being 
determined by other than party considerations. A partial answer to 
this thesis was given earlier in the chapter. A further answer is that, 
when each of the four recent Republican victories is analyzed, specific 
causes that motivated thousands of Democrats to switch their votes can 
be found.
The University of Michi^n Survey Research Center found that 
the 1952 and 1956 Republican presidential victories constituted "deviating 
elections" for the nation as a whole. A "deviating election" was defined 
as one in which a sufficient number of voters ignore their normal party 
allegiances tençorarily to elect the candidate of the opposing party.
Such an election is unlike a "realigning election," in which the popular 
feeling associated with the election is so intense as to cause a change 
in the basic allegiances of a portion of the electorate.? The Research 
Center found that a majority of the national electorate was Democratic 
in its party allegiance in 1952 and remained so through both Eisenhower
?CaBÇ)bell, The American Voter, pp. 531-534.
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terms. The Center's writers reported:®
General Elsenhower attracted the votes of several million people 
from the ranks of the Democrats and the young and previously in­
active voters without thereby effecting any substantial reorientation 
in their attitudes regarding peurties, and with only partial agree­
ment from them with the Republican position on issues. . . .
It was found that many voters did not see Eisenhower as a "real Republican,"
but rather as a candidate who TTas above political parties. Only five per
cent of the national sample of persons interviewed by the Research Center
said they liked Ike because he was a Republican; they liked Ike primarily
because they thought that he, personally, could do something about the
unpopular Korean war in particular and about the cold war in general.9
The Democratic congressional victories from 195^ through 196O indicate
further that the electorate was voting for Eisenhower personally and not
for the Republican party and its principles in the 1950's. This was the
case nationally, and there is little reason to doubt that it also was the
case in Oklahona.
But Eisenhower was elected by a Democratic switch vote, not by a 
so-called non-party vote, according to the Research Center. The Center 
found that the nation's normal Democratic majority reasserted itself by 
electing John F. Kennedy in i960. This was termed a "reinstating 
election," defined as an election in which the political peurty enjoying 
a majority of party identifiers returns to p o w e r . T h a t  a majority of 
the national electorate retained its Democratic allegiance through the 
Eisenhower terms is shown by the fact that more than fifty per cent of 
the national sample of persons interviewed by the Center prior to the
^Campbell, The Voter Decides, p. Ijh. ^IbM., pp. 57-58* 
^^Converse, op. cit., p. 280.
366
i960 election said they were pro-Democratic. The Center placed the 
"realistic voting strength" of the Democratic party at 53 to 5^ per 
cent in 1960. ^  A major reason why Kennedy received only 50.08 per 
cent of the vote was found to be his Catholicism.^^ This was especially 
true in overwhelmingly Protestant Oklahoma. It was shown in Table ik 
that the Democratic percentage of the vote for President in Oklahoma has 
exceeded that in the nation as a whole in every election except the two 
in which Catholic nominees have represented the Democratic party. The 
religious factor alone appears sufficient to explain the I960 Republican 
presidential victory in Oklahoma^ but it will be recalled slLs o  that the 
Democratic party was badly split in advance of the 196O election. The 
vote on the Edmondson petitions was held about six weeks prior to that 
election, and the fact that Edmondson was supporting Kennedy did not 
help the Kennedy cause in the rural areas. It appears that the factors 
which motivated Democrats to switch their votes in 196O were stronger 
in Oklahoma than in the rest of the nation. For Oklahcma, this was 
another deviating election.
Bellmon*s I962 gubernatorial victory resulted from a combination 
of factors that was highly fortuitous for the Republican candidate : many
rural Democrats were highly motivated to switch their votes to the Re­
publican nominee in protest against Gary's defeat and efforts to reduce 
rural influence in state affairs at the same time that nearly all Re­
publicans and some Democrats were motivated to vote Republican in protest 
against Democratic mismanagement of state affairs. The issue of the sales 
tax increase and candidate personalities were other factors that contributed
11
Ibid., p. 27k. ^^Ibid., p. 280.
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to Democratic switch voting.
There was extensive switch voting in Oklahoma both in 193° sincL 
in 1962— by Republicans in the former year and by Democrats in the latter. 
But there were specific motivations that explain the switch voting in 
both years, as there were in the 1952, 1956, and I960 presidential 
elections. These have not been elections for which no explanation 
exists other than that the voters see no differences between the parties 
or that their party ties have weakened greatly. No positive support was 
found for either of these contentions
The switch voting that occurred from 1950 through I962 was not 
a new or unusual phenomenon for Oklahoma. The decade of the 1920's was 
another period of Republican victories attributable to Democratic switch 
voting, and the causes of the switch voting in the two periods are not 
too dissimilar. In the 1920's there were severe Democratic party splits 
brought on by the Gtore-Fferris feud and the Jack Walton candidacy; post­
war disillusionment and the reaction against American entry into the 
League of Nations; and the Catholicism and prohibition repeal stand of 
the 1928 Democratic nominee.
But there is this important difference in the Oklahoma political 
situation as between 1928 and 1962: whatever political gains the Republi­
cans made in the 1920's were eradicated quickly by the Great Depression 
that began in 1929; a similar reversal of Republican gains was not in 
prospect in 1962. There are, on the other hand, one or two trends that 
auger well for continued Republican growth. Present population trends 
within Oklahoma appear favorable to the Republicans; Table 10 showed that 
seventeen of the twenty-three counties that lost more than twenty per
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cent of their populations between 1950 and I96O were strongly Democratic 
counties. Further, most of the population losses have resulted from 
young persons leaving to seek better job opportunities out of state or 
in the more populous areas of Oklahoma. Since young persons are among 
the groups known to have the weakest political party ties,^^ their 
movement to less preponderantly Democratic areas may prove to be a 
factor favorable to the Republicans. Though Oklahoma's infant urban­
ization movement has not had great political impact as yet, in time it 
may; most of the populous centers are in the Republican areas of the 
state. And, additioneüJLy, if the recent Republican victories should 
prompt any considerable number of Republicans-registered-as-Democrats 
to chemge their voter registrations, as Uhiversity of Oklahoma football 
coach Bud Wilkinson did when he announced his candidacy for the United 
States senate in 196b on the Republican ticket, this would do more to 
assure continued Republican growth than anything that has occurred to 
date. It not only would increase interest in Republican primaries and 
Republican affairs generally, but it would provide a much larger pool 
of talent from which the Republicans could draw more and better qualified 
candidates for office.
Among recent developments favorable to the Democrats is that the 
accession of lyndon Johnson to the presidency has removed one source of 
dissatisfaction with the national Democratic party. If legislative re­
apportionment is settled by court order, as it appears that it might be, 
the vestiges of Oklahomans for Local. Government influence probably will 
disappear and the Democratic party's urban-rural split probably will heal.
^3caimpbell, The American Voter, pp. I60-I65.
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The fact that niral chanqjion Gary lost the three-cornered 1964 Democratic 
senatorial primary to urban-progressive candidates Edmondson and Fred R. 
Harris may indicate that some rural Democrats already have become more 
moderate in their views. However, the fact that Edmondson was the in­
cumbent and that this was a senatorial rather than gubernatorial contest 
were factors here; Gary could not promise to build more highways or to 
balance the state budget as a senatorial candidate.
Most signs seem to indicate that Oklahoma will have a somewhat 
more competitive politics in the future than it has had throughout most 
of its history. But a two-party system has not developed as yet. The 
answer as to whether Republican gains will be sufficient to bring about 
a two-party system should not be too long in coming.
APPENDIX
Because there appears to be no complete list of Oklahoma Demo­
cratic and Republican state chairmen and national committeemen anyvhere 
available^ their names, home towns, occupations, and dates of tenure 
since 1907 are recorded here for the benefit of the future historian 
of Oklahoma politics. The names of the party officials are listed 
according to the chronology of their tenures. In order to preserve the 
chronology, occasional names are repeated where succeeding terms were 
not served consecutively.
Democratic National Committeemen
R. A. Billups, Cordell, lawyer and county judge, 1907-1908.
W. T. Brady, Tulsa, hotel operator, 1908-I912.
Robert Galbreath, Tulsa, Oklahmna's first oil millionaire, I912-I916. 
Tom Wade, Marlow, bank president, 1916-I920.
George L. Bowman, Kingfisher, lawyer, 1920-1924.
Scott Perris, Lawton, Pauls Valley, and Oklahoma City, congressman- 
financier-office building operator, 1924-19^0.
Robert S. Kerr, Ada, lawyer-oilman, 1940-1948.
Elmer Barber, Shawnee, bank president, 1948-1950.
William Doenges, Bartlesville, automobile dealcr-oilman, I95O-I956. 
James Arrington, Stillwater and Oklahoma City, real estate and oil,
1956-1964.
Democratic State Chairmen
Joseph B. Thompson, Pauls Valley, lawyer-congressman, I907-I9IO. 
Pred P. Branson, Muskogee, lawyer-Judge, I9IO-I912.
Tom Barrill. Wagoner, bank president, 1912-1914.
Alger Melton, Chickasha, lawyer, 1914-1918.
370
371
Ben F. Lafayette, Checotah, merchant and cotton gin owner, 1918-1922. 
Ed L. Semans, Oklahoma City, insurance and real estate, 1922-1924. 
Robert L. Davidson, Tulsa, lawyer-state senator, 1924-1926.
George D. Key, Oklahoma City, lawyer and toll bridge owner, 1926-1930. 
Samuel W. Hayes, Oklahoma City, supreme court justice, 1930-1932»
R. M. McCool, Tishomingo, college president, 1932-1934.
J. B. Moore, Ardmore, lawyer, 1934-1936.
Sam Battles, McAlester, book company representative, 1936-1938.
France Paris, Tulsa, merchant-banker, 1938-1943»
George D. Key, 1943-1944.
Harrington Wimberly, Altus, newspaper publisher, 1944-1946.
H. I. Hinds, Tahlequah, merchant-state legislator, 1946-1948.
James Arrington, Stillwater, real estate-oil, 1948-1952.
Smith Hester, Purcell, lawyer-oilman, 1952-1956.
Loyd Benefield, Chickasha, lawyer, 1956-1959»
Gene McGill, Alva, rancher, 1959-1964.
Smith Hester, 1964-
Republican National Committeemen
Cassius M. Cade, Shawnee, royalties and leases, 1907-1912.
James A. Harris, Wagoner, merchant-real estate-oil, 1912-I916.
James J. McGraw, Ponca City and Tulsa, bank president-oilman, I916-I92O. 
Jake L. Hamon, Ardmore, oilman, 192O.
James A. Harris, 1920-1924.
W. G. Skelly, Tulsa, oilman, 1924-1940.
Lew Wentz, Ponca City, oilman, 1940-1949.
Bailie Vinson, Tulsa, oil field supplies and equipment, 1949-1956.
Reuben Sparks, Woodward, lawyer-rancher, I956-I960.
John Tyler, Bartlesville, cement and oil, I960-I964.
Republican State Chairmen
Jake L. Hamon, Ardmore, oilman, 1907-1908.
Joseph Norris, Guthrie, Indian inspector, I908-I9IO.
James A. Harris, Wagoner, merchant-oilman, 191O-I912.
Arthur H. Geissler, Oklahoma City, lawyer-foreign diplomat, I912-I918. 
Vernon Whiting, Pawhuska, lawyer-real estate, I918-I92O.
James A. Harris, I92O.
A. C. Alexander, Oklahoma City, internal revenue collector, I92O-I926. 
Byron D. Shear, (Htlahoma City, lawyer, I926-I928.
Frank A. Parkinson, Enid, automobile agency owner, I928-I929»
Fred C. Clarke, Oklahoma City, insurance broker, 1929-1932.
Charles C. Hawk, Shawnee, businessman, 1932-1936.
W. G. Johnston, Oklahoma City, postmaster, 1936-1938.
Tom R. Blaine, Enid, lawyer, I938-I942.
C. R. Nixon, Tulsa, lawyer-state legislator, 1942-1946.
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Carl Morgan, Guthrie, lawyer-state legislator, 1946-1$48.
C. E. Barnes, Oklahoma City, lawyer, 1948-1950.
Floyd Carrier, Carrier, merchant-state legislator, 1950-1954. 
Douglas McKeever, Enid, lawyer, 1954-1956.
Walter E. Curry, Oklahoma City, oilman, 1956-1957- 
Carl Morgan, 1957-1958.
John Tyler, Bartlesville, cement and oil, I958-I960.
Henry Bellmon, Red Rock, farmer, I96O-I962.
Forrest Beall, Ifeish, farmer-editor-professor, I962-I963. 
William Burkett, Woodward, lawyer-state legislator, I963-
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